

International migration: local conditions and effects

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Tessa Savvidis (Hg.)

**INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
Local Conditions and Effects**

3/2009 **Freie Universität Berlin**

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Tessa Savvidis (Hg.)

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
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PREFACE

The present issue of the *Working Papers* published by the Department of Sociology of the Institute for Eastern European Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin contains preliminary results of the international research project *Comparing Out-Migration from Armenia and Georgia* (ArGeMi), funded by Volkswagen-Stiftung for the 2008-2010 period. Two introductory chapters provide an overview on the topic of international migration and on the aims of the research project. Three reports explore causes, processes and effects of out-migration from Armenia and Georgia to Moscow which is the most relevant destination of migrants from the South Caucasus. The issue also contains a comprehensive bibliography on out-migration from Armenia and Georgia and immigration to Russia.

The guiding idea of the descriptions and explanations is the necessity to analyze international migration from the perspective of both the countries of origin and the countries of immigration. This balanced approach is further elaborated by taking into account the variety of macro-, meso-, and micro-social determinants of international migration and its consequences. This two-tiered explanatory model offers fresh insights into the interplay of economic, political and cultural factors and effects of migration. In addition, it makes it possible to systematically study acting individuals together with economic organizations, political institutions and other collective actors involved in the international migration. Following this complexity of the

guiding conceptual approach, the reports discuss the historical background and the present day conditions of migration, provide statistical information from national and international sources, review legal regulations and results of scientific studies.

The bibliography at the end of this publication includes literature from periodicals (both printed and online editions), monographs, results of representative surveys and case studies. The bibliography will be updated and can be downloaded from website of the project

http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/soziologie/forschung/ArGeMi/Links_Bibliography.html

The papers included in the present publication are products of an international cooperation involving Prof. Dr. G. Poghosyan from the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan; Dr. I. Badurashvili from the Georgian Centre of Population Research, Tbilisi; Prof. Dr. G. I. Osadčaya and Prof. Dr. T. N. Yudina from the Russian State Social University, Moscow; Prof. N. Genov (Head of Project), Dr. T. Savvidis and Dr. M. Bojadžijev from the Institute for Eastern European Studies of the Free University Berlin. Paul Becker and Kristin Mehnert provide technical assistance to the Project. Special thanks of the research team go to Volkswagen-Stiftung and to the Freie Universität Berlin for the financial and organizational support to the ArGeMi research project.

LABOUR FOR SALE IN THE GLOBAL MARKET

Nikolai Genov

The statement “labour is not a commodity” was a cornerstone in the Eastern European ideology, politics and social sciences before 1989. The background was the interpretation of labour as commodity under capitalism. This interpretation was introduced by Marx in his early writings (cf. Marx 1847). Under the conditions of socialism the situation was supposed to be radically different. Labour was defined as free of commodification since the means of production were widely socialized (state owned). Economy was thus dominated by plan and not by market. There was officially no labour market and labour had no market price.

At first glance, the statement and the explanations were correct. Wages and salaries were in fact determined by administrative decisions and not by the market equilibrium of demand and supply of labour. However, a closer look at the realities in the state socialist societies reveals a controversial situation. Millions of peasants moved voluntarily from the rural areas to the emerging industrial agglomerations because of one major reason: the remuneration of industrial work was higher than the work in the agricultural cooperatives. Thus, peasants moved to towns because they could receive a better price by selling their labour force in the industrial enterprises.

After the first phase of industrialization was over, the deficits in the supply of labour force became chronic in most eastern European societies. Directors of industrial enterprises tried to cope with the deficiencies of the socialist labour organization and the lack of motivation for work. They tended to overstaff their factories by offering benefits to attract workers from other factories. Salaries and wages were generally kept low by administrative means but there was some space for bargaining concerning remuneration and other benefits. The workers did their best to sell their labour force under better terms of trade like payments, lower pension age, facilities for child care, etc. and massively fluctuated from factory to factory.¹ There was an administratively regulated international labour market in the former socialist

societies as well. Vietnamese, Cuban and Angolan workers voluntarily went to work in Eastern Europe for better pay. Thus, the reality was inherently controversial under state socialism. It did not function according to ideological and political assumptions. To the contrary, the state socialist societies were increasingly moving away from the imaginary situation in which the labour had to be free of commodification. It became clear for everybody that the ideological slogan “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” could not be practically materialized. The attempt to develop a convincing alternative to the efficiency of motivation and allocation of labour force under market conditions could not survive for long.

The rigid administrative regulations of the eastern European labour markets disappeared together with the rapid political changes after 1989. The population in the region reacted quickly. Only in the course of days thousands and later millions of Eastern Europeans joined the millions of international migrants offering their labour in the markets all over the world. No protectionist barriers in Western Europe and North America could stop them. When struggling with difficulties in their adaptation to the economy, politics and culture in the host countries, eastern European migrants practically experienced and continue to experience the fact that the labour market is the least globalized one as compared to the markets of goods, services and the financial markets.

The conditions for labour migration substantially improved after the accession of ten Eastern European countries to the European Union. The larger part of the former “second world” remains, however, outside of the common European labour market. It is actually not fully open to the newcomers, too. Still, there are not too many other destinations in the world, in which the Eastern European labour migrants could try to make their dreams come true. On the global scale there are only few impressive examples of societies which substantially profited from the international migration of labour:²

Table 1:

**Major destinations of international migration
(in percentage of migrants in the country's population, 2005)**

Country	Millions immigrants	In percentage of the population
United Arab Emirates	3.2	71.4
Israel	2.7	39.6
Saudi Arabia	6.3	25.9
Australia	4.1	20.3
Canada	6.1	18.9
USA	38.4	12.9
Germany	10.1	12.3
Russian Federation	12.1	8.4

Twenty years after the start of the East European transformations the effects of the out-migration from the region are spectacular. The lifting of administrative restrictions for international movement of labour resulted in a net loss of one-third of the population in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. Millions of migrants left Poland, Romania and Ukraine for some time or forever. Some 80% of them or more are

assumed to have joined international migration in search for employment. The economically motivated out-migration from Eastern European countries still continues and will continue in the foreseeable future. The long lasting effect is the net loss of population. Some new member states of the European Union are particularly affected by emigration:³

Table 2:

**Net migration projections for the Eastern European members of the EU
(in thousands)**

Country	2006 to 2010	2011 to 2015	2016 to 2020
Bulgaria	-58.3	-77.1	-83.1
Czech Republic	16.9	-10.2	22.0
Estonia	-9.9	-13.5	-7.2
Hungary	69.3	33.1	52.2
Latvia	-12.6	-22.1	-11.7
Lithuania	-29.5	-35.1	-18.7
Poland	-158.7	-277.3	-153.7
Romania	-68.4	-168.6	-226.5
Slovakia	-11.9	-13.7	-2.8
Slovenia	30.1	18.7	22.8

Thus East Europeans became involved in social processes which challenge social theory and social policies all over the world. For social sciences, the major issue is rooted in the complexity of the out-migration and immigration processes which "create whole new ways of linking labour-exporting and labour-importing countries" (Sassen 2007, 141). These links and processes are determined by multiple interconnected factors and fluctuate substantially in the course of time. It is difficult

to analytically specify the lines of determination and their effects. Only tentatively, some elements of international migration could be identified in relative isolation and related to theoretical explanatory models. An all-encompassing explanatory scheme concerning the phenomenon in general or concerning international labour migration in particular does not exist so far. This unsatisfactory situation will probably continue in the foreseeable future despite the fact that the

classical “push-and-pull” conceptual scheme has been successfully used for long. However, if the analysis and the search for explanations would go deeply enough, it turns out that there is a large variety of push and pull factors interacting at various structural levels and with largely varying intensity. There are other more or less elaborated conceptual schemes which could be used for explaining this variety of the specific push and pull processes. Some of these explanatory schemes concerning emigration/ immigration of labour could be briefly and selectively summarized as follows:

Macro-social dimensions of the international migration of labour:

- Of economic nature

- *International cleavages between national labour markets*
- *Segmented national labour markets*

- Of political nature

- *Open policies or isolationism at national level*
- *Supranational policies*

- Of cultural nature

- *Compatibility of value-normative systems*
- *Compatibility of communication means (language)*



Meso-social dimensions and conceptual schemes:

- Of economic nature

- *Economic actors facilitating or hindering international migration*

- Of political nature

- *Political and civil actors facilitating or hindering international migration*

- Of cultural nature

- *Cultural actors facilitating or hindering the adaptation of migrants*



Micro-social dimensions and conceptual schemes:

- Of economic nature

- *Rational choice calculation of gains and losses of migration*

- Of political nature

- *Balancing personal interests and social responsibilities*

- Of cultural nature

- *Dynamics of socializations*

Thus, the efforts to develop and apply explanatory models are facing a large variety of individuals' orientations, decisions and actions determined by multiple contingencies. One may focus on the concept of cultural preferences or on the rational choice among alternatives in the attempt to explain the relative importance of push and pull factors influencing personal decisions to leave the home country and to choose a country of destination. This might be done in the search for jobs or better pay, for economic and political security, for better professional development and realization, for a better future for the children etc. As seen from a macro-social point of view, one may focus on the segmentation of national labour markets or on the centre-periphery relationships in economic, political and cultural terms. In addition, serious theoretical and empirical research is possible and needed in order to precisely establish and explain the implications of emigration for the societies of origin or for the host societies. Labour emigration diminishes economic and political tensions and conflicts due to mass unemployment in the societies of origin of migrants but usually deprives these societies of their most active labour force.


Taking another vantage point, one has to precisely calculate the relevance of remittances from labour migrants for the mere survival of their families left in the countries of origin as well as for the stabilization and development of their national economies. As seen from still another angle, one has to include in the explanatory model the probability of return of labour migrants to their countries of origin together with the accumulated capital, work experience, cultural enrichment etc. A special research field having policy relevance concerns the social-structural situation and behavioural patterns of labour migrants in the host country. The task to reach precise description and explanation of the immigration processes is in itself multidimensional enough. The labour markets in the host countries might have large niches for newcomers or might be saturated with all types of labour. In addition, the population of the host country might be basically tolerant to newcomers. But it is also possible that deeply rooted attitudes of hostility towards foreigners in general and labour migrants in particular are widespread. The latter attitudes might be strong even in the case that all rational arguments support the thesis that

immigrants take jobs which the locals would not take, that the immigrants substantially contribute to the GDP growth and do not misuse the social security system at all.

This large variety of approaches, interpretations, cognitive results and policy orientations is possible and necessary since the very process of international migration is rather complex and complicated in motivations, actions and effects at various structural levels of society:

Figure 1:

Factors, processes and effects of international labour migration⁴



The complexity and the dynamics of these processes are exemplified below with the cases of mass labour out-migration from Poland and

with the immigration of labour into the Russian Federation.

1: Labour Out-migration from Eastern Europe: The Polish Case

There is one striking problem in the research on labour out-migration from the Eastern European societies. The phenomenon of out-migration is very well known for scientists, politicians and the general public in the region. One may identify causes and effects of out-migration in all walks of social life there. However, it is extremely difficult to analyze the phenomenon in precise

terms. According to the *Polish Central Statistical Office*, 35,480 persons emigrated from Poland in 2007. The major destinations for emigration were Germany and the United Kingdom. Nearly one third of the registered emigrants (13,771 persons) moved their permanent residence to Germany and 9,156 to the United Kingdom.⁵ This is well proved information but the numbers do not correspond

at all to the real level of out-migration or labour migration from Poland to Germany or to the United Kingdom. The reason is rather simple since only declared emigration is registered. Millions of Polish citizens have left Poland after 1989 for years without registering their emigration. Many of them still have a registered residence in Poland where they return from time to time. In practical terms they are emigrants and many of them have no intention to return to Poland indeed. However, in statistical terms they are not counted as emigrants by the Polish statistical office.

The registration of travels from Poland to other countries would not bring the researcher closer to the real numbers of out-migration, immigration and emigration in the Polish case. Many Poles travel many times per year abroad without the intention to join the Polish labour migrants abroad.

This holds true for people practicing cross-border trade or for business people. The information about labour permissions for Poles in other countries is also misleading. It is well known that Polish labour migrants often start working in the shadow economy in the host countries and then try to legalize their jobs. However, some of them remain working in the shadow economy for long and remain statistically unregistered as residents of the host country. Thus, statistical information about out-migration from Poland is basically unreliable. Even in best cases it is the product of estimations based on available partial statistical data. This is the way in which the following data focusing on 'temporary migrants from Poland' were collected by the Polish Central Statistical Office and should be interpreted (cf. Kaczmarczyk & Okólski 2008, 603):

Table 3:

**The stock of temporary migrants from Poland, by major destination countries
(in thousands)**

Destination	May 2002	January 2005	January 2007	January 2008
Total	786	1000	1950	2270
European Union	451	750	1550	1860
Austria	11	15	34	39
Belgium	14	13	28	31
France	21	30	49	55
Germany	294	385	450	490
Ireland	2	15	120	200
Italy	39	59	85	87
Netherlands	10	23	55	98
Spain	14	26	44	80
Sweden	6	11	25	27
United Kingdom	24	150	580	690

This large-scale out-migration of the Polish population in the recent years is a historically unique phenomenon. It has no precedence in the long history of out-migration from Poland which is one of the best-known emigration countries in Europe and even world-wide. How do we explain the process? More precisely, how do we apply the typologies introduced above for the purposes of multidimensional explanations?

The **macro-social dimensions** of the explanatory model should cover the substantial cleavages of incomes in Poland and in the EU core countries presented in Table 1. The salaries and wages in Poland are still at the level of three to four times lower than the average remuneration in comparable branches in the EU-15. The major determining factor of these cleavages is the low productivity of labour in the Polish industry and

particularly in Polish agriculture which is still marked by elements of a subsistence-type economy. Thus, mass labour out-migration is an escape from the low productivity/ low income national economy. The open question concerns the extent to which the out-migration lowers the tensions on the labour market and contributes to the faster rationalization of labour relations. In broader terms, the question concerns the facilitating or hindering impacts of out-migration on the modernization of Polish economy. Another explanatory line in this context concerns the predictable movement of labour force from the low productive periphery to the higher productivity and higher incomes in the economic centre of the supranational integration scheme of the European Union. This flow of labour is possible and economically necessary due to the segmentation of the labour markets both in the countries belonging to the centre of the supranational European integration and in the framework of the supranational integration itself. Polish migrants use to fill in niches in the lower segment of occupations taking jobs which are unattractive for the locals in the economic centre of the European Union.

Major explanatory models for the mass out-migration from Poland are of macro-political nature. Although Poland was a typical land of emigration already during the 1980s, there were substantial political barriers hindering mass emigration from the country at that time. After the political changes the out-migration from Poland to the European Union countries reached a peak in the first half of the 1990s and then declined due to political restrictions on the part of the then member states of the Union. The political decision for the membership of Poland in the Union in 2004 opened the access for Polish labour force to the labour markets of only three EU-15 member states at the beginning – Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom. The effects of these political decisions were truly spectacular. From May 2004 until January 2008, the number of Polish immigrants (conditionally called 'temporary migrants') increased by 4.5 times in Sweden, by 29 times in the United Kingdom, and by 100 times in Ireland. Particularly the latter case is a sound confirmation of the mingling of economic and political variables influencing migration processes. Exactly the same holds true in the reverse sense concerning the restrictive labour market policies of Germany. It

will take time to make a precise judgment about the effects of this policy. In preliminary terms, it is questioned by German authors (cf. Becker 2007, 2). Seen from the point of view of the political impact of the mass out-flow of labour force from Poland on the Polish domestic politics, the stabilizing impact seems to predominate. It has two sides. The first concerns the decreasing pressure on the Polish labour market due to out-migration of labour force and the ensuing decline of unemployment. The second side concerns the stabilization of attitudes supporting the European integration of the country.

There are some isolated efforts to explain the unique rise of Polish out-migration towards Ireland by referring to the value-normative proximity of both societies. Certainly, Poland and Ireland have strong Catholic traditions in common. However, observers also noticed the large increase of Polish labour migrants to the protestant British and Swedish societies. The explanation should probably take the religious element into account, but the political decisions to open the labour markets of the three countries to Polish migrants was not particularly influenced by denominational considerations. As seen from another point of view, the slow increase of the number of Polish migrants to Germany is mostly due to the restrictive politics of the German government. One should take one more cultural variable into account, however. A major cultural change also influenced the replacement of Germany as a major destination for Polish labour migrants by Great Britain. The study of English in Polish schools and universities is in a long-term rise mostly at the expense of the studies of German language.

At the **meso-social** level one may search for explanation of the rapid increase of the number of Polish migrants to the EU countries in the explosive rise of the number and in the range of activities of economic actors facilitating and supporting out-migration from Poland. Numerous agencies in Poland and in the host countries serve the search for jobs for the would-be labour migrants from Poland. Travel agencies serve their transportation to the host country of labour migration and back to Poland. Low fare flight companies like Ryanair or EasyJet make convenient flight transportation economically affordable for many. Indeed, the serving of labour migrants heading from Poland

to the United Kingdom and Ireland became a truly booming industry after May 2004. In the major host countries of Polish labour migrants there are already well established banking and other services offered in Polish. Shopping, medical and dental services, educational facilities etc. are largely offered in Ireland and in the United Kingdom by Polish migrants. They have developed networks for services tailored according to the habits and incomes of their migrant compatriots.

The EU enlargement to Eastern Europe in general and the accession of Poland to the EU in particular was and remains an important issue on the political agenda both in Poland and in the countries of the former EU-15. Most local political actors in the countries of the 'old' EU try to support a positive attitude in their population to the migrants from Poland. Part of the social policies in the 'old' EU contains special attention to the social and educational integration of the labour migrants from the new EU member states. Local governments have the task to implement these policies in organizational details. Since the adaptation of migrants is already seen as a social and not just personal problem, non-profit organizations, philanthropic foundations, church facilities and various clubs support the adaptation of Polish migrants to the economy, politics and culture of the host countries in Western Europe. An increasing number of cultural and social associations of migrants of Polish origin facilitate their networking and particularly the adaptation of the newcomers from Poland.

The explanatory model of the 'homo oeconomicus' is certainly of particular relevance in approaching the **micro-social dimensions** of the out-migration of labour from Poland. Due to the long tradition of emigration or due to first-hand information from friends and relatives working abroad, people in Poland are on average well aware of the gains and losses of potential labour migration or emigration. The vagaries of migration notwithstanding, potential migrants try to decide for or against out-migration on the basis of rational choice principles. Currently this is more and more possible due to improving public information systems. Economic actors and informal networks in Poland and in the countries of destination support the rational decision in favour of out-migration or in favour of the decision to stay

in Poland. Rational decisions are facilitated by the very fact that in most cases the motivation for out-migration or emigration is most often exclusively of economic nature. Highly emotional religious, political or other factors only exceptionally guide the decisions to emigrate or not.

This is not supposed to mean that the decisions to emigrate or to stay at home have become easily explainable. According to a national representative public opinion poll conducted in March 2007, by the *Centre for Research on Public Opinion* located in Warsaw, only 10% of the working-age Poles nation-wide have worked abroad during the ten years before the poll despite the strong Polish migration tradition, the open borders in the European Union or the unsatisfied material needs of millions of Polish households.⁶ Obviously, the decision in favour of out-migration is not easy since it includes a difficult balancing between personal interests and social responsibilities, mostly in terms of responsibility for the family. At the first glance, the best way to meet the responsibility towards the family might be the improvement of its material situation by incomes from work abroad. However, well known stories of broken families, abandoned children and neglected parents make the decision more complex and complicated.

The decision is so complex and complicated due to the fact that the adaptation to a new environment of life and work requires intensive learning. The out-migration is a new stage in the socialization of the migrant. The transition from one (at home) to another (abroad) phase of socialization might be full of uncertainties, tensions and various value-normative conflicts. This is not just a common wisdom but also a challenging everyday reality to migrants. This holds particularly true for Polish migrants who voluntarily choose or are forced by circumstances to work in the shadow economy. The difficult adaptation to the new social environment is often the background of the motivation to decide in favour of criminal activities of various kinds or to return home. The latter decision seems easy if one would not think about the reactions in the local Polish environment of the returnee. He or she is still typically regarded as a case of failure. In the Polish mass consciousness the winner is still the person who managed to successfully establish himself or herself abroad.

It is today much less a matter of state regulations but mostly a matter of personal decision to migrate, to stay in the host country or to return back to Poland. Since there are already labour deficits in some occupations in the country, the Polish state announced the Programme 'Powrót' ('Return'). It foresees a series of financial and organizational measures for the support of Polish migrants who would decide to return to Poland after having spent at least one year abroad. The measures supporting the repatriation of migrants are very much needed since the Polish society changes quickly and the re-socialization of returnees might be quite difficult in case of longer absence. Since the current financial and economic crisis will most probably press thousands of Polish migrants to return back to Poland, the programme is very timely.

All in all, it is extremely difficult to draw a clear-cut conclusion about functional and dysfunctional effects of the Polish out-migration under the conditions of re-commodification of labour in the country and in Eastern Europe in broader terms. One positive function of out-migration from Poland is undoubtedly the decrease of the conflict potentials due to the high level of unemployment. This effect might be taken for granted since unemployment in Poland has reached two peaks in 1993 with 16%, and in 2003 with 19%. Provided there were not the channels for mass out-migration, the unemployment would have been even higher and the social situation in the country could have been explosive. The effects of out-migration on the productivity are not so easy to calculate but most probably the result is also positive. The relevance of remittances for the survival or well-being of the families of labour migrants might also be taken for granted. One may assume that due to the worldwide financial and economic crisis a large number of Polish labour migrants will return to Poland together with their savings and accumulated human capital (experience in life and work) and social capital (established connections in the host

countries). This return could be supportive for the modernization of the Polish economy and society further on.

Analyzing causes and effects of out-migration from Poland one should notice that the composition of labour migrants from the country has substantially changed in the course of the years after 1989. Contrary to the situation during the 1990s, an increasing proportion of labour migrants recently consists of well educated young people. This is exactly the human capital the Polish society badly needs itself. In some areas like health care the emigration of medical doctors and nurses has already brought about substantial deficits in the Polish health care system. The deficits are not easy to overcome (cf. Krajewski-Siuda & Romaniuk 2007). The same holds true for some specialized craft services, IT specialists and other highly qualified personnel. Both the most advanced economies and the Polish economy itself will urgently need them. The best solution would be to close the cleavages of remuneration of these specialists in Poland and in the most developed economies. The process is advancing but will take time. In the meantime one may expect that the developed economies will be better served by Polish specialists than the Polish economy. As to remittances, they have been so far used for an increase of the level of wellbeing of migrants and their families, for acquisition of housing or improvement of the quality of housing. Only exceptionally remittances and the accumulated capital of returnees have been used for substantial productive investments.

Given the available information, some long-term effects of the out-migration from Poland to Western Europe are foreseeable. Polish society together with all other Eastern European societies is on the losing side with regard to the demographic development. On the contrary, the Western European societies are the winners in the competition for human capital although to a different extent from country to country:

**Population projection of selected western and eastern European countries
(2008-2055)⁷**

Country	2008	Population (millions)		Percentage change	
		With migration 2055	Without migration 2055	With migration 2055	Without migration 2055
Western Europe					
France	61.9	71.4	65.2	15.5	5.3
United Kingdom	61.3	75.6	61.4	23.5	0.3
Sweden	9.2	10.8	9.0	17.4	-2.3
Netherlands	16.4	16.7	15.5	2.0	-5.5
Spain	45.3	52.7	38.6	16.4	-14.8
Italy	59.5	60.4	46.2	1.5	-22.4
Germany	82.2	72.6	61.1	-11.6	-25.7
Eastern Europe					
Poland	38.1	32.2	31.6	-15.4	-17.1
Romania	21.4	17.6	17.2	-17.9	-19.9
Czech Republic	10.3	9.7	8.2	-6.0	-20.4
Slovenia	2.0	1.8	1.6	-9.5	-22.0
Hungary	10.0	8.9	7.8	-11.4	-22.5
Latvia	2.3	1.7	1.7	-23.0	-23.4
Bulgaria	7.6	5.7	5.6	-25.3	-27.0

The above projections for demographic development in the western and the eastern part of the EU-27 substantiate the point that the decision for EU-enlargement to the East was a

well calculated decision of the EU-15 in the long run. Many factors can influence the demographic processes in the meantime, however.

2: Immigration to Eastern Europe: The Case of the Russian Federation

The Eastern European countries introduced in Table 4 will gain few immigrants in the foreseeable future but will lose substantial parts of their population due to emigration in the long run, mostly to Western Europe. The change of the population of the Russian Federation is marked by quite different patterns due to two contradictory processes. The first one marks the losses of population. Russia lost a well educated segment of its population due to mass emigration to Germany, Israel and the United States during the 1990s (cf. Mansoor & Quillin 2007, 47). However, more relevant in the longer perspective is the fact that the population of the Federation is declining fast due to rather negative demographic


processes. The country annually loses some 700,000 of its population because of a low birth rate (11.0 per 1,000 in 2008), high mortality rate (16.0 per 1,000 in 2008) and low level of life expectancy (59.1 years for men and 73.1 years for women in 2008). As seen from the opposite point of view, the Federation is the second largest receiver of immigrants world-wide after the United States (see Table 1). However, as large as it actually is, the inflow of mostly ethnic Russians from the republics of the former Soviet Union together with all other forms of immigration cannot replace the natural loss of population of the Russian Federation. It numbered 148 millions at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and

has reached some less than 142 millions in 2008. The pessimistic projections tend to estimate the population of the Federation at about 100 millions

in 2050. Both controversial trends of population development are presented in Figure 2.⁸

Figure 2:

Net migration and population growth in the Russian Federation 1991-2008




After the tide of ethnic Russians moving to the Russian Federation in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union was over, the massive labour migration from the 'near abroad' (from the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent states, CIS) became the major source of additional labour for serving the needs of the Russian economy.

In **macro-social** terms, the economic, political and cultural reasons for the attractiveness of the Russian labour market for citizens of the former Soviet republics were and remain strong. During the last decade the Russian Federation used to have a much higher GDP per capita as compared to these countries. The economy of the country was booming due to the high revenues from the export of crude oil and natural gas. The cleavage between the level of salaries and wages in Russia

and in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia became very deep. The economic cleavage turned into a powerful pull factor attracting millions of migrant workers from these parts of the former Soviet Union to Russia. The particularly strong growth of the construction sector had to be met mostly by migrant labour since the citizens of Russia use to avoid jobs in construction. The same holds true for jobs in the communal services. As seen from the supply-side of migrant labour, due to the decline of the national economies in Central Asia and in the South Caucasus as well as due to political turbulences there, the remittances of labour migrants in the Russian Federation became crucial for the survival of the families of the migrants and even for the survival of the national economies in both regions. This is obvious particularly in the cases of Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.⁹

Figure 3:

Comparison of the GDP level per capita in PPP terms in selected post-Soviet republics with the GDP of Russia and ratio of the remittances from Russia to their national GDPs (2007, in percentage)



The macro-social political conditions for the movement of labour force from the ‘near abroad’ to the Russian Federation were and basically remain favourable. There are no visa regimes and practically no boundaries between the member-states of the CIS.¹⁰ In some cases such as Tajikistan the migration of labour force to the Russian Federation is specially facilitated by bilateral agreements at state level. After seventy years of co-existence under the umbrella of the Soviet Union there are many value-normative common grounds for mutual understanding and cooperation at the work place between citizens of the Russian Federation and labour migrants from the CIS states. Most of them still have a good command of Russian. In addition, from the beginning of 2007, the Russian state started a special programme aiming at the attraction of immigrants because of the burning demographic problems of the country. The target for 2007 was 6.5 millions registered immigrants with permission

to live and work in Russia. A special six year programme started in the same year focusing on the support for Russians from the ‘near abroad’ who would like to move to Russia.

At the **meso-social level** of relations and processes the migration of labour force from the CIS countries to the Russian Federation is largely supported by a variety of intermediary economic actors like labour agencies, transportation firms, firms for legal services etc. There are well established civic and cultural organizations of the migrants’ ethnic groups in the Russian cities. Some of these organizations have their roots already in Soviet times. Together with newly established ethnic organizations they use to actively support the adaptation of the new coming labour migrants to the local conditions in Russia.

A variety of **micro-social** factors also facilitate decisions to migrate from the South Caucasus or Central Asia especially to the Russian Federation

in search of employment. The rational calculation of gains and losses takes into account the visa regimes to all other desirable destinations, the abundant information about living and working conditions in the Russian Federation, the easy contact with networks of compatriots there and even old business or human connections with citizens of Russia as remnants from Soviet times. The socialization with the Russian conditions of life and work is in most cases not a new experience for the labour migrants who still remember schooling in Russian language and culture.

Thus, one may draw the conclusion that there should be no burning economic, political and cultural issues confronting the labour migrants from the CIS countries to the Russian Federation. The legal regulations of their stay are well developed both in terms of the international treaties ratified by the Federation and the Russian laws. A special package of laws has made the residential registration of foreigners, the legalization of their employment and their stay in Russia easier since January 2007. However, representatives of the international organization *Human Rights Watch* recently documented grave perpetrations of laws and regulations concerning the human rights of foreign workers employed in the construction industry in Russia. The issues are socially relevant since half of the labour migrants in the Russian Federation have their jobs in particular in the construction sector.

The perpetrations against legally guaranteed human rights start from the very attraction of labour force for the construction sites in the Russian federation. Both Russian and local agencies in the CIS states advertise conditions which are not observed on the spot. Transportation firms and other intermediaries use to cheat the labour migrants on their way to the construction sites in Russia. Contrary to the clear legal regulations, labour contracts are still rarely concluded between the construction firms and the migrant workers. Moreover, the concluded contracts rarely include precise definitions of the conditions of labour. The lack of clarity is intentional for the purposes

of tax evasion or evasion of liabilities for the construction firms in case of work accidents. The working conditions are very often indecent in terms of long working days, dangerous working environments and low salaries. In addition, the payment of salaries and wages is being typically delayed, not made to the full extent or in some cases they are even not paid at all. The treatment of labour migrants by their supervisors is reported to be notoriously uncivilized in many documented cases. The state institutions supposed to protect the rights of migrants typically act slowly if they act at all. Moreover, representatives of the local administration, legal institutions and the police are recorded to have abused the unclear or illegal situation of labour migrants by various forms of extortion. The options for effective complaints or resistance of the exploited, abused or even tortured migrant construction workers are rather limited (cf. Buchanan 2009).

It would be naïve to assume that illegal employment of labour migrants, their cheating and exploiting belong to the specificities of the conditions in the Russian Federation alone. All events described above do happen with migrants everyday in Western Europe and North America as well. The commodification of the labour force of migrants obeys everywhere the market rules of pursuing maximum profit and not necessarily of maximum humanism. However, the institutional conditions in the Russian Federation still allow extremes of wild capitalism. This does not apply to the treatment of migrant workers alone. In many particular cases both workers of ethnic Russian origin and labour migrants are treated badly in the same way. But the workers of foreign ethnic origin are particularly vulnerable since they are also subject of xenophobic attitudes and actions. They are well rooted in the Russian cultural and political tradition but used to be ideologically and politically suppressed in Soviet times. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly after the wars waged in the Caucasus these traditional xenophobic attitudes powerfully reappeared. Representative public opinion polls provide sobering information about that.¹¹

Table 5:

How do you relate to the fact that one may meet more and more often workers from Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldova and other countries from the 'Near Abroad' on the construction sites in Russia? (N=1600, in percentage)

Relation	1997	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Definitely in a positive way	10	11	10	8	6	7	6	6	6	6
Mostly in a positive way	15	18	17	20	16	15	15	16	14	12
In a neutral way	34	33	32	39	44	42	39	42	45	49
Mostly in a negative way	19	24	23	22	22	20	25	24	21	25
Definitely in a negative way	14	10	15	8	9	12	13	11	12	6
Difficult to say	8	4	3	3	3	4	2	1	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The global economy cannot function efficiently without the commodification of labour or without a trans-border mobility of labour. In the European Union most conditions for the legal and institutional integration of the migrant labour are already well developed. Nevertheless, migrants' work in the shadow economy and various forms of the abuse of migrant labour force are permanently on the agenda for political discussions and legal actions in the Union. The institutional framework of the Russian Federation is still far from this pattern of a social market economy. The free market economy as understood and practiced in Russia is particularly detrimental for the migrant labour which is in most cases not properly legalized, badly organized and vulnerable in every respect

of human rights. One may only hope that the growing understanding of the contribution of the migrants to the wellbeing of Russian society will strengthen the economic, legal and moral respect to this segment of the Russian labour market. This critical attitude towards the present day situation on the labour market in Russia is not based on the assumption, however, that the problems of migrant labour are exceptional in the Russian Federation. Global labour markets indeed should go through a process of civilizational upgrading. The current global financial crisis does not make the task any easier. To the contrary, the crisis has effects hindering the very much needed process of civilizational upgrading in the treatment of migrant labour worldwide.

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NOTES

¹ During the 1980s, annual labour fluctuations between 5 and 15 percent of the factory staff were regarded as normal in Eastern Europe. No administrative measures could stop the process of selling the labour force under better conditions.

² *Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision* (2005) New York: United Nations, <http://esa.un.org/migration>.

³ *EUROPE IN FIGURES – Eurostat Yearbook 2008* (2008) Brussels: European Commission, p. 75

⁴ Schematic presentation by the author

⁵ *Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2008* (2008). Warsaw: Central Statistical Office, Table 23 (195), p. 461

⁶ See *Praca Polaków za granicą* [Labour of Poles Abroad] (2007) Warszawa: CBOS, BS/40/2007

⁷ Coleman, David (2008): The Demographic Effects of International Migration in Europe. "Oxford Review of Economic Policy", Vol. 24, N 3, pp. 452-476, p. 459. Modifications by N. Genov

⁸ The primary data stem from the Goskomstat's overview on population development 2008. See http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/04-30.htm

⁹ Primary data from the World Bank: World Development Indicators Database

¹⁰ The relationships between the Russian Federation and Georgia changed abruptly after the war in South Ossetia in August 2008.

¹¹ *Obščestvennoe mnenie – 2007* [Public Opinion – 2007] (2007) Moskva: Levada-centre, Table 19.24, p. 204

COMPARING OUT-MIGRATION FROM ARMENIA AND GEORGIA TO MOSCOW:

CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF RESEARCH

Tessa Savvidis

1: Introduction

The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990 hurled the former Soviet republics into a social-economic situation they were not prepared for. The new geostrategic situation required the simultaneous implementation of profound political and economic reforms

in the affected societies, their integration into international politics and the global economy. Combined with new individual and collective liberties, such as the freedom of movement, the post-socialist conditions triggered large-scale emigration.

Figure 1:

The South Caucasus




Massive emigration as a form of individual crisis management became particularly relevant in the South Caucasus, where the combined effects of natural disasters (the earthquake in North Armenia at the end of 1988), civil wars and political crises, unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts, expulsion and flight of ethnic minorities, economic embargos together with notorious mismanagement brought about social degradation and polarisation, impoverishment and overall insecurity. Experts from the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM) describe the regional challenges

of migration in the South Caucasus as follows: “Displacement issues in the context of unresolved conflicts continue to dominate national migration agendas. This, combined with an incomplete transition to market economies, leads to high out-bound migration. High unemployment especially affects educated young people and causes many to pin their hopes on jobs in Turkey, Russia and Western Europe. Migrant community networks, already established abroad, enhance economic pull factors. While some migration is regular, most people risk irregular migration and even

trafficking.”¹² Victims of trafficking from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are predominantly women and children from socially vulnerable groups – Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees and urban poor. According to the IOM, which published its first study on trafficking from

Armenia in September 2001, there were annually about 700 women and girls, who were promised labour abroad but found themselves trapped in prostitution. 61.4% of these were transferred to neighbouring Turkey, followed by 29.5% to Dubai (cf. IOM 2001).¹³

Figure 2



The mass exodus from the South Caucasian republics started already in 1988/89. Since then, roughly one million of emigrants¹⁴ from both Armenia¹⁵ and Georgia have left their homeland seeking socially, politically and economically more stable conditions abroad. For practical reasons such as passport and visa regulations, language skills or familiarity with the way of life, the Russian Federation used to be the main destination for migrants in the 1990s and remained in that position, as a more recent household survey by the OSCE proves: 97.6% of all labour migrants (87,600-143,600 persons) from Armenia have visited Russia at least once during the period between 2002 and 2005 (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 27).

As a result of the massive emigration during the first post-Soviet decade and according to

the calculations of Armenian demographers, the average annual net migration outflow exceeded the average annual net natural population growth by more than three times (cf. Mirzakhanyan 2004, 2). Although net migration rates in Armenia and Georgia were reduced over a period of 17 years (1990 and 2007) by 40-50%, in international comparison the rates remain quite high. In 2008, Armenia is expected to experience a net migration rate of minus 4.95 per 1,000 of the population¹⁶ (2000: -9.0/1,000) and Georgia minus 4.36¹⁷ (1990: -9.2/1,000; 2,000: -5.7/1,000¹⁸), assumedly due to the economic growth in both countries. One may ask, however, if there is really an immediate and direct causal link between economic and social development. Impressive as the economic growth rates may seem, the growth itself remains relative. Not earlier than 2005, Armenia could for the first

time slightly surmount the gross national product of the late Soviet period. It is one of the aims of the ArGeMi Project to explore the inter-relation between economic and social development, keeping in mind the above mentioned relativity of the current economic growth and the general discrepancy between economic and social development.

The post-Soviet exodus from Armenia and Georgia was the largest massive emigration in the long and rich emigration history of both countries. The exodus is being perceived as a painful experience and the most challenging economic, political and cultural phenomenon. The political and scientific debates on this complex issue are highly controversial. Particularly relevant is the question whether the emigration is caused by the system transformation, by geopolitical factors or whether it is an independent process loosely linked with the opening of previously closed societies. As a working hypothesis we hold that the South Caucasian out-migration has most notably to do with the opening of societies in the South Caucasus to global processes. In more specific terms, this means opening to global markets for goods, services, investments, financial exchange and labour.

There is no widely shared view about the effects of migration on the countries of origin. International bodies generally avoid any criticism of migration as such and instead focus on aspects of mismanagement of this increasingly relevant global phenomenon. Quite typical for this position was the statement of the former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan in his address to the *UN General Assembly*. Opening the 'High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development' (September 14-15, 2006), Annan described international migration as a phenomenon "to be with us for as long as human societies continue to develop. Migration should not be stopped, but it should be better managed" (Annan, cited in: Gutcheneire & Pecoud 2006, 16). In its communication of May 16, 2007 to the *European Parliament* and others, the *Commission of the European Communities* attempted to summarize labour migration experiences of sending countries by introducing the term of 'net benefits': "Neighbouring countries [of the European Union;

TS] are experiencing the effects of both brain gain and brain drain, and the net benefits help mitigate pressures in terms of high unemployment and low income that often result from the difficulties of political and economic transition." (*Commission of the European Communities* 2007, 4)

Undoubtedly, a more specific, differentiated approach to international migration is needed. For instance, massive out-migration helped to moderate the rise of unemployment in the most critical period of the transformation of the Armenian and Georgian societies. Remittances of the migrants enabled a substantial part of the households to survive during the critical years of large-scale impoverishment. However, it is a widely shared opinion that the migrants belonged to the best-educated and most entrepreneurial parts of the population thus causing a heavy loss of national human capital. For example, between 2002 and 2005, 39.4% of Armenian labour migrants had higher or secondary special education in engineering (15.1%), construction (11.2%), social sciences (8.8%), natural sciences (2.4%) and agronomy (1.8%). (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 35)

Therefore, the causes, reasons, effects and prospects of mass migration from Armenia and Georgia urgently invite for well-focused systematic studies. It would be particularly relevant in scientific and practical terms to determine the specific national and regional features of this process, while understanding it at the same time as part and parcel of broader trends. Taking into account the above cited polls and studies about migration from the South Caucasus, the *ArGeMi Project* focuses on comparing out-migration experience and prospects in two South Caucasian societies – Armenia and Georgia – on a cross-national basis. Additionally, we are studying the experience of immigrants from these two societies in one receiving society – in the Russian Federation (Moscow). In the given context, Moscow exemplifies typical patterns of success and failure in the integration of migrants from Armenia and Georgia. The similarity of the two societies of origin, as well as that of the host society is determined by the fact that all of them went through intensive post-socialist transformations.

2: Conceptual Background

Hereafter, we shall interpret migration as a social and spatial move from one country to another for a short, medium¹⁹ or long-term²⁰ or even permanent residence. Migration is a typical strategy and practice of managing risk situations, faced by individuals and groups in the country of origin (push factors). Risks are particularly intensive in the case of an overall transformation of the society. Thus, one could expect an increase of out-migration as an effort to escape from intensified local risks in the context of opening of the borders as part and parcel of societal transformation as it happened in the post-socialist societies after 1990

(cf. Genov 1999). This escape became possible because the countries under scrutiny joined the global process of international migration after the restrictions on international travel were dropped down in the course of the third wave of democratisation. Thus, it became a realistic endeavour to rationally calculate gains and losses of legal out-migration. Since the economic arguments in favour of emigration from poor to rich societies (pull-factors) were too strong, the mass exodus from Armenia and Georgia during the 1990s has a clear explanation in terms of rational choice calculations.

Roots and Routes of Migration

The established economic, political and cultural links and transportation routes determine the destination of out-migration. Contrary to the widespread belief, the majority of migrants do not come from the most disadvantaged groups or regions in the transformation process. Studies prove that relatively better to do groups and developed regions account for the bulk of the migrants (cf. Schürkens 2005). A promising task is to prove whether there are regional, local or periodic exceptions to this rule in Armenia and Georgia.

Researchers who have their theoretical roots in modernization theory often believe that economic improvements automatically reduce the potentials for emigration. Given the figures of migration potentials in Armenia and Georgia in 2007, we assume that this correlation generally exists but its effects do not come immediately and automatically. The failing poverty reduction management and the failure to fairly distribute the benefits of economic growth are decisive determinants for a continued mass out-migration despite economic growth. Consequently, we assume that there is an important lag between the trends of economic stabilization and improvement and migration flows. In practical terms, we have to test whether and why migration from Armenia

and Georgia will persist even though economic growth in these societies is already quite visible. We also have to take into account the already mentioned difference between economic and social development.

How can international migration be managed in order to avoid or at least reduce its negative impacts? Which are the key aspects for migration management? The ArGeMi project includes research on the three areas ('three R's') of development impact of international migration, as identified by Papademetriou and Martin (1991), – recruitment, remittances and return – and the additional categorization ('six R's') by Lowell and Findlay (2002) for possible policy responses:

- Return;
- Restriction of international mobility to own nationals and foreign workers;
- Recruitment of international migrants;
- Reparation for loss of human capital (compensation);
- Re-sourcing expatriates (Diaspora options);
- Retention: through educational sector policies and through economic development.

Remittances

Migrant remittances provide a good example for the ambivalent nature of migration related issues. It is often assumed that migrant remittances form a substantial support to economically less developed societies.²¹ In fact, the volume of remittances may match or even exceed the volume of foreign direct investments in the countries under scrutiny. According to international expert estimations, in 1995-96 Armenia annually used to receive remittances of about 450 million USD. The amount was surpassing the national budget of the country. The percentage of monetary transfers by out-migrants made up approx. 60 to 65% of the sum (cf. Poghosyan 2003, 118 et seq.). Between 2002 and 2005, the amount of remittances, sent by labour migrants to their families in Armenia, decreased to an estimated annual amount of 100 million USD (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 44) due to the smaller number of migrants. In a *World Bank* study Armenia, together with Moldova, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is still counted among the four of the world's largest recipients of remittances as a proportion of GDP (cf. Mansoor & Quillin 2007, 57). Remittances really improve the balance of international payments of the state, the economic situation of households and spur domestic consumption. Remittances also constitute an important source of foreign exchange, enabling vital imports, pay off external debts and the improvement of the country's creditworthiness.

However, there are different interpretations of the impact of migrants' remittances on the countries of origin. From the 1960s until the early 1990s the generally pessimistic view predominated. It stressed the point that remittances do not promote growth but exacerbate the dependency of societies sending migrants by raising material expectations without providing a variety of means for satisfying them. Some authors used to stress the point that remittances "do nothing to convert stagnation to development" (Jacobs 1984) and "serve more as symbols of a 'squandered opportunity for development'" (Martin 1991). Meanwhile, the impressive growth due to remittances and the contribution of migrants' remittances as a source of development finance are widely recognized (cf. Alshabibi 2005, 1 et seq.; UN 2006, 13; Baruah & Cholewinski 2006, 74). But still there

remain many aspects, which demand a thorough considering.

The IOM author Bimal Gosh (2006, 95) certainly has good reason to insist on the point that remittances often have a positive development effect at household level. They may even help to develop small enterprises or to promote entrepreneurial skills if credit constraints are eased and risk insurances for rural households are provided. Remittances can contribute to the development of villages and local communities as they help to establish social facilities such as schools, hospitals, community centres, feeder roads and infrastructure projects by promoting micro-enterprises. Some caution is needed, however. Although remittances "can be a valuable source of foreign exchange and an important addition to gross national product, their overall development impact at macro-level has so far been less impressive. (...). There is hardly any causal relationship between inflows of remittances and economic performance, although they may well be correlated" (ibid, 97). Roberts and Banaian have studied for USAID the impact of remittances on development in the South Caucasus in 2004. In Armenia the Diaspora and migrants benefit from the effective international Anelik money transfer system, established in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Baltic States in 1996.

However, on a national level a high amount of remittances can have a decisive impact on the floating of currency, as the example of Armenia shows. According to the *Armenian Central Bank*, in 2007 the country's currency (Dram) gained worth of 21.62%, as compared both to the US dollar and the EU's Euro; during 2004-2007, the growth rate was even close to 60%. The *Central Bank* and the *International Monetary Fund* explain this with the high amount of remittances by the Armenian Diaspora, including migrants (an alternative or rather additional explanation would be currency speculations). The main losers of the Dram's high revaluation are again those parts of Armenia's population that depend on remittances and who are usually seen as the exploiters of remittances. Furthermore, the high revaluation negatively affects all exporters of goods in Armenia, whose trade balance deficit climbed up to 73% in 2007,

followed by a prize increase of consumer goods and natural energy.²² The example clearly indicates that an unambiguous answer to the question 'curse or blessing' is impossible. Any analytically based answer will have to take into consideration the various levels of national economies and the interaction of different variables.

In the receiving states, remittances of immigrants can become the object of xenophobic speculation and subsequently a pretext for inter-ethnic hate of immigrant communities, as it is the case with (South-) Caucasian immigrants in the Russian Federation. Under the slogan 'For Law and Order! For Russia's Glory!' the extremist *Movement against Illegal Immigration* (in

Russian: *Dviżenie Protiv Nelegal'noj Immigracii* – DPNI) agitates on its website against foreign immigrants: „The vanguard of the foreign invasion consists of descendents from Caucasian states, from Central and Southeast Asia. Every month millions of the migrant Diaspora send enormous amounts of money (more than 50 billions USD) to their homelands. The bulk of this money was obtained by speculation, drug trade and in other criminal ways. Since their families count five to ten children, in twenty years they will become the entitled overlords of the Russian land, and our few children will turn into slaves in their own homeland.”²³ We shall study such xenophobic effects both by migrant and expert interviews.

Conditions for Return Migration

We strongly question the widespread assumption of a possible mass return of emigrants²⁴ to the two scrutinized countries of origin. We assume that this type of return is and will most probably remain a rare phenomenon under normal conditions. The reason for our opinion is simple. The hesitation to return is caused by risks facing the returnees in an environment, which has considerably changed since their emigration. Examples of successful returnees investing their financial, political and cultural capital in their country of origin are usually the result of state efforts to attract returnees or certain groups of them. However, this applies to relatively small groups of scientists and administrators only. A differentiated definition of

migration motifs and forms will help to establish precise knowledge about the groups from which returnees can be expected and under which conditions they would revert to their country of origin.

There is, however, the phenomenon of involuntary 'returnees', who are deported back to their country of origin.²⁵ In the field studies we pay particular attention to deportees who fall victim to the deterioration of Georgia's foreign relations with Russia since October 2006. The case of the Georgian deportees exemplifies the general vulnerability of migrant and Diaspora communities and their dependency on international relations.

Ethnic Composition and Ethnic Stratification

We assume that out-migration often changes the ethnic composition and ethnic stratification in both the societies of origin and in the host societies. However, the changes are down-played or ignored in the countries of origin and frequently exaggerated in the public and political discourse of the receiving societies. In the societies of origin out-migration may be combined with a tendency towards mono-ethnization. As seen

from a socio-structural point of view, immigrants usually end up in positions on the low level of the stratification ladder of the receiving societies, thus building ethnic enclaves there. We try to ascertain, whether 'ethnic emigration' is a closed chapter of post-socialist migration history of the first half of the 1990s, or whether there is a regional revival of 'ethnic emigration' still to be expected with regards to current developments.

Brain Drain

It is widely assumed in contemporary migration theory and research that better educated individuals and groups are more inclined to migrate and have better chances to be well integrated in the host societies. We will try to verify this assumption on out-migration from the two societies under scrutiny. The major issue is usually presented as ‘brain drain’ from societies of origin of the migrants (cf. Friedman & Shalini 2004) and ‘brain gain’ on the part of host societies. The background of both assumptions mostly concerns the investments into the development and improvement of skills of nationals through education and training in the country of origin. The investments give their returns abroad by the work of temporary migrants or permanent emigrants. The opposite version of the issue concerns the use of education and skills acquired abroad by returnees to their country of origin (cf. International Agenda for Migration-Management 2004, 38). Data from censuses prove the fact that the percentage of highly skilled²⁶ international migrants has significantly increased since 1990. It was estimated that the number of foreign-born persons having tertiary education and living in the *OECD* countries increased from twelve to twenty millions between 1990 and 2000. The increase of eight million represents 46% of the total growth in migrants aged 25 or older between 1990 and 2000 in the *OECD* countries (cf. Docquier & Marfouk 2006).

It is not fully clarified, whether the flows of highly skilled migrants are always detrimental to their country of origin. There are two main ‘schools’ of thought on the issue. In the 1960s the arguments usually considered the aftermath of skilled migration by analysing its impacts on the remaining population. This is a zero-sum analysis that seeks to demonstrate that “by reducing the number of educated remaining in the country, the brain drain unambiguously reduces the average level of education and generates a loss for those left behind” (Docquier, Lohest & Marfouk 2005, 3). Skilled out-migration is argued to have knock-on effects such as wage deflation for unskilled workers, and lower levels of attractiveness for foreign direct investments (Page & Plaza 2005). This approach corresponds with the endogenous growth model. According to it a person’s knowledge provides a direct benefit in terms of

available skills and has also positive effects on the productivity of the other. If those with skills and knowledge leave, the indirect benefit to the economy at large is eliminated. ‘Chronic and sustained human flight’ are one of the social indicators of the ‘Failed States Index’, as defined by the US based think-tank *Fund for Peace*. This includes:

- “‘Brain drain’ of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression;
- Voluntary emigration of ‘the middle class’, particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to economic deterioration;
- Growth of exile communities²⁷.

Another strand of arguments rejects the very notion of entirely detrimental consequences of skilled migration for less developed countries. Instead, the emphasis is on the positive impact of skilled migration on the general population prior to the actual emigration. The conclusion is that „in the long run, the global impact of the brain drain balances its ex ante beneficial and the ex post detrimental effects.” (Docquier, Lohest & Marfouk 2005, 3) This new approach analyzes various ways in which outward migration of skilled workers may have positive repercussions (cf. Farrant & MacDonald 2006, 9). Since only few empirical studies have been conducted to consequently test both theoretical models (ibid. 10)²⁸, our research will be of particular importance for the analysis of this controversial issue. The scope of real post-socialist ‘brain-drain’ from the South-Caucasus is rather obscured since many South Caucasian scholars work on contract bases abroad, but remain registered as staff members in domestic scientific institutions, with annual prolongations of their “long-term business tours” (Poghosyan 2003, 120 et seq.).

The question of ‘brain gain’ will be studied both from the point of view of the sending and the receiving side. Some 400 structured interviews with migrants from Armenia and Georgia in Moscow will focus on a broad selection of immigrants, who came for different reasons

(work, educational reasons, or professional training) and in different ways after 1990. We assume that some of them are well integrated into Russian society while many others still work in the shadow economy and in occupations with lower requirements than their level of education. Most naturally, the experiences, expectations and

social-economic conditions of these groups differ considerably. The extent to which one or another development predominates has not been studied so far with a view to the immigrants from Armenia and Georgia in Moscow neither as specific cases nor on a comparative basis.

Feminisation of Migration

Globalisation is marked by the rapid increase of international migration in general and by a growing share of women in migration in particular. "The more significant influence of globalisation on migration can be seen in relation to the origin, composition and the respective profiles of migrants. It is in regard to these changes that the phrase the 'feminisation of migration' refers to. (...) The most notable change concerns women participating in both formal and informal labour migration. (...) This increase in female participation in trans-national labour migration can be most readily seen among low-wage earners (...)." (Engle 2004, 21) The Georgian analyst Badurashvili suggests: "...when women cross international borders to take a job in the global market, they are making decisions, taking actions and redefining their family and labour roles. (...) Feminisation of trans-national migration has been prompted by rising global demand for labour in specific female-type domestic jobs and occupations. Under the conditions of massive unemployment in Georgia being long time in an economic crisis this global demand for female-specific job acts as a significant incentive for migration of Georgian women implying not less responsibility and obligations for their children than men" (Badurashvili 2005, 9).

The size and relevance of female migration from post-socialist societies is still an understudied issue connected to many open questions. The Georgian patterns of female migration making out nearly half of all out-migrants in 2003 differ considerably from the patterns in Armenia, where out-migration remains a predominantly male domain. Our hypothesis is that this remarkable difference between out-migration patterns in two otherwise similar neighbour societies originates in historical differences in the perception of migration. The OSCE financed survey conducted from 2002 to 2005 revealed that the overwhelming majority of the Armenian society (78.1%) rejects migration of women abroad because of three major reasons: 1) seeking jobs abroad contradicts the image of Armenian women (20.6% of respondents); 2) women should not leave the country (20.5%); 3) women should not work at all (13.8%). As many as 10.4% of the respondents assumed, that women, who go abroad engage in prostitution (Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 52 et seq.). The notably low rate of 14.1% female migrants from Armenia registered in the survey seems to correspond with such a negative perception of female migration (cf. *ibid.* 31).

3: Cognitive Aims of the Project

The final product of the present research project is expected to contain multi-faceted profiles of out-migration from Armenia and Georgia, which enlarge and deepen the knowledge about the causes of the massive out-migration and its consequences both for the sending and receiving societies. In order to accomplish this task we plan to conduct qualitative and quantitative surveys in Armenia and Georgia before, during, after or between out-migration as well as in Moscow,

which is the main destination for South Caucasian migrants. The multi-dimensional approach will be guided by the following ideas:

Firstly, we interpret the intensive migration from both societies as an unavoidable result of the opening of their previously non-market economies to global markets. The profound re-orientation requires the restructuring of fundamental economic and political relations together with the

corresponding change of value-normative systems. This type of societal transformation brings about intensive social risks and often provokes the effort of individuals and families (households) to manage the risks by means of trans-national migration and emigration.

Secondly, the massive out-migration from both societies under study became possible in the context of the global commoditization of labour. Under these conditions the migration of individuals or families to countries offering jobs or better payment of labour became a real option.

Thirdly, a special incentive for mass migration from countries which had a planned economy before the changes is the difficult accumulation of capital for starting economic activity under the precarious conditions of transformation of all dimensions of society. The liberalization of markets is followed by a rapid rise in the supply of goods and services. They are already available on the market but not affordable for large segments of the population. This discrepancy is another powerful incentive for out-migration.

Fourthly, labour out-migration from the societies under scrutiny became also possible due to the development of segmented labour markets in the societies hosting migrants. They fill in niches in the labour markets which the native population in the host countries is no longer willing to occupy due to bad work conditions, low payments and limited prospects for occupational development. This is particularly the case in large urban conglomerations marked by a high concentration of an affluent native population requiring a large amount of low paid services.

Fifthly, the need to fill in exactly these positions in the labour market, which are not attractive for the native population, brought about and maintains specific recruitment agents for attracting labour force from low-income countries, including the former socialist countries. These recruitment and travel agencies often work at the edge of legality or, in the case of human trafficking, beyond legality. In the framework of this field study, the methods to explore half legal and illegal recruitment practices are limited. Nevertheless we hope to shed some light on the issue with the help of interviews with migrants and migration experts.

Sixthly, as seen from the vantage point of receiving societies, they are particularly interested in attracting the best and brightest specialists from developing and transition countries thus saving the resources already invested in their education and qualification. For the countries of origin this is a net loss of 'brain drain'. We shall study and re-assess qualitative and quantitative aspects of highly qualified migration both from the perspective of sending and host societies under scrutiny.

Seventhly, at a certain moment mass migration develops its own dynamics because of the spread of networks facilitating it. It is widely believed, that this is particularly the case with societies having a well established traditional Diaspora. We shall comparatively study out-migration from Armenia and Georgia in the context of Diaspora building and answer the question whether and under which circumstances Diasporas, compatriot and expat networks facilitate or trigger migration.

4: Societies Selected for Comparison and Related Studies

Armenia and Georgia offer examples of well comparable societies. They are similar in their historic and cultural development as well as by the size of their populations (three and four millions respectively). The following paragraphs

contain an outline of the available knowledge on migration from both countries as well as on aspects of immigration from the South Caucasus to Moscow. A comparative summary of Armenian and Georgian migration specifics is given in Table 4.

4.1 Armenia

The Armenian society is nearly mono-ethnic and has a longstanding migration tradition. The worldwide Armenian Diaspora is estimated at about seven to nine millions, with the Russian

Federation, the USA and France harbouring the largest communities. However, the massive emigration in the early 1990s has reached levels unknown in the turbulent history of the Armenian

society. In a 1993 survey of 1,200 residents of the Armenian cities of Yerevan, Gyumri, and Ashtarak, 70% of the respondents indicated they would leave Armenia if given a chance, while 50% of the parents claimed they wish for their children to leave the country (Poghosyan 1994, 150 et seqq.). By the mid-1990s, ethnic Armenians had become the dominant migrant inflow from the Republic of Armenia to the Russian Federation (cf. Riddle & Buckley 1998).

The recent wave of out-migration of Armenians started after the earthquake of December 7, 1988. Following that disaster some 130,000 people left Armenia for other Soviet republics, of which about 70,000 left permanently. At the dawn of independence, in the winter of 1991-92 over 700,000 Armenians emigrated mostly to the Russian Federation. Some settled in Europe and in the USA permanently as a rule. This large-scale out-migration radically questioned the political vision of making Armenia the homeland of all Armenians, at least of those in the former Soviet Union (cf. Karakashyan & Poghosyan 2003, 225 et seqq.).

The out-migration from Armenia continues. The Statistical Yearbook of Armenia (2004, 3 et seqq.) reports net migration figures for the years 1999 to 2003 of annually minus 10,000. However, in a summary statement, the figure of over one million Armenians is mentioned who have left the country between 1992 and 1994 (cf. Balian 1995, 55). A more recent study of out-migration from Armenia, co-funded by the OSCE's Yerevan Office and the *British Foreign and Commonwealth Office* estimated the number of people who have left Armenia between 2002 and 2005 in search of employment at approximately 147,000, or 4.6% of the total population, and 7 to 9% of the economically active population. Some 85% of those job seekers are men aged between 21 and 50 years with secondary or vocational education. Over the same period, some 95,000 Armenians who had left the country earlier in search of work returned, the study found.²⁹

According to the *National Statistics Service of the Republic of Armenia* (NSSRA), since 1991, the calculation of emigration in Armenia was based on the statistical coupons of those arriving and departing by air links. This approach does not reflect the real scope of migration, as only

10% of those departing were registered.³⁰ The high percentage of unregistered out-migration led to politically motivated speculations. In 1996, a first migration survey was conducted within the framework of the 'Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS)' program, and aimed at exploring the motives of those departing from Armenia. Interviews with 900 passengers were conducted at all airports of the country. As a result it became obvious that the main reason for departure from Armenia was the deplorable social and economic situation. Afterwards, in the period between November 1, and December 19, 1996, a similar survey was conducted covering both arriving and departing air passengers, through separate questionnaires.

In 2001-2002, the NSSRA carried out its 'External Migration Survey' within the framework of the Migration Survey Project Component, TACIS Programme of the *Statistical Office of the European Union* (Eurostat) and with the support of the IOM. The survey aimed at deriving information on the number of those arriving and departing, their sex and age composition, marital status, educational level, purposes, as well as geographical segmentation etc.

Some analysts use to point out to the assumedly positive effects of the long-term and large-scale out-migration from the country. It is considered helpful for avoiding social and political crises and even a civil war since the potential insurgents had an exit option. Of the more than 700,000 Armenians who left the country in the early 1990s, the majority were men aged between 17 and 60 who could otherwise be involved in insurgent activities. However, a nation-wide survey with in-depth-interviews of 100 emigrants from Armenia revealed, that there are deeper reasons for the decision to migrate than just the poorly developed employment market, high unemployment rates and poor social conditions. The ethnologist Hranush Kharatyan explained at the launch of her book 'Emigration from Armenia' (2003) that "many of those who leave the country are employed people, who have average living standards in Armenia and more or less normal perspectives for future. (...) Besides the lack of jobs, the reasons have deeper roots like lack of confidence, problems with getting used to new socioeconomic conditions,

legal injustice, helplessness, hopelessness and the feeling of being at a ‘dead-lock’.”³¹

Other analysts (cf. Poghosyan 2003, 72) point at the devastating social and economic consequences of migration as the loss of human capital. The 20th century has seen the Armenian intelligentsia repeatedly shattered and rebuilt. Within the first half of the 20th century, the country experienced the destruction of the Armenian Genocide between 1915 and 1923, the Stalinist purges of the 1930s and the Soviet Armenian civilian and military losses of World War II. The Soviet practice of sponsoring intellectual work – as long as it remained within Soviet ideological bounds – encouraged respect for intellectuals. Once the Soviet control loosened under the last General Secretary of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, Armenian intellectuals “were at the forefront of the effort to fundamentally rethink all aspects of Armenia’s situation, past and present”³². The politicising of the intelligentsia occurred during

a period dominated by idealism. However, “the high hopes characterizing the period of 1988-91 have long since evaporated along with state subsidies and support for intellectual work”³³. With so many residents leaving, those who stayed in Armenia grew increasingly bitter towards the regime, and this was one source, according to Poghosyan (2003: 5-14), of Armenia’s political instability. The impact of out-migration on the economy, especially with the large number of skilled workers leaving, was significant. The political instability and economic collapse are associated with civil war onsets.

The Russian Federation used to be and continues to be the predominant choice of destination for migrants from the South Caucasus until recently. From 1991 until 1995, five percent of Armenia’s population immigrated to the Russian Federation.³⁴ Estimations present the destination choice of out-migrants from Armenia between 1990 and 2001 as follows:

Table 1:

Choice of Destination of Out-Migrants from Armenia between 1990 and 2001

Russia	620,000
United States	100,000
Ukraine	80,000
Western Europe	20,000
Belarus	15,000

Source: Baghdasarian & Yunusov: 2005

Table 2:

**Destinations of Labour Migrants from Armenia
between April and June 2002 and 2002-2005**

	Russia	Georgia	Ukraine	USA	Turkey	Iran	Belarus	Others
2002 (April -June)	78 Percent of total	8	5	2	1	1	1	4
2002-2005	87.6		2.2	9.9 (EU states incl.)				

Sources: 1) National Statistical Service of the Russian Federation: Survey of Arriving and Departing Passengers in April-June 2002; 2) Minasyan & Hancilova 2005, 27-28

According to a representative nationwide OSCE survey of 1,503 households this situation did not change much in subsequent years: Between 2002 and 2005, 90.1% sought work in other CIS states, including Ukraine (2.2%) and Kazakhstan (0.3%), and the remainder in the EU and the United States. The bulk of migrants, however, still names Russia as the main destination for labour migration. Some 87.6% have visited this country at least once during the period between 2002 and 2005. The remainder of 9.9% (ca. 7,000 persons) migrates to EU countries with France on top and to the USA (ca. 5,000 persons) (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 27 et seq.). Most of the migrants from Armenia to the EU and USA hold university degrees, while the majority of migrants to CIS countries have either no profession or are skilled workers (cf. *ibid.*, p. 35). The picture is obscured by the methods applied in previous studies. For example, the exclusion of temporary short term migration or commuting migration randomly ignores the individual traders who conduct frequent short term travels in order to import and export goods and form a relevant cohort of migrants from Armenia. Since neighbouring Iran

and Turkey are main destinations of this cohort, the overall destination choice of migrants would be less focused on Russia³⁵ if current obstacles in the complicated Turkish-Armenian relations (no diplomatic relations, closed borders, visa regime) (cf. Derderian: 2006, 9) would be abolished. The sectors in which South-Caucasian migrants can work are more abundant in Turkey (household services, entertainment and sex industry, construction, textile, restoration and agriculture) than in Russia (construction, retail and trade in markets, sex industry) (cf. Yudina, cited in: Derderian 2006, 8).

As both the Russian and the Turkish examples reveal, work permits, visa regulations and administrative restrictions are key determinants in migration flows. The increasing number of working women in Turkey is due to the demand for domestic service. This demand is satisfied with foreign labour, which Turkey legalized in 2003. The majority of Armenian and Georgian female out-migrants therefore go to Turkey instead of Russia, which has not such a high demand in domestic servants (cf. Derderian 2006, 7).

4.2 Georgia

The phenomenon of mass emigration from Georgia questions the national myth and self-perception of a nation clinging to its homeland under all hardships. Revaz Gachechiladze (1997) presents the negative and positive sides of migration for Georgians as follows: "...it is hard not to see the danger in mass emigration, the fact notwithstanding that Georgians belong to the people who used to say: East or West, home is best...But a big amount of families of Georgia survived on the money sent or brought by labour migrants in the period of economic crisis (...)" (cited in Badurashvili 2005, 3). Another scholar, Tamaz Gugushvili (1998), pointed out that labour migration "...has saved Georgia from starvation" (*ibid.*), but demanded also special attention of the Georgian government to the protection of human rights of Georgian citizens abroad (cf. Badurashvili 2005, 3). According to Guram Svanidze (1998) the intentions to emigrate was increasing in Georgia at the end of the nineties. The main reasons for emigration were tracked to

unemployment and the low living standard in the country. Following the results of these studies, the main negative effects of large-scale out-migration from Georgia might be summarized as follows:

- Changes of the ethnic composition of Georgian society;
- Deterioration of families;
- Ageing of society due to out-migration of the young age cohorts;
- Rural or regional depopulation with impacts on employment opportunities, public infrastructure, taxes, etc.;
- Dependent development (dependency on remittances and transfers).

The choice of destination for out-migrants from Georgia seems to be more diversified than the choice of migrants from Armenia, who face more restrictions than Georgians when migrating to Turkey, while Georgian migrants suffered from deportation and restrictions in Russia. Russia, the

EU, Turkey, Greece, Israel and the USA are main destinations for Georgian migrants, in particular for women, as Badurashvili (2004) found. In contrast to male Georgians, who go in the course of labour migration mainly to CIS territories (the share of men among former migrants to Russia exceeds 70%). Georgian women are keen to migrate to other destinations (up to 60% of respondents).

Georgians have not yet developed a self-image of a 'Diaspora nation' as Armenians did long ago. Another relevant distinction is the ethnic composition of Georgia and Armenia. While Armenia became a nearly mono-ethnic nation after the last emigration wave with 97.7% of the current population being ethnic Armenians, Georgia was and still is the ethnically and culturally most diverse of the three South Caucasian states, even if the breakaway regions of South-Ossetia and Abkhazia are not taken into consideration. According to the official 2002 population census, more than 16% (or more than 700,000) residents of Georgia were ethnic non-Georgians, with Azerbaijanis (284,761) on top and Armenians (248,929)³⁶ as the second largest ethnic groups. The largest cities with high ethnic diversity are Tbilisi (up to 150,000 representatives of non-Georgian ethnic groups) and Batumi (up to 20,000). Two regions in the East of Georgia – Samtskhe-Javakheti (Armenian) and Kvemo-Kartli (Azeri) – have a non-Georgian ethnic majority.

The study of the Georgian case can help to understand, whether, in which way or to what extent ethnic policies become a push factor for large-scale emigration. According to the Georgian analyst Zaal Anjaparidze (1998), respondents with a minority background in Georgia denied in a public poll of April 1993, that they felt overt oppression in Georgia, even in the first years of the struggle for national independence. Anxiety persisted. Urban Slavs (ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians) who settled in Georgia during Soviet times were the first to emigrate. Most representatives of these ethnic groups were either part of the military or were civilians working for the military. According to calculations conducted by various institutions in charge of migration and demographic problems, Slavs accounted for more than 60% of all emigrants in 1992. Most of them (88.5%) were city dwellers and moved to cities in the Russian Federation.³⁷ For the period

between July 1992 and 2005, the *Russian Federal State Statistics Service* recorded a total figure of 18,982 refugees and expelled persons of Russian citizenship.³⁸

The second largest group of emigrants were the Azeris, who lived primarily in rural areas. More than a quarter of the Azeris who left Georgia in 1992, emigrated to Russia while the remainder moved to Azerbaijan. The third largest group – the Armenians – predominantly lived in cities. According to official figures, 56.2% of the ethnic Armenian emigrants immigrated to Russia, just under a quarter moved to Armenia, and the rest moved to other former Soviet republics. Many Armenians emigrated abroad – mostly to the United States. Updated information provided by *Georgia's Department of Statistics* show that "4,980 people emigrated outside the former USSR in 1990, 3,876 in 1991, and 2,920 in 1992. According to the *Department of Visa and Population Registration* of Georgia's *Ministry of Internal Affairs*, 5,059 people emigrated in 1993, 4,676 in 1994, 3,885 in 1995, and 2,527 in 1996, or a total of 27,913 registered emigrants. The most popular destinations were Israel, Greece, Germany, and the USA. The same countries seem to be the destination of choice for emigrants from the Russian Federation." (Anjaparidze 1998)

Thus, in the first half of the 1990s, out-migration from Georgia was predominantly ethnic migration. Whereas some researchers try to prove that ethnic out-migration from Georgia was voluntary and occurred independently from the nationalist pressure in the society and by state authorities, other scholars admit ethnic repressions as a push factor: "Ethnic migration constituted the biggest flow of emigrants from Georgia in that time and was partly developed as a result of incorrect nationalities policy of the Georgian government at the beginning of the 1990s" (Badurashvili 2004, 2). A return to Georgia by Russian, Armenian, Azeri and other emigrants from ethnic minorities seems unlikely.

Meanwhile, another wave of ethnic emigration from Georgia may be under way, after Russia handed over its military base at Akhalkalaki and started to transfer the equipment to Gyumri (Armenia) since April, 2007. This once 15,000-man-military complex was not only the most relevant employer (of 1,000 jobs), dating back to

1828, and the only provider of medical services in the otherwise poverty stricken Samtskhe-Javakheti province in the borderlands between Armenia, Georgia and Turkey. The base was also seen as a safeguard against Turkey by the near to mono-ethnic Armenian population (96%) in the Javakheti region, who blame the Georgian government for intentionally neglecting the area.³⁹ While the 3,000 Russian and local Armenian servicemen of the base were scheduled to be transferred to Russian bases in Armenia and Russia after the termination of the withdrawal in autumn 2008, the security of the remaining more than 100,000 Armenians is feared to be at stake.⁴⁰ With an official poverty rate

of 66% of the population (2008), the province of Samtskhe-Javakheti is the poorest region of post-Soviet Georgia. Traditional seasonal migration of Javakhetians to Russia seems to be prompted now by permanent emigration. In Moscow, the influx of Armenian migrants from Javakheti has already been noticed (cf. Galkina 2006, 187). This second wave of ethnic migration or emigration puts a question mark over the previous perception of ethnic migrations from the South Caucasus allegedly limited to the early 1990s as well as a strict separation of ethnic and social determinants or push-factors.

Table 3:

Change of Ethnic Composition in Georgia (1989-2002)

Main Ethnic Groups in Georgia according to the census of 1989 and 2002 (in brackets: the census of 2002)					
Group	Population ^a	Percentages of entire population and trends ^b	Linguistic group	Ethnic-religious group	Main area of residence
Georgian	3,615,000 (3,661,173)	72.4 % (+) (83.8%)	Georgian	Georgian Orthodox, some Sunnite Muslim	
Armenian	430,000 (2002: 248,929)	8.6 % (--) (5.7%)	Armenian	Armenian Apostolic	South, bordering Armenia; Tbilisi
Azeri	358,000 (2002: 284,761)	7.2 % (+) (6.5%)	Turkic	Shiite Muslim	South and west of Tbilisi
Ossetian ^c	165,000 (2002: 38,028)	3.3 % (--) (0.9%)	Iranian	Orthodox Christian, some Muslim	Central, South Ossetia
Russian	140,000 (2002: 67,671)	2.8 % (--) (1.5%)	Slavic	Russian Orthodox	Urban centres, Abkhazia, coastal areas
Abkhaz ^d	100,000 (2002: 3,527)	2.0 % (--) (0.1%)	Caucasian	Orthodox Christian, some Sunnite Muslim	Abkhazia
Greek	75,000 (2002: 15,166)	1.5 % (--) (0.3%)	Greek	Greek-Orthodox	Abkhazia; South-central, coastal areas
Kurd	33,000 (2002: 2,514)	0.7 % (+) (0.0%)	Iranian	Sunnite Muslim; Yezidi	Southwest
Ukrainian	23,000 (2002: 7,039)	0.5 % (--) (0.2%)	Slavic	Orthodox Christian	Urban centres, Abkhazia, coastal areas
Other	50,000	1.0 % (--) (0.3%)			
Total	4,989,000	100%			

^a Figures for all groups, except for Russians, are derived from the 1989 census results, modified by rates of natural increase and out-migration. The figure for Russians is a 1999 estimate by the *Russian State Bureau of Statistics* (Goskomstat), published in “*Nezavisimaya gazeta*”, on September 17, 2001. The total population figure is an estimate (as of July 2001) by the *CIA*, World Factbook, www.odci.gov/populations/factbook/index.html. Due to massive out-migration in the 1990s, the above figures are likely to have a large margin of error.

^b Future trends regarding population share are based on state policies of favouritism, patterns of natural increase,

and expected migration flows. + = relative increase; -- = relative decrease; - = little change.

^c The majority of Ossetians reside in South Ossetia, currently not under the control of the Georgian government.

^d Almost all Abkhazians reside in the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic, currently not under the control of the Georgian government. The 2002 census does not include the break-away regions of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, but relates to Abkhaz people and Ossetians outside these regions.

Since 1996, the *Department of State Statistics of Georgia* is conducting a longitudinal household survey, which also covers the departure of household members to foreign destinations. A survey by the *Georgian Centre of Population Research* was conducted among randomly chosen 360 households of three different strata where at least one member has left Georgia between 1997 and 2002 with the purpose of labour activity abroad. In a second stage, this survey included interviews with 1,000 returnees, who had been abroad during the period between 1997 and 2002 (cf. Badurashvili 2004, 6). An *IOM* financed survey (2002, 600 interviews) on labour migration revealed the considerable discrepancy between the qualification and skills of Georgian migrants and their occupation abroad. The skills required for working in Georgia and abroad vary significantly. Georgians are often not adequately qualified to work in a particular field abroad. It is expected that this will lead to a further depreciation of their

human capital in the long run. In contrast, many countries in the world are increasing their human capital through labour migration. Highly skilled workers often form associations abroad and upon their return to their county of origin are in the position to positively influence the economic and social development within their home countries. Very few labour migrants from Georgia advance their qualifications abroad and as a rule, their human capital depreciates.

The share of people employed in the domestic service sector (nurses, nannies) is significant for Greece (38%), Germany (34%) and the USA (32%). 41% of the migrants to the Russian Federation work as auxiliary workers, but the share of those having succeeded to start their own business is also high (18%). 75% of the businessmen out of the total number of labour migrants from Georgia work in the Russian Federation.” (Gotsiridze et al. 2003, 40 et seq.).

Table 4:

Country Migration Profile (Preliminary results)

Migration aspects	Armenia	Georgia
Estimated net migration rate 2007	-5.34/1,000 (2000: -9.0/1,000; 2003: ca. 9,000; 2004: 50,000)	-4.45/1,000 (2000: -5.7/1,000)
Massive emigration/ migration	1991 to 1994: - 600,000 1991 to 2004: - more than 900,000 – one million	1990 to 2003: 960,000 to 1.1 million (20% of population)
Education level	2002 to 2005: 39.4% with higher or secondary special education	2003: 44% with a university degree;
Unemployment rate	2006: 7.7% (officially registered) 32 to 35% (unofficial estimation)	2004: 12.6% (est.)
Average duration of out-migration	2002 to 2005: 67.5%: 5 to 11 months; depending on destination	24 months
Percentage of female labour migrants	14.1 %	2003: 49.3%
Ratio of ethnic majority among migrants	2005: 2/3 Armenians	2005: 2/5 Georgians, Ossetians, Azeris
Main destinations of labour migrants	1990 to 2001 (est.): To Russia 620,000, to USA 100,000, to Ukraine 80,000, Western Europe 20,000, Belarus 15,000 2002: To Russia 78%; Georgia 8% ⁴¹ 2005: To Turkey 40,000 2002 to 2005: To Russia 87,600- 143,000 (87.6%) ⁴² USA (5,000 est.) and European Union: 9.9% (in all: est. 7,000)	1999: To Russia 61.9%; 12.7% Azerbaijan; 8.6% Ukraine; 5% Greece; 4.4% Israel; 2.1% Armenia; 2000: To Russia 50%; 2004: Turkey registered 235,143 arrivals of Georgian nationals 2006: Turkey registered daily 800 to 1,200 entries
Visa regimes, introduced by	Turkey	Russia (in Dec 2000), Belarus (2005)
Overall remittances	1995/96: 450 million USD 2007: 1.2 billion USD	2006: 1.627 billion
Migrants share in remittances	1995/96: 60 to 65% 2007: 100 million USD	
Remittances sent from Russia	2007: 600 to 650 million USD	210 million USD (annually)
Demographic consequences: gender ratio imbalance	2001 (Census): Female population 53.13% (1,294,976)	Female population: 52.8%
Population growth rate	2007: -0.19%	2007 (est.): -0.329%

4.3 Russian Federation

General Trends

After the collapse of the USSR and as its *de iure* and *de facto* heir, the Russian Federation found itself relatively unprepared in the midst of complex migration and demographic developments, which ever since determine any political and academic discourse on Russian migration policies:

1) Refugees and ‘forced migrants’: The Russian Federation became the easily accessible refuge for ethnic Russians, Russophone and various other ethnic communities from previous Soviet republics targeted by ethnic violence and territorial conflicts (in particular, the South Caucasus states). In contradiction to international refugee law, Russia defined those immigrants from the FSU as ‘forced migrants’ that obtained or could obtain Russian citizenship by virtue of their former Soviet citizenship, including IPDs. Only immigrants not eligible for Russian citizenship were given the status of ‘refugees’. The revised in 1997 refugee law adopted Western European standards in the intention to reduce the burden on the state for caring for refugees.

At the end of 2000, there were a total of 667,000 registered refugees or forced migrants from other FSU states and only 9,710 refugees from non-FSU states in Russia. However, this number did not include those immigrants, who had meanwhile obtained Russian citizenship and subsequently lost their ‘forced migrant’ status. Most forced migrants arrived either from Central Asia or the Caucasus, including about 600,000 persons displaced during the first war in Chechnya (1994-1996). About one-third, mostly Chechens, have since returned. As a result of the second Chechen war, which started on 26 August 1999, there are about 300,000 IDPs (and nearly half a million at the peak of the exodus in 2000), most in neighbouring Ingushetia. Several thousand refugees from Chechnya went into exile, as of 2009 most residing in EU countries.

2) A magnet for foreign migrants: Russia has become a ‘migration magnet’ for both legal and undocumented immigrants, making the country the largest ‘receiver’ of foreign migrants next to the USA. According to official figures, about 180,000 migrants visit Russia every year. The

majority of these immigrants originate from the CIS and are attracted by the significant income differences and the less competitive Russian labour market. In 2005, 95% of documented immigrants came from other CIS countries. They are mainly Russians or Russian speakers from adjacent Kazakhstan (29.30%), Ukraine (17.4%), Uzbekistan (17.2%) and Kyrgyzstan (8.8%) (Banjanovic 2007). On the other hand, significant changes in the 1997-2007 decade occurred with regards to the main ‘sending’ countries: While the influx from Ukraine declined from 138,231 arrivals to 51,492 (with the lowest level of 51,492 in 2004), the influx from Central Asia increased over the same period, with Uzbekistan in lead position (39,620 arrivals in 1997 against 52,802 in 2007). Somehow exceptional is the high amount of arrivals from Armenia despite the fact that Armenia is no direct neighbour of Russia (19,123 in 1997 against 30,751 in 2007). Among all CIS states Armenia has the highest share of her workers abroad (perhaps 700,000 in a labour force of 1.2 million). In difference to Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the high figures of arrivals from Armenia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan cannot be explained by the ethnic or ‘expat’ factor, for these countries did not send any large ethnic Russian or Russophone communities. Migrants from the ‘far abroad’ in African and Asian states (China, Vietnam, Korea etc) also use Russia and the CIS in general as a transit corridor to Europe.

Estimates on general figures of undocumented migrants vary considerably from 3.0 to 12 millions, not at least because of methodical and definitional flaws. Nevertheless, these disputable figures are at the core of the public Russian discourse between social liberals and anti-migration conservatives or nationalists. Whereas the *World Bank* estimate is as high as 9 million undocumented migrants in Russia, leading Russian administrators present even higher figures: The Federal Migration Service’s head, Konstantin Romodanovsky, told the *State Duma* in mid-March 2006: “Experts say about 10 million of [supposedly 20 million immigrants to Russia; TS] do so illegally”⁴³. The *Federal Migration Service* estimates that the number of unregistered immigrants will

increase to 30 million by 2010.⁴⁴ According to K. Romodanovsky, Russia's economic losses due to illegal immigration totals USD 7 billion annually: "It is a huge [amount of] damage to the country. Migrants evade taxes and duty payments,"⁴⁵ he said, adding that the loss equalled the total budget spending on education and healthcare.

3) 'Brain drain' experience: Although Post-Soviet emigration from Russia has been only 1.1 million, or less than one percent of her 1989 population, it included a significant part of the highly educated population. Ethnic Germans (1995-99: 45% of net migration), Russians (36%) and Jews (13%) made the main groups of emigrants, with Germany (57% of the emigrants), Israel (26%) and the United States (11%) as main destinations. Experts estimate that both the numbers of Jews and Germans in Russia declined for about 25%. Among the Jewish emigrants, 21 % had a college education (against 13.3% of the general average).

4) Depopulation and aging society: The European North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation make up 70 percent of its state territory, while less than eight percent of the population live there. Under the market conditions, the previous level and type of development of the northern regions has proved to be unsustainable. The dramatically rising cost of living and the shrinking economy resulted in massive out-migration from the northern regions to central Russia and the other FSU states. Between 1989 and 2001, from the 16 regions that are defined as the 'Far North', over 12 percent of the population emigrated. From seven of these regions, over 20 percent have left. Many more people wish to leave the North, but do not have the means to do so.

Continued below-replacement fertility and high mortality combined with an aging population cause a general demographic crisis. Russia's population shrinks by 700,000 people each year. Since 1992, the excess of deaths over births has been 7.7 million. Russia had a birth rate of 10.4

per 1,000 people in 2006 and a higher death rate of 16.2 deaths per 1,000. Already by the beginning of 2002, the population had fallen by 4.3 million from its peak of 148.7 million in 1992 to 144.0 million.

Net immigration to Russia of 3.6 million has compensated for less than half of the natural decrease. According to a 2002 United Nations population projection, the population of Russia in 2050 will be 113 million according to the high scenario, 104 million in the medium, and 96 million in the low. "Using these UN population projections as the basis for a feasibility study on replacement migration, researchers found that in order for Russia to maintain the same population size as in 1995, there would have to be a net migration of 24.9 million in the first half of the 21st century. For the size of the working-age population to stay the same, there would have to be a net migration of 35.8 million." (Heleniak 2002)

However, immigration of ethnic Non-Russians is obviously not the first choice for Russia's decision-makers, who have to meet their compatriots' fear for a profound change of the country's ethnic composition. For this reason, decision-makers rather try to increase the population by encouraging first of all the 'repatriation' of expat communities. In his state-of-the-nation address in May 2006, President Vladimir Putin vowed to make Russia's population decline his highest priority and initiated changes in the migration policy, such as the attempt to attract compatriots from abroad. Subsequently, a six year government programme, started in June 2007 encourages 'compatriots' living abroad to return to Russia. They will receive cash, social benefits and support to gain or regain Russian citizenship. However, the migration potential of this group only accounts for 6-7 million people and is limited and expensive. The reintegration of one million 'repatriates' will cost approximately USD 6 billion. (Banjanovic 2007)

Moscow

The most populous and economically vibrant capital city of the Russian Federation attracts the bulk of immigrants to the country. Metropolitan Moscow and the Moscow region (in Russian: 'Moskovskaya Oblast') receive about 75% of

them (cf. Galkina 2006, 183). The percentage of foreign born residents among Russia's population of 145,166,731 was 8.3% (= 11,976,822) in the 2002 census, and the percentage of foreign born Muscovites was 10.9% (= 1,128,035).⁴⁶

According to a research conducted by the *Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Science* South Caucasians – Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis – are the fastest growing ethnic groups in Moscow. Their migration-generated growth is much higher than that of other nationalities living in Moscow.⁴⁷

Although the percentage of migrants from Armenia to the Russian capital is significantly lower than the above mentioned general immigration indicator of 75% – some 43% of all Armenian migrants to Russia go to Moscow – it remains still on top of the Armenian destination choice hierarchy according to the 2005 OSCE survey (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 28). Compared with its neighbours, Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia has the highest share of out-migrants to Moscow, which has the largest concentration of Armenians in the Russian Federation, followed by Krasnodar and the Kuban region.

Links and interrelations between Russia and the South Caucasus go back to medieval times, when Armenian merchants and Georgian kings established early trade, diplomatic and even dynastic links first with the Kingdom of Kiev (Rus'), then with the Kingdom of Moscow. The roots of the Armenian and Georgian Diaspora in Moscow are deep, in contrast to the Azeri community that has emerged in recent times.

New Immigration Regulations

After human rights NGOs heavily criticized the amendment of Russia's 'Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens' (Law No. 62, 2002), Russia's lawmakers adopted amendments in July 2006 that made Russia's migration policies one of the most liberal in the world, according to some expert opinion.⁵⁰ The main purpose of the legislative and procedural improvements, however, must be seen in the obvious attempt to better control and more effectively use foreign labour force.

On January 15, 2007, amendments to the existing 2002 Law No. 62, together with the new 'Law on Recording the Migration of Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons' (Law No. 109, 2006) entered into force, stipulating simplified procedures for temporary residents to register on the migration registry. It is mandatory for all non-

Although migrants from most previous Soviet republics do not belong to the category of 'illegal' immigrants in a strict sense of the word – their entry is legal due to the lack of Russian visa regimes with most CIS states⁴⁸ – they are regarded and treated as 'illegal' immigrants by many Russians, including authorities. We agree with the Russian scholar Tamara A. Galkina from the *Russian Academy of Sciences* who proposes to use the more precise and careful term of 'unregulated migration' instead of 'illegal immigration' with regards to migrants/immigrants from CIS states (cf. Galkina 2006, 190). Besides, it has to be taken into account that until the liberalization of migration regulations in 2007, legal immigrants could have easily turned into illegal ones, because the applications for temporary residency in Russia were processed over the duration of six months (cf. Gevorkyan 2006). Subsequently, if a citizen of a CIS country wanted to stay in Russia for more than three months he or she had to apply for a residency permit ('propiska') at least three months prior to arriving in Russia; otherwise he or she would have acquired an illegal status after a stay of three months (cf. Derderian 2006, 6). Moscow's police seemed unable to cope with the flow of undocumented workers into the capital. Employers flagrantly disregarded penalties and failed to stick to quotas for the employment of foreign workers.⁴⁹

Russian nationals entering Russia to do this in order to obtain work permits including immigrants from former Soviet Union (FSU) countries for whom a visa regime does not exist. To obtain legal status, migrants from the FSU currently only need to register at the local Russian post office where they reside.⁵¹ These reforms have helped many migrants to legalize their short-term stay in Russia. In 2007, 7.9 million migrants had registered on the migration registry, which meant a 65% increase as compared to 2006. Over 1.75 million migrant workers entering Russia received work permits in 2007, up from 570,112 in 2006.⁵² Also in 2007, 60% of the employers hiring migrant workers sent official notifications to the *Federal Migration Service of Russia* (FMS) that they had hired migrant workers. While this degree of compliance resulted in a 2.5% increase in the

tax base in 2007, experts say that full compliance would increase the tax base by five percent.⁵³

The new laws also established annual entrance quotas on work permits. In Moscow, the annual quota is agreed between the *Labour exchange of the Moscow Committee on Interregional Ties and Ethnic Policy*, the city's trade unions, the *Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs* and other organizations. Against the opinion of the trade unions and other organizations, which did not even want to draw the entrance quotas dead-line over 200,000, the entrance quota was fixed at 300,000 for 2008. In 2007, the quota for Moscow was still 810,000, while in reality there were 953,000 migrant workers in Moscow at that time.⁵⁴

There remain certain legal and procedural obstacles, such as significant delays in issuing work permits; early expiration of quotas for work permits; and other bureaucratic hurdles. Migrants with an irregular status are more vulnerable to abuses and less willing to seek assistance from government agencies out of comprehensible fears that approaching any official person or body will result in a fine or in expulsion.⁵⁵ Extortion is still practiced on a large scale by employers and police, both of whom benefit from the illegal status of migrant workers. The police often demands bribes, threatening to confiscate or destroy identification documents or even to deport migrant workers. Employers frequently refuse to pay already low compensated migrant workers after services have been rendered.

Experts admit that not regarding some significant changes in the Russian migration system over recent years, profound flaws remain: "Some of the changes include several laws being amended and some new regulations being enacted to improve the procedures and make them more straight-forward, but this is not enough.

The current situation concerning migration and employment of expatriates in Russia is still far from perfect and needs further thorough revision of state bodies and undivided attention of companies seeking to employ foreign nationals", lawyer Marina Gordeeva summarizes the situation as seen from the point of view of employers.

For employers or principals, the procedure for legalization of foreign employees is rather complex and involves obtaining various permissions from

the *Federal Migration Service*, *Federal Migration Department*, Employment Center, as well as Tax and Labor Inspection and a number of other authorities; furthermore, companies in demand of foreign labour have to register at the *Federal Migration Service*, with only one year validity of such registration. The general procedure includes the following stages:

1. Submission of a foreign labour forecast;
2. Submission of an application and its resolution in an employment center;
3. Processing of employment permissions;
4. Processing of individual work permits;
5. Company accreditation for visa support;
6. Processing of a work visa;
7. Notification of the employment center, tax and labor inspections on employment of foreign nationals;
8. Undertaking migration recording.

According to government regulations each company seeking to employ foreign nationals has an obligation to participate in the forecasting campaign by submitting information about the demand for foreign specialists. This demand is taken into account when forming the quota rate for certain regions of Russia and an all-Russia rate. Employers must pay special attention to the timing: If a company wants to attract and hire foreign specialists in 2010, the forecast for 2010 has to be submitted before May 1, 2009. Many new companies establishing a business in Russia are facing difficulties in applying work permits because they were not able to submit forecasts in time.⁵⁶ Because of the bureaucratic procedure, certain agencies offer their services to companies to help them through the submission and application hurdles. Tax evasion by employers may become another result of the existing flaws: While there were 13,000 economic entities in 2007, that were ready to employ foreigners, just nine employers informed the corresponding state services about foreigners working for them. The other employers simply did not pay taxes for hired foreign labor.⁵⁷

On July 25, 2008, another administrative regulation came into force that replaced the two-

step procedure for obtaining conclusions with regards to attracting foreign workforce by a 'one window' system.⁵⁸ The *Federal Migration Service*, which receives all the documents from the applying employer or principal, will internally send requests to the *Federal Employment Service*. All phases of the document processing are recorded in the *Trudovaya Migratsiya* ('Labour Migration'), an automated sub-system of the central foreign citizens' data bank. The term for obtaining work permits should not exceed 30 days. The practical side of implementing the new regulation is expected take some time, as there are a lot of internal changes to be applied to the *Federal Migration Service*.⁵⁹

The 2002 Law on the Status of Foreigners in the Russian Federation stipulated, among others, that all foreign residents, regardless of nationality and occupation, must obtain a migrant card. The

deadline for obtaining the card was February 15, 2003. However, as of early February 2003, only a small number of foreign migrants had actually obtained a migrant card (in Moscow only 30,000 out of the estimated 800,000 foreign residents or more in the city).⁶⁰ In 2006, Mayor Luzhkov introduced his project of a magnetic plastic card as the new personal identity document for foreigners ('migrant card' or 'migration passport') which also serves as a work permit. The plastic card features a special microchip, which can access nearly all (including sensitive) information about migrants, including their photo, passport data, blood type, and medical history. The card will function as a foreigners' primary document in Moscow, and employers will be able to determine whether an employee has passed a medical examination and is therefore allowed to work. The new ID regime will be mandatory, and workers will be unable to register in Moscow without a card.⁶¹

Human Rights Violations and Hate Crimes

Russia's fight against undocumented immigration is just one reason for the difficulties of South Caucasian migrants in Moscow. Security concerns are another. After terrorist actions claimed a large number of victims in September 1999, Moscow City authorities held a new registration of all recent arrivals. Law enforcement agencies paid particular attention to those coming from the Caucasus, detaining and fining some of them without sufficient grounds. Illegal detentions and searches went on even after Mayor Yury Luzhkov established a telephone hotline "to keep permanent contacts with the ethnic public organizations for considering cases of illegal actions by law-enforcement organs in the course of doing their duties" (cited in: Filipov & Filippova 2002, 164). But judging by the information received through the hotline service, illegal detentions and searches, seizures of valuables and documents, as well as unwarranted refusals of residence registration or other violations of human and civic rights by law enforcement agencies went on.

Although the peak level of immigration to Russia was in 1994, it was the second wave of work related migrants in the first decade of the 21st century that coincided with a significant increase of ultranationalist sentiments and xenophobic

violence in the indigenous majority society, in particular among young Russians. The Muscovite *Human Rights Office* noted in 2005, an „increase of fascist sentiments“, of extremist publications, among them Nazi publications by otherwise respectable publishers. The *Human Rights Office* estimates that between 2005 and 2007, the number of ultra-nationalist 'skinheads' in Russia rose from 50,000 to 70,000⁶² and that hundreds of websites propagated chauvinist ideas in Russian language; the same NGO gives the number of extremists in Russia in 2007 with 500,000.⁶³ *Amnesty International* reported 28 racist killings and 366 assaults in 2005⁶⁴, but presumes the real figure to be much higher, since the police registers most incidents not as racist or interethnic hate attacks, but downplays their relevance by categorizing them as acts of 'hooliganism'.⁶⁵ During the first six months of 2007, the Moscow based civic rights NGO *Sova Center for Information and Analysis* registered 37 racist killings⁶⁶ and an additional 193 physical attacks across Russia, which is an increase of 20% in comparison to 2006.⁶⁷ Most such incidents occurred in the megalopolis of Moscow (January to May 2007: 21 killed, 62 wounded), followed by St. Petersburg (3 killed, 56 wounded).⁶⁸ The increase of racist and xenophobic murder continued throughout 2008 and 2009, as

Table 5 shows, while there was a decline in the overall figure of assaults in 2008 (690 assaults in 2007, against 525 in 2008). There was also a

significant increase in Moscow's share (City and Greater Moscow) in the overall figure of assaults, reaching nearly 50% in 2008.

Table 5:

Growth of racist assaults in Russia between 2004 and January 2009⁶⁹

	2004			2005			2006			2007			2008			Jan 2009		
	1) Killed			1) Killed			1) Killed			1) Killed			1) Killed			1) Killed		
	2) Wounded			2) Wounded			2) Wounded			2) Wounded			2) Wounded			2) Wounded		
	3) Overall assaults			3) Overall assaults			3) Overall assaults			3) Overall assaults			3) Overall assaults			3) Overall assaults		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
	50	218	268	49	418	467	66	522	588	85	605	690	97	428	525	14	33	47
Including																		
Greater Moscow	8	62	80	16	179	195	40	228	268	49	222	271	57	196	253	10	23	33
Petersburg and Region	9	32	41	4	45	49	6	56	62	11	111	122	15	38	53	2	6	8

Source: Galina Koževnikova 2009

Human rights NGOs, critical and/or independent journalists as well as representatives of migrant communities see the main reasons for the tacit acceptance of racist and xenophobic violence among Russian law enforcement and judicial institutions as the following:

- The wide distribution of racist and xenophobic bias in the majority population, including civil servants;
- The high figure of Neo-Nazis;
- Corruption in the law enforcement system;
- A low figure of indictments of racist and xenophobic crimes;
- The lack of an active integration policy.

Galina Koževnikova (*Sova Center*) mentions a “near to complete impunity for radical elements”, blaming the Russian jurisdiction as the main reason for the increase of racist and xenophobic crimes. Despite the fact that in 2006, 588 persons had been victimized, only 33 court indictments were executed.⁷⁰ In 2008, there were another 33 court indictments (against 525 assaults).⁷¹ In 2007, however, the ratio was only 24 convictions for hate-related violent crimes against 690 assaults, which is the largest discrepancy between crime,

jurisdiction and law enforcement over the last three years.⁷²

Some progress was reported by *Sova Center* for 2006, from such neighbourhoods as Voronezh, where local civic rights NGOs took action and achieved a series of anti-racist court decisions.⁷³ Russia's legislators were expected to consider amendments to various laws in order to strengthen the prevention and punishment of chauvinist crimes and propaganda⁷⁴. In 2008, however, the appropriate activities of the Russian law-making institutions ceased.

In an interview of March 6, 2007, the representative and *Humanitarian Coordinator* of the *UN* in the Russian Federation, Kasidis Rochanakorn, articulated his concerns about the rising xenophobia in Russia⁷⁵. In his report of May 30, 2007, the *UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance*, Doudou Diène, concluded:

“that while there is no state policy of racism in the Russian Federation, the Russian society is facing an alarming trend of racism and xenophobia, the most striking manifestations of which are the increasing number of racially

motivated crimes and attacks, including by neo-Nazi groups, particularly against people of non-Slav appearance originating from the Caucasus, Africa, Asia or the Arab world; the growing level of violence with which some of these attacks are carried out, resulting in some cases in the death of the victim; the extension of this violence to human rights defenders, intellectuals and students engaged in the combat against racism; the climate of relative impunity that the perpetrators of such acts enjoy from law enforcement agents, despite a substantial increase, in recent months, of prosecutions and convictions for acts including racial hatred or enmity as a motivating factor; the rise of anti-Semitism as well as other forms of religious intolerance, in particular against Muslims; the existence and the increasing importance of political parties with racist and xenophobic platforms; and the virtual correspondence of the social, economic and political marginalization with the mapping of ethnic minorities and other discriminated groups in the Russian Federation.

*The alarming rise of racist and xenophobic violence is linked to two fundamental trends in the Russian society. On the one hand, the ideological ground of the rise of this violence is rooted in the ethnic interpretation, by neo-Nazi and extremist groups and some political parties, of the political nationalism promoted by the Russian authorities to fill the ideological void of socialism and internationalism left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the deep social and economic crisis of the Russian society has nourished the political instrumentalization of the ideology of nationalism and promoted a culture of xenophobia and racism in the growing marginalized groups of the society. In this context, the dominant security approach to immigration and the growing association between ethnic and religious minorities and criminality, justified by 'the combat against terrorism', are giving legitimacy to the rhetoric and violence of racism and xenophobia."*⁷⁶

In July/August 2008 the *UN Committee Against Racial Discrimination* reacted sharply to Russia's official report on its progress in implementing the 'International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination' (ICERD)⁷⁷, as adopted by the *UN General Assembly* in 1965

and ratified by Russia in 1969. Among others, the *UN Committee's* 'Recommendations' of August 20, 2008 to the Russian report suggested an independent inquiry of the 2006 campaign against Georgian nationals in Russia, demanding that the responsible for these actions, officials and other decision-makers, must be revealed.

Russian human rights defenders go even further with their criticism, emphasising the involvement and responsibility of the state for hate crimes. In her report for 2008, Galina Koževnikova highlights the "anti-Georgian" and "anti-migrant rhetoric" not only of the Russian mass media, but also by some MPs and representatives of the jurisdiction and law enforcement, who irresponsibly and without reason link Georgians and migrants in general with criminal activities (cf. Koževnikova 2009). As likewise worrying Koževnikova describes the xenophobia of Russian pro-governmental youth organizations, such as *Evroaziatskiy Soyuz* (Euro-Asian Union), *Rossiia Molodaya* (Young Russia) and *Molodaya Gvardiya 'Edinoy Rossii'* (Young Guardians of United Russia), of which the latter is the most official, pro-governmental of them. In October 2008, *Molodaya Gvardiya 'Edinoy Rossii'* launched a nation-wide campaign of ethnic protectionism 'Our Money to our People'. It demanded the reservation of work-places for citizens of the Russian Federation. Under the protection of Greater Moscow's Governor Boris Gromov the youth movement *Mestnye* (Locals) repeated their 2007 boycott of 'non-Slavic' cab drivers in autumn 2008.

It should be noted that the Russian ultra-rightist segment was shaken in 2008 by a split in the *Movement against Illegal Immigration* (DPNI) and various minor conflicts (cf. Koževnikova 2009). Furthermore, already in 2007, and in imitation of the Russian chauvinist organizations some militant 'Caucasian' youth gangs emerged. Experts explain their emergence as a reaction to the discriminatory attitude of law enforcement authorities and also by the failure of adequately addressing and preventing hate crimes (cf. Koževnikova 2009). The patterns for organising these young 'Caucasians' correspond to those of their Russian adversaries, not so much by identifying themselves by faith, ethnicity or nationality, but along the lines of counter-identification by their geographical origin ('Caucasus') and their potential victim status.

Effects of the Current International Crisis

Under the impact of the international financial and economic crisis that started affecting Russia in 2008, migrants will supposedly experience further severe discriminations in their work places. In her report ‘Are you happy to cheat us?’ (February 2009) for *Human Rights Watch* (HRW) author Jane Buchanan found that “migrant workers in Russia are routinely denied wages, threatened with violence and abused by the police, and the economic crisis is likely to make their lives worse”.⁷⁸ The report is based on interviews with 146 current or former migrants in Russia who work or have worked in the construction sector. Of the estimated up to nine million migrants (*World Bank*) in Russia, it is said that approximately 40% are working in the Russian construction industry. Construction has been among the worst hit sectors, when half a million people lost their jobs in Russia in December 2008 as the country suffered from its worst economic crisis in a decade. The *HRW* report states that “employers in most cases refuse to provide migrant workers with written employment contracts, as required under Russian law, making workers even more vulnerable to wage violations and other abuses and limiting their ability to access official avenues of redress. In some of the worst cases, employers, intermediaries, and employment agencies confiscated migrants’ passports and forced them

to work without wages, in some cases confining them to worksites or physically abusing them” (Buchanan 2009).

The report continues by defining forced labour as work extracted under the menace of a penalty and for which a person has not offered him or herself voluntarily. It reminds that forced labour is banned under both international and Russian law, and states: “International human rights law obligates the Russian government to protect all people from abuse, including by private actors. In the case of migrant workers, the Russian authorities have in most cases failed to do so. They have not provided sufficient legal protections, nor have they made existing protections effective. The government has also failed to take adequate action against police or other officials who threaten or abuse migrant workers.

The Russian government should ensure effective regulation and monitoring of employment agencies and other intermediaries, and rigorous inspection and prosecution of abusive employers; accessible complaint mechanisms for victims of abuse; timely and effective investigations into allegations of abuse and the imposition of appropriate fines and sanctions. Russia must provide guarantees of protection for all victims of abuse irrespective of migration status” (Buchanan 2009).

4.3.1 Armenians in Moscow

The Muscovite Armenian Diaspora is the most heterogeneous of Moscow’s migrant communities, having developed since medieval times with subsequent waves of Armenian immigrants from several countries. In the past, Armenian traders of Crimea, the South Caucasus and Iran likewise used the Volga River and its tributaries for international trade, which became so intense, that this trade route was sometimes called ‘the Armenian road’, while ‘Armenian Lake’ (*Lacus Armeniacus*) and ‘Maritime Armenia’ (*Armenia Maritima*) became epithets for the Azov Sea and the Crimea in the 14th and 15th centuries. Privileged by subsequent Russian Tsars, since Ivan IV Grozny conquered the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556, Armenians held a key position in the production, manufacture and international trade in silk between Iran, the

Ottoman Empire, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. Since the late 14th century a permanent Armenian colony of merchants in Moscow is documented, with a first Armenian Apostolic Church in the 15th century. During the reign of Peter I the Armenian population of Moscow was already numerous. During the 18th century, many Armenian artisans and merchants in Moscow prospered as purveyors to the court.

The South Caucasus came under Russian military and political control at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century. In the 20th century, the collapse of the Russian Empire and later of the USSR led to independent South Caucasian republics (1918 to 1920/21; and since 1991). Situated on an economically, as well as strategically relevant isthmus, the conflict-

ridden area struggles hard for independence from competing regional supremacies (traditionally Russia, Turkey, Iran, and as newcomers: the USA and the European Union).

During Soviet times, the labour market of the USSR offered many possibilities for numerous highly educated and skilled residents from Armenia and Georgia outside these Soviet republics, with Moscow as a prestigious, but restricted starting-place for careers. Although a third of Soviet Armenia's population lived outside their republic (cf. Brubaker: 1994, 57), migration was not yet perceived as external migration, due to the lack of a visa regime, legal differences and the many commonalities in Soviet everyday-life.

The influx of South Caucasian (im)migrants in late and post-Soviet times profoundly changed the composition of the Armenian community in Moscow and in all of Russia respectively: In addition to the already existing and established Armenian Diaspora of Russia with nearly 500,000 members before 1988, many Armenian newcomers from conflict ridden republics such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan arrived as de facto refugees. Precise figures of the recent state of affair are difficult to ascertain. The Russian census of 2002, recorded 1,130,491 Armenians (4.4%) in the whole country, among them 124,425 in the capital (1.2% of Metropolitan Moscow's 10,101,500 population, where Armenians form the forth largest ethnic group after Russians [84.8%], Ukrainians [2.4%] and Tatars [1.6%]). More realistic estimations by the Armenian Apostolic Church, however, mention 2 to 2.5 million Armenians in Russia, half of them residing in Greater Moscow. Other estimations for the Armenian population of Moscow vary from 160,000 to 500,000 (cf. Galkina: 2006, 186). The important difference of ethnicity and country of origin shows the fact, that Armenians – before Azeris and Georgians – form the forth largest ethnic group of Moscow, while Armenia – after Ukraine (35%), Azerbaijan (10%), Belarus (8%), and Georgia (7%) – is the fifth among the top ten countries of origin of foreign born Moscow residents.⁷⁹

Community building is a more difficult task for the Armenians in Moscow than elsewhere, due to the lack of formal diasporic traditions in Soviet history and also to the highly diversified structure of the current Armenian community. Although

a quite substantial community of Armenians existed in Moscow already during Soviet times⁸⁰, any Armenian cultural and community activity was oppressed by the Soviet authorities as 'chauvinist'. Meanwhile there are 20 to 30 registered Armenian cultural, compatriot⁸¹, or expat NGOs, attempting – similar to all Diaspora organisations – to serve the dual aim of preserving a minority identity, while at the same time aiming at a better integration into the majority society. The largest and most influential Armenian NGO is the Moscow based *Union of Armenians of Russia* (Soyuz Arмян Rossii – SAR), an umbrella organisation of Armenian associations in more than 350 cities of Russia, chaired by the businessman Ara Abrahamyan.⁸² With the Moscow Armenian Theatre, the Moscow Armenian Chamber Choir, schools, grammar schools and an Armenian language centre, the contribution of the Muscovite Armenian population to the cultural life of Russia's capital is considerable (cf. Galkina: 2006, 190). There are four ethnic Armenians among the 450 MPs of the Russian State Duma (2008-11), and the state education system offers five Russian-Armenian schools in Moscow (ibid. 188), where children study some subjects in Armenian and the Armenian language.

Scholars have paid attention to the fragmented nature of the Armenian community in Russia, trying to develop typologies for the various 'diasporic milieus'. This is being done by differentiating between the socio-economically and legally well adapted 'old Armenians', and the newcomers of the second wave of immigration of the post-Perestroika era in the 1990s. The latter are divided into successful Armenian businessmen and much less successful 'borderline Armenians', characterized "by bi-locality, syncretism, and ambiguity" (Oussatcheva: n. d., 16). It is this second group of newcomers, "who still have no secure legal status, reliable jobs or places to live. Many of these people still have families left behind in their hometowns and villages. Often they move between Russian cities and their places of origin." (Ibid. 15) So far, the most elaborate typology is that by Galkina (2006), who identified seven⁸³ socio-cultural sub-groups in the Armenian diaspora of Moscow, determined by differences in the country of origin, language commands (bilingual or Russian speaking), levels of education and social status, profession, duration of permanence in Moscow etc. (ibid., 186 et seqq.).

Table 6:

Estimated Language adherence among Armenian migrant cohorts to Moscow

Country of origin	Russian as first language	Armenian as first language
Armenia	Ca. 10%	90 %
Azerbaijan	Ca. 90 %	10 %
Georgia	Ca. 75 %	25 %
Central Asian republics	Ca. 90 %	10 %
European part of FSU	100 %	---
Republics of FSU and/or unsuccessful settlement in Armenia due to lacking command of Armenian	100 %	---
Other regions of Russian Federation	100 %	---
Moscow born or residents for more than 20 years	100 %	---

Notsurprisingly, the most successfully integrated fragments of the Muscovite Armenian population are those who speak only or predominantly Russian and live for a long time in Moscow as in the case a) of those Armenians ‘deeply rooted in the Muscovite society’, whose ancestors have lived there for generations, or b) with mainly or only Russian speaking Armenian immigrants of the 1990s from different places of the previous USSR (Georgia, Azerbaijan, partly from Russia/ North Caucasus). Vice versa, the least integrated, educated, skilled and successful group are the predominantly Armenian speaking immigrants of recent years, who come from Armenia or from

areas in South-Western Georgia, predominantly inhabited by Armenians (Javakhetia, Abkhazia) (ibid., 187). As the table below confirms, with 75% (1987) and 89% (2000) the migrants/immigrants from the South Caucasian states have the highest share in the migration of ethnic Armenians to Moscow. Whereas this trend is increasing, the share of Armenian migrants from Russia and other post-Soviet republics declined considerably from 35% to 11%. The decline of this subgroup means that the share of Russophone or predominantly Russian speaking Armenians is roughly one tenth, whereas most of the newcomers of the 21st century speak predominantly Armenian.

Table 7:

Armenian migrants in Moscow by origin (1987 and 2000)

Country of origin	1987	2000
Armenia	44 %	50%
Georgia and Azerbaijan	31 %	39 %
Russia and other post-Soviet republics	35 %	11 %

Source: Arutyunyan 2001

The difference between ‘old’ resident Russian speaking Armenians and new immigrants from Armenia and Georgia is also reflected in the occupational stratification of Armenian employees in Moscow: with 44%, the ‘old’ resident Armenian hold the highest share in education, science, public health and culture; at the same time, most of them are occupied in the public sector; whereas 50% of the new Armenophone migrants are employed in

private companies or are else engaged in individual labour activities (22%); while only 19% work in the public sector. The newcomers to Moscow often start in simple occupations and in physical jobs such as construction and road works, taxi driving etc., while the “restaurant business serves as a common professional niche for all migrants from Transcaucasia” (Galkina: 2006, 188 et seq.).

Table 8:**Occupational distribution of Armenians employed in Moscow**

Groups of Armenians	Industry, construction, transport, communication	Trade, services	Education, science, public health, culture	Whole
Old residents	29 %	27 %	44 %	100 %
New immigrants	34 %	47 %	19 %	100 %

Source: Arutyunyan: 2001

Armenians in Russia fall frequently victims to ‘Caucasophobia’, a variety of xenophobia that is equally directed against Muslims and Christians from the North and South Caucasus. According to the *Human Rights Office* in 2007, Armenian immigrants were, together with Uzbeks, Azeris and Africans, the most threatened group by racism.⁸⁴ Negative attitudes towards the ‘people from Caucasia’ are stronger in Moscow than in other Russian regions (15% of the Muscovites mention them as the group that they ‘like the least’; 10% of respondents in St. Petersburg, and 14% in Novosibirsk said the same). 53% of the Muscovites are against the freedom to settle in Moscow; the respective numbers for residents of Novosibirsk and St. Petersburg are 11% and 38%.⁸⁵

As Table 9 indicates, Caucasian victims (killed and/or wounded) of racial and Neo-Nazi assaults in Russia form the second largest of eight subgroups of such victims, followed by victims from the five Central Asian countries. Considering, that ‘Caucasus’ (covering both the Russian North Caucasus and the three independent South Caucasian republics) covers a much smaller area with a corresponding smaller population, the victim tolls below are quite dramatic. Furthermore, the figures reveal a distinct difference in the intensity of the assaults: While persons of ‘Non-Slavic appearance’ form the main victim groups of racial killings (including premeditated murder), subgroups 7 and 8 show the highest amounts of wounded Russians etc.:

Table 9:**Victim groups of racial and Neo-Nazi assaults in Russia 2004-January 2009**

	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		Jan 2009	
	1) Killed		1) Killed		1) Killed		1) Killed		1) Killed		1) Killed	
	2) Wounded		2) Wounded		2) Wounded		2) Wounded		2) Wounded		2) Wounded	
	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
Overall	50	218	49	418	66	522	85	605	97	428	14	33
Including												
1) Dark coloured	1	33	3	38	2	32	0	37	1	22	1	8
2) From Central Asia	10	23	18	34	17	60	30	81	49	108	7	5
3) From Caucasus	15	38	12	52	15	72	25	57	23	72	3	5
4) From the Near East + North Africa	4	12	1	22	0	11	1	21	1	12	0	0
5) From China, Vietnam, Mongolia etc.	8	29	4	58	4	52	2	43	1	34	3	3

6) Other victims of 'non-Slavic appearance'	2	22	3	72	4	69	20	87	12	36	0	2
7) Victims of youth subcultures or leftist orientation	0	4	3	121	3	119	5	193	3	75	0	4
8) Others (including Russians) or no information	10	57	5	21	21	107	2	86	6	69	0	0

Source: Galina Koževnikova 2009

In particular Armenian migrants were hit by the pogrom of July 8, 2002, in the town of Krasnoarmeysk (Moscow region) with a population of 25,000 Russians and a few hundred migrants from Caucasia and Central Asia.⁸⁶ Among those migrants murdered in Moscow during 2006, there were at least seven Armenians, who were stabbed or shot, in most cases by young Russians, some of them being university students. For example, the Russian icon painter and student Artur Ryno (born 1989), who admitted to have murdered 37 non-Russians, among them one Armenian⁸⁷, expressed particular hatred against Caucasians, "who come to Moscow, unite here and oppress Russians".⁸⁸

The liberalization of migration laws in early 2007, the subsequent regularization of the residency and work of many migrants and the feasible increase of taxes, paid by migrants to the Russian tax authorities did not reduce the number of hate crimes. A new wave of anti-Armenian aggression in Moscow started in early 2009, when, within a few days, four ethnic Armenians, including a 50 year old mother and her 12 year old son⁸⁹, were stabbed to death in Greater Moscow. In contrast to previous years, when most victims were young males, victims are now also in the cohort of immigrants aged 50 and more, including a woman for the first time.

Human rights advocates in Russia blame the law enforcement, prosecution and jurisdiction authorities to delay or even suspend investigations of cases of racist violence.⁹⁰ For example, in the case of the 19 year old Armenian Artur Sardaryan, who was stabbed in 2006 at a Moscow city train station by Neo-Nazis, while screaming „For Russia's glory!“ the authorities refused to

categorize the case as related to inter-ethnic hate. On May 30, 2007, a Moscow court acquitted Roman Polusnyak of the murder of A. Sardaryan, although two witnesses had identified him.⁹¹ In 2007, a centre for legal assistance to Armenians of Russia was founded in Moscow as a result of the increasing incidents.⁹²

In Armenia, the increase of killings of Armenians in Moscow and the frequent inactivity of Russian law and law enforcement authorities caused strong protest by human rights NGOs and western orientated political parties, who called on the Armenian government to a more powerful defence of the rights of Armenian migrants. Under pressure of such public protests, President Robert Kocharyan and Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan articulated official protest for the first time, when a high-ranking Kremlin representative paid an official visit to Yerevan in June 2006 (cf. Danielyan 2006). In amazing contrast to this more recent development, the representative OSCE survey of 2005 revealed that 52% of Armenian migrants to Russia still considered the attitudes of the host country authorities to be either good or satisfactory. Even more are satisfied with the local population: 46.5% believe that they were positive, 28.6% rate them as satisfactory, and 18.7% as neutral (cf. Minasyan & Hancilova: 2006, 26 et seq.). Our project will help to ascertain whether this surprisingly positive opinion still lasts among migrants in and from Armenia.

Since the 1990s, Russian scholars have conducted several surveys to explore the perception of foreign immigrants by the Russian population. A 1994 survey revealed that 30 to 34% of ethnic Russians do not trust Armenians, Azerbaijanis

and Chechens; the only ethnic group that are viewed more suspiciously by Russians are the Roma (36.3%).⁹³ More recent surveys confirm the significant increase of this trend. A study among 2,500 respondents, published by the Moscow based demoscopic institute *Expertisa* in February 2004, found that one third of all Russians favour limiting the entry of foreigners to Russia, with 60% of those polled expressed dislike for people from the Caucasus regions, 51% for Chinese, 48% for Vietnamese, 47% for Central Asians, and 28% for Africans and Jews. Mark Umov, the head of *Expertisa*, commented in an interview that “chauvinism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism are worsening. Not because life in Russia is so hard. On the contrary, such phenomena occur whenever life becomes just a little easier, and people immediately want more. The rest depends on the moral climate within society.”⁹⁴

Xenophobic and racist sentiments are also widely spread among the academic youth of Moscow, as a survey of 2002, conducted by the sociology department of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations revealed: Among 306 students only 21% of the respondents say they are tolerant towards people of other ethnic groups. More than half (54%) concede that they express intolerance and resentment against people who do not look like them. Also, only 33% say they are ready to marry people from other ethnic groups, against 40% preferring only their own nationality. About 20% say the choice depends on the nationality. Other findings indicated that about 45% were against having Roma as neighbours,

31% were against Chechens, and 14% were against Jews. Finally, 69% say they will support any measures to restrict the freedoms and rights of Caucasus and Central Asia residents in Moscow.⁹⁵ A 2004 study by the University of St. Petersburg on the anti-foreign sentiments of Russians between the ages of 16 and 19 revealed that four out of ten young Russians support extreme nationalist groups, and one in ten of those aged 16 to 19 would be willing to beat up foreigners for money. Two out of three respondents felt that Russia belongs to the Russians, while at the same time only one fifth felt opposed to nationalism.⁹⁶ In late 2005, Alexander Brod of the Muscovite Human Rights Office declared that according to polls 60% of the residents sympathize with xenophobic slogans.⁹⁷ In a survey from 2005, headed by Tatiana Yudina, 60.5% of the Muscovite respondents admitted to have a “negative attitude towards migrants” while almost 40% do not want Armenian immigrants to live in Moscow (cf. Yudina 2005, 4).

The phenomenon of the rapid increase of xenophobia in Russian cities and in particular in the megalopolitan milieus of Moscow and St Petersburg in the middle of the first decade of the new century, demands further research and, above all, explanation, because, as Galkina rightly pointed out, in “Russia there are no obvious cultural and civilizational distinctions between the indigenous population and most migrants. Basically, they all come from CIS countries (...), with Russian as the language of intercultural relations” (Galkina 2006, 190).

4.3.2 Georgians in Moscow

According to realistic, but unofficial estimations, there are about one million Georgians living in the Russian Federation⁹⁸. Russian officials estimate, that their number is 300,000⁹⁹, and half of them are ‘illegals’¹⁰⁰. The official figure of Georgians in Moscow, according to the 2002 census, is 54,387, or 0.5% of Moscow’s population. Roin Konjaria, vice president of the Moscow Georgian Community, however, remarked in 2006, that there are between 150,000 to 200,000 Georgians living in Moscow and some 500,000 throughout Russia.¹⁰¹ Annually an estimated 90,000 citizens of Georgia migrate to Russia.¹⁰²

Georgia’s *Central Bank* estimates Georgians transferred 161.5 million EUR from Russia to Georgia in the first half of 2006 – accounting for nearly 15% of Georgia’s GDP¹⁰³, while a Russian official report of April 2006, mentioned 152 million EUR¹⁰⁴.

The Georgian residents of Moscow founded the *Moscow Georgian Community* (Moskovskoe Gruzinskoe Zemlyachestvo - MGZ)¹⁰⁵, to which the choir Lomisi (founded in 1989), a children’s theatre (founded 1993) and the literary club *Monatreba* are affiliated. The Georgian Orthodox

St George's Church in the Presna district, founded in 1750 for the Georgian colony of Moscow was returned to the Georgian Orthodox church in 1991,

and re-opened after restoration in 2000. There are two ethnic Georgians among the 450 MPs of the Russian State Duma (2008-2011).

Table 10:

South Caucasian ethnic groups in Moscow

Ethnic group or country of origin	Census 1989	Census 2002	Estimated figure (ca. 2007)	Percentage of 'legal' (registered) residents
				(before 2007)
Armenians	43,989	142,425 (1.2% of the entire population)	1-1.5 million	Ca. 10%
Azeris	20,727	95,563 (0.92%)	600,000	Ca. 15%
Georgians	19,608	54,387 (0.5%)	150-200,000	Ca. 44%

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Although the annual influx of migrants from Georgia to Russia surmounted that of immigrants from Armenia at least until 2004 (see Table 11), the total amount of Georgians in Moscow is roughly a third of the official Armenian figure and only a tenth of the unofficial estimation. For this reason, perhaps, their Diaspora and migration patterns have been less researched than it is the case with Armenian residents in Russia in general and in Moscow in particular. We assume that the Georgian community shares otherwise many features with the Armenians.

There are distinct differences as well: 1) a major difference to the Armenian community is the more than four times higher share of registered ('legal') residents among Muscovite Georgians (before the laws amendments of 2007). 2) While Armenians and Azeris are targeted in the first place by societal xenophobic violence, Georgian migrants to Russia fall victims to state orchestrated campaigns. In autumn 2006, when Tbilisi initiated its current conflict with Russia by arresting four Russian officers for espionage, the Russian government reacted with large scale repressions and deportations. It advised its citizens not to visit Georgia, stopped issuing visas to Georgian nationals, and cut off all air, land, sea and postal links with its southern neighbour, which affected the land blocked Armenian Republic as well, because as a result of the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish blockade of Armenia since 1993, all land transfer of goods from Russia come to Armenia via Georgia.

Moscow has also imposed restrictions on bank transfers, directly hurting the hundreds of thousands of Georgian nationals working in Russia. Georgian immigrants and entrepreneurs were targeted by increased police, health and tax inspections, prompted by closures of businesses, two casinos, car services, markets and stores. Under the pretext of fighting economic and tax crimes, the police and secret service *FSB* uncovered migrants who resided unregistered. When the police acquired volunteers from the population, the ultranationalist *Movement against Illegal Immigration* (DPNI) offered its services and called on their web site on nationalists to report on the places of possible living of 'illegal' Georgian migrants, their stores and clubs.¹⁰⁶ The *Russian Home Ministry* ordered some Muscovite schools to provide the names of pupils with Georgian family names in order to check their parents.¹⁰⁷ Moscow courts issued 700 deportation orders¹⁰⁸, regardless of the fact whether Georgians lived documented or undocumented in Russia or whether they considered themselves Georgians at all or Russians, had Georgian or Russian surnames.¹⁰⁹ According to the Georgian Foreign Minister, the number of Georgians evicted from Russia is as high as 4,600¹¹⁰, according to other sources 2,500.¹¹¹ Several Georgians died while in custody or during deportation hearings.¹¹² Due to the suspension of rail and air links between Russia and Georgia, deportees have had to take alternative routes back home. Many have ended up in Minsk, Yerevan or Baku.

A representative opinion poll of October 14-15, 2006, explored the views of 1,500 residents of 100 residencies in 44 Russian regions on Russia's policies towards Georgian immigrants and entrepreneurs. The results revealed ambiguities: In Moscow, 39% of the respondents declared that their attitude towards Georgians was still positive, despite the Georgian-Russian conflict and the actions taken by the Russian authorities, while 13% said that their attitude had worsened. Simultaneously, most respondents (57%) believe that law-enforcement agencies should in fact be more vigilant with regards to the activity of Georgians living in Russia. Only 28% of Russians are against such ethnically selective attention. It is indicative that half of those expressing their invariably positive overall attitude towards Georgians demand nevertheless a more careful attention on the part of law-enforcement agencies to Georgians' activities in Russia. According to the same survey, many respondents deal with Georgians on an everyday basis and judge on the basis of personal acquaintance: 18% of all respondents even say that they have Georgians among their friends, acquaintances or neighbours. More than half of the respondents (53% in Moscow) say that there are Georgians where they live, 29% believing that there are many of them in their locality¹¹³.

In an opinion poll in Georgia, conducted in March 2006 (and before the conflict of autumn 2006), respondents were given a choice between three commonly discussed approaches to relations with Russia. 53% of the respondents in Georgia said the two countries must be on friendly terms "no matter what", while only about a third (32%) said Georgia must stand its ground with regard to Russia and not yield under any circumstances. Insignificant three percent said Georgia should cease any relationship with Russia, while 12% did not offer a response¹¹⁴.

Migration both of Georgians and Armenians to Russia has constantly declined since the second half of the 1990s, in particular since 2001, as the table below suggests; the decline of two thirds (Armenia) or a half (Georgia) of arrivals from both countries coincided with a change of the relationship towards departures: While less persons from Armenia and Georgia arrived in Russia, the number of those departing was relatively higher (by more than 10%). However, in 2005 the situation changed again, reaching its so far peak level since 1997 for immigration from Armenia in 2007. Immigration from Georgia reached 10,595 arrivals in 2007, which is more than twice the amount of the bottom level of 2004. At the same time the number of departures to Armenia only slightly increased since 2004, while the amount of departures to Georgia slightly decreased:

Table 11:

Armenian and Georgian Departures and Arrivals to and from Russia

Arrivals from	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Armenia	19,123	15,951	5,814	6,802	5,124	3,057	7,581	12,949	30,751
Georgia	24,517	20,213	9,674	7,128	5,540	4,886	5,497	6,806	10,595
Departures to									
Armenia	2,578	1,519	1,362	1,114	1,098	654	620	686	728
Georgia	3,286	1,802	1,339	964	939	740	691	593	603

Source: *Russia Federal State Statistics Services*, International Migration Web site: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-09.htm

The International Migration Web Site of the *Russian Federal Statistics Services* does not yet offer the 2008 data. Drawing conclusions from the data of previous years, the new increase of arrivals from Armenia and Georgia is the more remarkable. The crisis of 2006 – the serial killings of Armenians and the increasing deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations – obviously had no lasting repercussions on the migration flows between Russia, Armenia and Georgia, thus again

illustrating that international migration develops its own, complex dynamics. Tentatively, we offer the conclusion that the legal liberalizations of early 2007 had a more positive effect on immigration than the above mentioned negative events had. But it remains to be seen, whether this trend will continue throughout 2008 and 2009, when Georgia's attempt to regain control over South Ossetia by military means caused a war with Russia in August 2008.

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NOTES

¹² From IOM's official web site: <http://www.iom.int/jahia/page692.html>.

¹³ The situation of Armenian youths and women in the sex industry of the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) is well researched by the NGO Investigative Journalists of Armenia. Compare their web site <http://hetq.am/en/>, which has been banned in Dubai as a result of their critical reporting.

¹⁴ “In the period between two population censuses, 1989 and 2002, due to emigration Georgia has lost more than one million of its citizens that consists of a fifth of its population” (Badurashvili 2005, 2). According to estimations made by the Georgian Centre of Population Research, some 300,000 persons have left Georgia officially and acquired citizenship in other states, while approximately the same number of persons resides in other countries, but they are still registered in Georgia (cf. Bit-Suleiman 2002). Other Georgian analysts regard the estimation of one million out-migrants as exaggerated (cf. Anjaparidze 1998).

¹⁵ According to estimations of Armenian experts, since 1990 Armenia lost more than one million of its citizens, which is 25% of its current population (cf. Poghosyan 2003).

¹⁶ Cf. web site: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html>

¹⁷ Cf. web site: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html>

¹⁸ Cf. web site: <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Europe/Georgia-MIGRATION.html>

¹⁹ Any duration from three to twelve months

²⁰ Any duration of foreign residence for more than twelve months

²¹ The Berne Initiative, which was launched by the Swiss government in 2001 and represents views of states throughout the world, defines remittances as “an essential component of the global economy, of the economies of countries of origin and of the economies of individual households. Remittance flows are large, stable and reach a broad spectrum of beneficiaries. The most obvious impact of remittances is to increase the income of the migrants' households in the

countries of origin and increase the total purchasing power of a given economy” (International Agenda for Migration-Management 2004, 38).

²² Germany Trade and Invest: Wirtschaftsentwicklung Armenien 2007 [Economic Development Armenia 2007]. 3 December 2008. Web site: http://www.gtai.de/DE/Content/_SharedDocs/Links-Einzeldokumente-Datenbanken/fachdokument.html?fident=MKT200812028027.

²³ See the web site: <http://www.dpni.org>.

²⁴ In 1997, Poghosyan conducted the first survey on 300 Armenian returnees who returned from Germany (in most cases deported asylum applicants).

²⁵ Poghosyan mentions “thousands of Armenian families annually” (Poghosyan 2006, 3), starting with the years 1997/98. In a survey conducted for the *Danish Refugee Council* in 2006, 200 families, who returned from Europe, and 100 families, ‘repatriating’ or fleeing from Central Asian countries, were interviewed.

²⁶ Most researchers identify highly skilled persons with tertiary education.

²⁷ Cf. *Fund for Peace*: Failed States Index, web site: http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/content/fsi/fsi_4.htm.

²⁸ Poghosyan notes that “despite of persistent talks about serious ‘brain drain’ from Armenia, today there is no special survey on this problem.” (Poghosyan 2003, 120)

²⁹ Cited in the Armenian news agency ‘Noyan Tapan’, February 10, 2006, web site: <http://www.cacianalyst.org> (accessed on August 21, 2007).

³⁰ Peculiarities of the Survey on External Migration, cf. web site: <http://www.armstat.am/Publications/2003/Migracia-ang/migracia-ang-III.1..pdf> (accessed on August 21, 2007).

³¹ The survey was supported by the *Open Society Institute*. Ten of the 100 interviews were published in “Emigration from Armenia” (2003). For a report on the book launch, cf. Mkrtchyan, Gayane: Exit Interviews: Publication reveals cause and effect of emigration. “ArmeniaNow.com”, November 7, 2003. Web site: <http://www.armenianow.com/>

archive/2004/2003/november07/news/exit/index.htm.

³² Mamigonian, Marc A.: Robert Krikorian of Harvard Speaks on Intellectual Crisis in Armenia at NAASR. "The Armenian Reporter", December 2, 2000. Web site: <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-79126449.html>.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ In comparison, during the same time period, 4.4% of the population of the Central Asian nations and 4.4% of other Caucasian nationals immigrated to the Russian Federation. Only 2.4% of the Slavic nations' population and 2.2% of the Baltic States' population left their home countries for Russia (cf. Riddle & Buckley 1998).

³⁵ The subsequent distortion of findings has been conceded as a methodological problem in Minasyan & Hancilova 2006, 29.

³⁶ This figure, however, is challenged by Armenian representatives from Georgia, who claim, that the real figure is something between 300,000 and 500,000 due to assimilation practices and similar reasons.

³⁷ Results of the 2002 census published in August 2003, show that Georgia has only 75,000 Russians left, compared with 350,000 in 1989 (cf. Peuch: 2003).

³⁸ Cf. web site: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/2006/b06_13/04-34.htm

³⁹ Cf. Gusep, Tarel: "The Russian military base protects us. From unemployment and from Turkey", "Caucasus Europe News: Politics", Issue 04/07/2005. Web site: http://www.caucasus.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=170

⁴⁰ Cf. Ghazinyan, Aris: "Unease in Javakhetia: Armenian population in Georgia concerned about loss of Russian military". "ArmeniaNow.com", April 15, 2005. Web site: <http://www.djavakhetia.com/detail.php?r=0&id=4602&l=en>.

⁴¹ Most workers leaving for Georgia were retail traders.

⁴² Without short term trips abroad (less than three months)

⁴³ Cf. "Immigration to Russia hits 20mln annually – official". March 15, 2006, "Russian News and Information Agency Novosti"; web site: <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060315/44345843.html>

⁴⁴ *Network of Ethnic Organizations* in Russia; a project of: *UNITED for Intercultural Action and Center for Interethnic Cooperation* in Moscow. Cf. web site: <http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/>

On July 24, 2002, a Russian *Federal Migration Service* official told reporters that between 10 million and 12 million undocumented immigrants live in Russia without paying taxes. Cf. Blagov, Sergei: "Ex-President, Caspian confusion

cloud Russo-Azerbaijan relations". "Eurasia Insight", August 1, 2002. Web Site: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080102.shtml>

⁴⁵ Cf. Blagov, Sergei: "Ex-President, Caspian confusion cloud Russo-Azerbaijan relations". "Eurasia Insight", August 1, 2002. Web Site: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080102.shtml>

⁴⁶ In Russia's 2002 census, 1,581,189 people did not report their country of birth; of those, 458,033 lived in Moscow.

⁴⁷ Cf. "Moscow for Non-Muscovites - City Authorities Find New Methods of Fighting Xenophobia". "Interethnic cooperation"; May 12, 2006; web site: http://www.interethnic.org/EngNews/120506_3.html

⁴⁸ The introduction of a visa regime for Georgians in 2001 has been officially legitimated by the need to prevent 'terrorists' to enter Russia from Georgia.

⁴⁹ Cf. "Moscow for Non-Muscovites - City Authorities Find New Methods of Fighting Xenophobia". "Interethnic cooperation", web site: http://www.interethnic.org/EngNews/120506_3.html

⁵⁰ For example Davlat Khudonazarov, Senior Research Fellow at the *Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Arts and Sciences* and former Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the *Kennan Institute*. – See: Tajik Migration in Russia: Risks and Prospects. *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars*, June 5, 2008. Web-site: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.print&event_id=408140&stoplayout=true

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Cf. *Federal Migration Service*: Report on Results and Basic Aims of the Activities of the Federal Migration Service from 2008-2010, pp. 22, 50, and 57; cited in Buchanan, Jane: "Are you happy to cheat us?" February 2009, web site: <http://www.hrw.org/de/node/80466/section/2>

⁵³ Cf. *Human Rights Watch* interview with Žanna Zayončkovskaya, May 26, 2008.

⁵⁴ Dmitriyev, Sergei: Migrant Workers in Moscow to Get New IDs. "Moscow News" No. 33, 23, August 2007. Web site: <http://www.mnweekly.ru/news/20070823/55269484.html>

⁵⁵ Cf. Buchanan, Jane: "Are you happy to cheat us?" February 2009, web site: <http://www.hrw.org/de/node/80466/section/2>

⁵⁶ Gordeeva, Marina: Legalization of Foreign Employees in Russia. "TIM-Services", <http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=5990>

⁵⁷ Dmitriyev, ibid.

⁵⁸ The new regulation was approved by Order No. 1 of the *Federal Migration Service*; Order No. 4 of the Ministry of Health and Social Development of the Russian Federation; Order No. 1 of the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation; and the State Fishery Committee of the Russian Federation on January 11, 2008.

⁵⁹ Yurev, Sergei; Tiftikidis, Maria: Russia introduces new regulations for foreign employees. August 14, 2008. Web-site: <http://www.cmslegal.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/26143880-3836-46e5-a5e6-0115f565d55e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/eb1b89f0-2895-4991-9af2-04d5fc4d3245/Complinet%20SVY.pdf>

⁶⁰ Zheng, Yu: Sino-Russian Relations: The Issue of Chinese Emigration. Beijing 2003, pp. 5-6. Web-site: http://gsti.mii.edu/CEAS-PUB/2003_Yu_Zheng.pdf.

⁶¹ Dmitriyev, *ibid*.

⁶² Web site: <http://www.sarinfo.org/nov266.htm>

⁶³ Cf. Hartmann, Jens: Russland: Rassismus ist Teil der Subkultur. In: „Die Presse”, 21.08.2007, web site: http://www.diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/324664/index.do?_vl_backlink=/home/i

⁶⁴ Cf. “Russian racism, out of control”. “BBC News”, 6 May 2006, web site: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4969296.stm>

⁶⁵ Cf. Franchetti, Mark: Russia’s Nazis launch wave of racist attacks. “Times Online”, 07 May 2007. Web site: <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article714084.ece?token=null&offset=0>.

⁶⁶ Cf. Hartmann, *ibid*.

⁶⁷ Alexander Brod of the Muscovite *Human Rights Centre* mentioned 130 incidents, registered as racist, in the period of January to May 2007, among them 31 victims of murder and 130 wounded. Web site: <http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:zhFWrIrXt0sJ:www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/%3Fnid%3D22538+%22Xenophobia+in+Russia%22&hl=de&ct=clnk&cd=16&gl=de>

⁶⁸ Cf. ‘Bigotry Monitor’, Volume 7, No. 7. Web site: <http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/052507BM.shtml>.

⁶⁹ Cf. Galina Koževnikova (2009), based on the monitoring by *Sova Center* (Moscow)

⁷⁰ Cf. No Justice for Race Victims in Russia. “Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty”, 6 June 2007. Web site: <http://russophobe.blogspot.com/2007/06/no-justice-for-race-victims-in-russia.html>

⁷¹ Cf. Koževnikova 2009

⁷² Cf. Koževnikova 2007

⁷³ Cf. “Radical nationalism in Russia and efforts to counteract it in 2006”, Web site: <http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/93A572E>

⁷⁴ Cf. web site: <http://www.sarinfo.org/nov266.htm> (accessed on august 21, 2007)

⁷⁵ Cf. *UN representative: Xenophobic Tendencies in Russia is another concern to us*. Web site: <http://www.interfax.com/17/136072/interview.aspx>

⁷⁶ *United Nations General Assembly*, Human Rights Council, Fourth Session, Agenda item 2: Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 entitled “Human Rights Council”: Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène; Addendum: Mission to the Russian Federation. -

GENERAL A/HRC/4/19/Add.3, 30 May 2007. Web site: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/127/01/PDF/G0712701.pdf?OpenElement>

⁷⁷ ICERD defines racial discrimination as „any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.“

⁷⁸ Cf. Humphries, Conor: Report claims migrants in Russia beaten and exploited. “International Herald Tribune”, February 10, 2009. Web site: <http://www.ihf.com/articles/reuters/2009/02/10/asia/OUKWD-UK-RUSSIA-MIGRANTS.php>

⁷⁹ Cf. web site: <http://www.migrationinformation.org/dataHub/GCMM/Moscowdatasheet.pdf>

⁸⁰ The 1989 census counts 44,000.

⁸¹ In this research project, we differentiate between ‘Diasporic’ and ‘compatriot’ formal and informal structures and networks. An example for a compatriot organisation is the Moscow based NGO ‘Artsakh’, an association of Armenian Muscovites from Nagorno-Karabakh.

⁸² Cf. web site: <http://www.sarinfo.org/>

⁸³ With a further subdivision in the group of migrants from Azerbaijan and Georgia

⁸⁴ Cf. Website: <http://209.85.129.104/search?q=cache:zhFWrIrXt0sJ:www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/%3Fnid%3D22538+%22Xenophobia+in+Russia%22&hl=de&ct=clnk&cd=16&gl=de>

⁸⁵ Cf. Shlapentokh, Vladimir: Moscow values: The masses and the elites. Website: <http://www.msu.edu/~shlapent/maselite.htm>

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- ⁸⁸ Cf. “18-year-old Moscow resident confessed to killing 37 people”, 28.05.2007. Web site: <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=22449>
- ⁸⁹ Cf. The murder occurred on the village of Safonovo (Greater Moscow) on February 11, 2009. “PanArmenian Net”, February 12, 2009. Web site: <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=28627>. In an earlier incident, a 51 years old Armenian man was found stabbed death in a building yard in Moscow on February 9, 2009. Cf. web site <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=28169>. A 50 years old Armenian administrator was stabbed to death on February 2, 2009 by ‘two unknown males’ at his workplace in a Moscow café. Cf. “PanArmenian Net”, February 3, 2009.
- ⁹⁰ Cf. Nazarian, Anna: Another Armenian killed in Moscow. “Radiolur”, 29 August 2007, web site: <http://www.armradio.am/news/?part=soc&id=6869>. <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=28627>
- ⁹¹ Cf. Moscow Court acquitted murderer of Armenian. 30 May 2007. Web site: <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=22484>.
- ⁹² Cf. web site: <http://www.panarmenian.net/news/eng/?nid=22342>
- ⁹³ Cf. Human Rights Watch: The Rise of Xenophobia in Russia. 1998. Web site: <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/russia/srusstest-03.htm>
- ⁹⁴ Cf. News: Bigotry Monitor: A Weekly Human Rights Newsletter on Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, and Religious Persecution in the Former Communist World and Western Europe”, Vol. 4, No. 12, March 26, 2004. Cited in web site: <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Honestly-Concerned-Mailingliste/message/303->
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OUT-MIGRATION FROM ARMENIA AFTER 1990

Gevorg Poghosyan

1: Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, migration from former Soviet countries joined international migration flows. Additionally to migration out of these countries, the movement of people distinctly increased within and among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which is the successor entity of the USSR after 1991. According to data from the European regional bureaus of the *UN High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), between 1991 and 1992, 700,000 refugees and 2.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were registered in the countries of the CIS (cf. Migration and Development 1999).

In 1999, the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM) issued a special report ("Migration in the CIS: 1997-1998"), in which it mentions in particular, that in 1997 the main destination of migrants from CIS countries was Russia. While by that time out-migration from Russia had already decreased (by 20%), immigration to Russia, mainly from the CIS, decreased only by 7.5% (cf. IOM 1999). According to the report, more than half of all migrants in CIS countries are Russians (54%), 16% are Ukrainians, 3.5% come from Belarus, and 6% left the countries of Transcaucasia (ibid.). The educational and occupational composition of migrants consisted predominantly of a working population, qualified workers, specialists, and

highly educated people. Each year about 220,000 migrants from the CIS migrate to Germany and other countries of Western Europe, to the USA and Israel (cf. IOM 1999).

Against this backdrop of tendencies within and from the CIS, specific processes are taking place in the South Caucasus region. Severe changes of historical traditions are in progress. The main historical changes of the last decade of the previous century for Armenia are characterized by depopulation and mono-ethnization of the population as a result of migration processes.

The historically unprecedented process of depopulation in the countries of the South Caucasus was one of the many negative consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and of the attempts to modernize those countries. In total, about three million people left the South Caucasus. By the end of the 1990s, around a million people had left Armenia. The main reasons causing such a huge out-flow of population is the abrupt reduction of work places, the economic crisis, and the decrease of living standards. Armenia became an 'export' country for unskilled and skilled workers. The 'export' of labour resources, the outflow of the economically active population on such a large scale, essentially changed the demographic structure of the Armenian society.

2: A Brief Historical Overview of Armenian Out-Migration

Migration processes, however, have their history. There were several huge waves of migration from Armenia taking place during the 20th century. Armenians fled because of genocide, deportation, political and religious pressure, war, bad economic conditions and crisis, social conflicts and natural disasters. The reasons for migration did not differ from those that prevailed in previous centuries, except for the Genocide of 1915 (cf. Karakashian & Poghosyan 2003).

According to the data of the National Library archives in 1917, 202 settlements of Armenians spread from Madras in India to Australia, Argentina, Ethiopia, North America, as well as to European and Russian cities. There is information about a certain degree of out-migration of Armenians from Turkey to the USA and Europe even before 1895. The vast majority of Ottoman Armenians were peasants; but in urban settlements they worked also as craftsmen and merchants.

Religion played an important role in the moral, spiritual and intellectual life of the people. The trading centre, royal residence and capital city of Ani (10th/11th centuries), whose ruins are to be found at the North-East border of today's Turkey, was also known as the 'City of 1,001 Churches'. Many ruins of Armenian churches in the recent territories of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Iran witness the Armenians' once wide-spread area of settlement in the Near East.

Besides, areas of settlement were not always voluntarily chosen. Since ancient times, rulers of the Near East used to deport entire populations, as it happened in the early 17th century, when Iranian rulers during their retreat from Ottoman forces depopulated parts of the Armenian Highland by marching their population to Iran¹¹⁵ and resettling the survivors in different areas. As a secondary result of the massive forced settlement in Iran, substantial Armenian communities emerged in the Far East (Japan, China and the Philippines), but are almost extinct at present.

Currently, far-away Armenian communities can still be found in India, but also in Australia, New Zealand, Sub-Saharan Africa (Sudan, South Africa, and Ethiopia), in Singapore, Myanmar and Hong Kong.

The Genocide against the Armenians during the Ottoman Empire

At the turn of the 19th century, tragic changes took place in the lives of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: During the reign of the reactionary sultan Abdülhamit II (1876-1909) 300,000 Armenians perished in local massacres (1894-96) and from starvation and disease in their aftermath (cf. Dadrian 1995)¹¹⁶. Further 100,000 Ottoman Armenians fled their homeland and found sanctuary in neighbouring countries such as the Balkans, Iran and the Russian Empire (cf. Dadrian: 1995). But an increasing number sought

already trans-Atlantic refuge in the 'New World': Between 1895 and 1899, about 70,980 Armenians left for the USA (cf. Tashjian 1947). Emigration of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire continued until the beginning of the 20th century and resulted in even more significant flows between 1915 and 1922.

These were caused by the genocide (nation-wide massacres and forced deportation) against the remaining Ottoman Armenians, planned and organized by the chauvinist *Committee for Union and Progress* (CUP; in Turkish: *Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti*), that autocratically ruled the Ottoman Empire since 1913. This party attempted to stabilise the collapsing multi-religious and multi-ethnic Empire by means of ethnic homogenization, namely by Turkification. Its results were the annihilation of 1.5 million of a pre-war population of 2.5 million Ottoman Armenians¹¹⁷. Survivors who did not return into the territory of the newly founded, post-war Republic of Turkey (in 1923) lost their right to obtain Turkish citizenship under the new Kemalist regime during the 1920s.¹¹⁸ To a large extent, the present-day Armenian diasporas represent the consequences of the genocide during the years 1915 to 1917.

Though Armenian settlements of refugees and traders existed since Medieval times (since the loss of Armenian statehood in 1045), they grew in size only after the genocide, when the survivors did not dare to return to their homelands for fear of continuing persecution, or were barred from Turkey by the above mentioned legislative regulations. Similar to the survival patterns of previous decades, they established themselves predominantly in neighbouring areas of their historic homeland: in the Balkans and in Middle East countries (Lebanon, Syria, Iran). Further ten thousands settled in Western Europe, in particular in France and in the Americas (North and South).

Migration from and to Armenia during the Soviet Era

A massive wave of immigration of ethnic Armenians from the Middle East into Soviet Armenia started in 1946¹¹⁹. At that time the government of Soviet Armenia, with the approval of the central Soviet

government appealed to the diasporas, hoping to compensate for Armenia's losses of its male workforce¹²⁰ during World War II. Although the Soviet Armenian intention was primarily to attract

unskilled labourers (Karakashian & Poghosyan 2003, 236), many skilled and highly qualified migrants of different professions arrived from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Greece, after giving up their properties. During 1946 to 1949 alone, some 100,000 ethnic Armenians immigrated, mainly from the Balkans (Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece) and from the Near and Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran), but also from France¹²¹ and the USA¹²²; among them, 32,000 from Lebanon and Syria, 21,000 from Iran, 18,000 from Greece and 5,300 from France. The total figure of ethnic Armenian immigrants to Soviet Armenia in the period between 1921 and 1962 was given as 220,000, and for the period of 1962 to 1973,

with 26,140.¹²³ These figures include also the influx of Armenians from other Soviet republics, which increased when the influx of foreign ethnic Armenians decreased after 1965 to some 3,000 to 4,000 immigrants annually. In all, the number of immigrants to Soviet Armenia between 1965 and 1985 was as high as 178,000 people.

At the same time, the Soviet regime harshly limited the freedom of movement, especially concerning out-migration.¹²⁴ But Armenia used to be a region of labour surplus, as far more labour resources existed than there were employment possibilities. Thus, the seasonal departure of Armenians to other destinations within the USSR was a well known phenomenon.

The Nagorno-Karabakh War

Due to the still unsolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (since 1888) and subsequent undeclared war (1991 to 1994), the flight of Armenians from Azerbaijan resulted in refugee movements to Armenia, Russia, the USA and other countries. According to data from the *UNHCR*, out of 360,000 Armenians expelled from Azerbaijan, 264,339 found refuge in Armenia (cf. *UNHCR* 2001); of these, about 100,000 were naturalized. Many others left the country in search of earnings and a better life elsewhere. The admission of refugees from Azerbaijan lasted over many years.

Neither the Armenian society, nor the Armenian state was capable of tackling the accommodation and integration of such dimensions of refugees. Most of them came from predominantly urban, industrialised societies (like Sumgait and Baku), and were often specialised in the petroleum industries. Subsequently, they did not fit into the different profile of professions needed in Armenia. Great efforts to determine state policies concerning refugees and aiming at their full integration were finally successful during the late 1990s.

Armenian Out-Migration and Diasporas Today

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, migration processes revived after having been restrained for seven decades. Despite the generally extended freedom of movement after 1991, Armenians continued on their routes to Russia and to other countries of the CIS, where already established business contacts and relationships with the local Armenian Diaspora existed. Visa regimes outside the CIS and the lack of a command of foreign languages other than Russian were further reasons for the continuity of migration patterns. During that period 800,000 to 900,000 people migrated from Armenia (cf. *IOM* 2002), which is about one third of the current overall population. According to census data, 3.2 million people lived in the country in 2001 (cf. <http://www.armstat.am>).

According to various experts' estimations, the number of Armenians in the world today amounts to approximately eight to nine million. Today, the countries with the largest numbers of Armenians (excluding Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) in rank of order are Russia, the USA, France, Georgia, Lebanon, Argentina, Iran, Syria, Canada, and the Ukraine. Since most states in their census do not include the category of ethnicity, but poll only nationalities or citizenships, estimates can only relate to the registration of baptism, weddings and burials, as established by the *Armenian Apostolic Church* that is the only universal Armenian organization. However, such figures do not only exclude Armenians of other denominations (Catholics, Uniates, Protestants),

but may be artificially enlarged or decreased for various political reasons, depending on the situation in the given countries.¹²⁵ Tentatively, some figures are suggested here for the above mentioned countries:

- Russia: While in 1989, 532,390 ethnic Armenians were counted in the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), the 2002 census revealed 1,134,491 residents with Armenian citizenship (nationality). However, in 1996, the Armenian Apostolic Arch-Bishop for Russia, Tiran Gyuregyan, mentioned an influx of 1.63 million ethnic Armenians who settled in Russia after 1991: 850,000 of these came from the Republic of Armenia, 350,000 from Azerbaijan, 250,000 from Georgia and Abkhazia and further 180,000 from the five Central Asian republics, in particular from Turkmenistan.¹²⁶ Together with the 'old' Russian residents of Armenian ethnicity this makes a total of 2,162,390 ethnic Armenians in the Russian Federation in 1996. More current estimates of approximately 2.5 million ethnic Armenians in Russia therefore do not seem improbable.
- USA: Reliable estimates vary from 1.2 to 1.4 million.¹²⁷
- France: Reliable estimates vary from 400,000 to 500,000.
- Georgia: The number of ethnic Armenians declined from 437,273 (census of 1989) to 248,929 (2002 census, not covering South Ossetia and Abkhazia). However, Armenian NGOs and representatives of the *Armenian-Apostolic Church* in Georgia believe that as a result of assimilation the real number is higher (estimates vary between 300,000 and 500,000). The 2003 census in Abkhazia revealed 44,870

Armenians (1989: 76,500), but the results are generally refuted as exaggerated not only by Georgian authorities, but also by international NGOs such as the *International Crisis Group*.

- Lebanon: With the last official census being conducted in 1932, everything is guesswork. Estimates put the number of ethnic Armenians as high as 150,000 (1975: 186,000).
- Argentina: The last census of 2001 did not consider ethnicity or nationality. There may live 130,000 ethnic Armenians in the largest Armenian community of South America.
- Ukraine: According to the 2001 population census, there were 99,894 ethnic Armenians residing in the country. 50,363 of them were nationals of the Republic of Armenia, 5,798 were Ukrainian nationals and further 43,105 were nationals of the Russian Federation.¹²⁸
- Iran: While details of the 2006 population and household census were not available, estimates vary considerably between 80,000 and 500,000, with a probability rather being something between 80,000 and 100,000 (1979: ca. 300,000). Since Armenians are the Christian showcase minority in Iran, they are given the right of two mandate seats in the National Assembly (one seat for each 100,000 members of a minority among the recognized 'book religions').¹²⁹ This indicates an official acknowledgement of 150-200,000 ethnic Armenians in Iran.
- Syria: Ca. 75,000 – 200,000 (1985: 150,000), with the low figure being the more probable.

In Central Europe, migrants from Armenia first tried to settle in Germany (cf. Poghosyan 1997), Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland (cf. Marciniak 2001).¹³⁰

Social Composition of Out-Migration from Armenia Today

Many migrants from Armenia have departed without any preparation of documents, such as visas. Initially, they intended not to leave for long, but assumed they would earn some money and return. But the absolute majority of them has not returned yet and continues to live in different countries as undocumented migrants. The

remainder (incomparably less) joined the group of seasonal workers which periodically leave, generally to Russia and to other countries of the CIS (cf. Poghosyan 2003).

The social-demographic composition of migrants is highly differentiated. In general these are people between the age of 18 and 55.

The majority of them (65%) are men of working age. Their educational level is quite high – as a rule these are qualified workers with an average and professional-technical education. A further 30 to 35% of the migrants from Armenia have completed higher education (cf. UNDP 1999). At the beginning of the period of massive out-migration (1991 to 1994), male migrants were leaving unaccompanied, when trying to settle abroad. Only at a later stage entire families would migrate (cf. *ibid.*).

Migration processes are serious factors of social transformation and have an influence on the demographic and social situation in the country. Armenia was among those countries that ‘exported’ its labour surplus, including qualified specialists and intellectual workers. Due to this ‘brain drain’ Armenia has lost intellectual and spiritual wealth that it had spent on the education and training of specialists (cf. Yudina 2002).

Economists predict that future out-migration from Armenia will annually number between 70,000 and 80,000: “If to proceed from the fact that the economical development will be 6% a year, that can create 30-35 thousand work places, then even under these circumstances the domestic market will not be able to take up the incoming labour force within the next few years” (Papoyan & Bagdasaryan 1999, 9). Armenian scholar Khojabekyan notes that between 1986

and 1990 the population of an active economic age (25-50) numbered one million on average. But between 1996 and 2005, it already numbered 1.35 million people (cf. Khojabekyan 2001). In other words, the number of working age persons increased dramatically, and will certainly make the continuation of out-migration likely.

The mechanism of migration allowed hundred of thousands of Armenian nationals to find work abroad and in that way prevented a significant increase of the unemployment rate in the country. The unregulated redistribution of the workforce from Armenia complemented the need for labour in other regions of the CIS. Though migrants promote the economical survival of the people, their absence nevertheless harms the economy of the Republic of Armenia at the same time. The formation of a middle class has suffered to a large extent.

Today new migration processes take place in the country, and the state still does not play an active role in regulating them. This concerns first of all the return of undocumented Armenian migrants and their reintegration into society; secondly, the trafficking of women for exploitation including the sex-industries; and finally transit migration in Armenia. The above listed relate to new phenomena in the sphere of migration in Armenia, but has an increasing impact.

Causes of Out-Migration from Armenia

Thorough, socio-historical analysis of the reasons and circumstances that cause large-scale migratory flows provides evidence of multidimensional factors that have sometimes been inappropriately simplified. An analysis of the causes of migration here shall provide a detailed categorisation of the key motives and objective circumstances which have caused the large scale outward flow of the population during the last ten years (cf. Kharatyan 2003):

Cultural-historical factors: Armenians have a historically conditioned tendency to high mobility and adaptability to new living conditions. Numerous historically formed Armenian diaspora(s) in many countries of Europe, Asia and America verify this

fact. The presence of diasporas is without any doubt an important ‘pull’-factor that stimulates the mobility of labour.

Historical-political factors: The collapse of the Soviet Union, and as a result the emergence of 15 new independent states, led to what is commonly called the ‘anti-block’-syndrome, i.e. when the citizens of the previous Warsaw Pact countries, who were limited by a strict migration regime and limited options to travel abroad, suddenly obtained the freedom of movement and left for other countries. Long-standing political propaganda led by Western powers towards the population of the Soviet Union should also be considered a factor in this context. The praise of Western values,

freedoms and a 'Western way of life' certainly had an impact on many Soviet people and they took their ways to Europe in search of a higher living standard as soon as they were given this opportunity.

Furthermore, a particular political situation emerged in the development of the new independent states, when political power was redistributed. In the case of Armenia (as in Georgia and Azerbaijan) over the first years of the establishment of a state system, the focus shifted to the declaration of 'national values': of the language, culture, traditions etc. This 'national' revival created some discomfort for the Russian-speaking part of society that in turn intensified its migratory dispositions. It is well known that among the migrants who left Armenia within the first years of independence, many Russian-speaking residents and even Russophone specialists of Armenian descent preferred to leave for Russia out of political considerations.

The change of the political regime played a decisive role in the historical-political push-factors. Usually, literature on migration tends to underestimate this, but in our opinion it has a high relevance. Under Soviet rule large groups of skilled state officials, including their family members, settled in Armenia (as in other republics). For the majority of them the collapse of the regime meant the end of their professional career, a change of their life strategy. These people found themselves if not in the position of social outcasts from the new society, then at any rate among the socially and economically disadvantaged. Many of them emigrated to Russia and other countries at the first opportunity.

War and conflict factors: The Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict that in the end of 1991 transformed into a war became the cause of the displacement of huge amounts of people from

both sides. About 500,000 ethnic Armenians were forced to escape from Azerbaijan, of which the majority, 360,000, came to Armenia.

As a result of the war, an additional 78,000 Armenian refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh arrived in Armenia. A further 75,000 residents of villages situated near the Armenian border to Azerbaijan were forced to leave their homelands because of constant bombings, destruction, kidnapping and hostage-taking. The depressing situation of war and long lasting, unsolved conflict, combined with the failure of international mediation and conflict settlement caused the flight of hundred of thousands of Armenians.

Economical factors: A whole set of difficult economic conditions, such as the blockade of roads and communication by neighbouring Azerbaijan and Turkey, the suspension of almost half of the industrial enterprises of the country, a violent energy crisis, a high level of unemployment and the abrupt decrease of living standards for the majority of the population, the loss of former markets for export goods and the loss of providers of raw materials became the main reasons for the emigration of almost one third of the Republic's population during recent years.

Psychological factors: These factors relate to a sensed loss of the 'tranquil life' and a desperate situation for certain parts of the population. In search of a better future for themselves and in particular for their children people try to improve their life by going abroad. The psychological factor of despair and mistrust towards the future in Armenia played a major 'push'-role in the formation of migratory dispositions. Throughout different periods, these factors sometimes weakened, sometimes intensified, but as a rule they had a strong impact on the social self-esteem of citizens. Nowadays they have slightly weakened, but remain relevant.

Transit Migration

In recent years Armenia has become a buffer zone through which transit migrants try to cross to enter Western Europe. For example, it was reported that Kurdish refugees from Turkey have crossed the Armenian-Turkish border, reached the Armenian capital and were arrested at the nearby international

'Zvartnots' airport when attempting to depart to Amsterdam (cf. Karakashyan & Poghosyan 2003). Armenia has also become a transit country for migrants from India, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, and even from some African countries for those making their ways to Russia and Europe.

Transit migrants do not appear in large numbers, and do not make for the main type of migration in Armenia. However, a certain quantity of migrants crosses the territory of the Republic every year, usually making their ways from South to North. As our own research and observations has shown, these migrants are predominantly male and of working-age (between 18 and 40). Their aim is to study or work elsewhere in order to support their families at home, and/or they intend to bring their spouses later. The main reasons for migration are the unfavourable economic, political and social condition in their countries of origin. Between 2000 and 2001, about 95 transit migrants were registered in the country (cf. IOM 2002). Many of

those transit migrants are being assisted to return with the help of international organizations.

Return flows of transit migrants occur as well within the territory of Armenia. Thus, for example during the recent military operations in South Ossetia and Georgia, a huge flow of migrants (about 20 thousand) from Georgia left for Armenia. Among those were ethnic Georgians and Armenians who left their homes because of the martial law imposed in Georgia, and also because of the termination of air communication between Moscow and Tbilisi. Georgian nationals who used to live in Russia returned to Georgia via Armenia.

Vague Statistics

The system of statistics on out-migration or emigration carried out by the passport services of the territorial divisions of the *Police of the Republic of Armenia*, based on the data on population being registered or expunged from the register, does not reflect the full volume of population movements. A considerable proportion of the population leaves the Republic and resides abroad for a rather long period of time without being expunged from the register. In order to fill this gap of information and to acquire a clear understanding of the external migration volumes of the Republic, the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the Republic of Armenia* in collaboration with the *National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia*, transportation companies and services

of the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter: RA) border-crossing posts, have initiated the data collection on persons arriving in and leaving from Armenia. Since 2000, the Department monthly receives information on the numbers of arrivals and departures in Armenia (a) through the *RA Central Department of Civil Aviation*, (b) the *RA State Customs Committee*, and (c) from the *Armenian Border Guards of the RA National Security Service*.

According to data from the *Agency on Migration* at the *Republic's Ministry of Territorial Administration's*, the quantity of arrivals and departures in Armenia in March 2008 was as follows:

Table 1:

	Total	Including transport		
		Airway	Railway	Car
Arrived	88,524	38,423	1,137	48,964
Departed	104,109	56,369	1,301	46,439
Balance	-15,585	-17,946	-164	2,525

The quantity of persons that had arrived and departed from Armenia between January and

March 2008 reads as follows:

Table 2:

	Total	Including transport		
		Airway	Railway	Car
Arrived	240,003	114,303	3,719	121,981
Departed	272,109	153,746	3,734	114,629
Balance	-32,106	-39,443	-15	7,352

The analysis of the passenger registration made at the entry points of the Republic of Armenia shows that between January and March 2008, the quantity of departures from the Republic outnumbered the quantity of arrivals (negative migratory balance) by 32,100 persons. This is 10,900 persons (or: 51.7%) more than the corresponding index of the same period of the previous year. The negative balance in March was 15,600 persons, which in comparison to the same month in the previous year represented an increase of 5,400 persons, or 52.4%.

The amount of passenger transportation between January and March 2008, in comparison to the same period during the previous year has

increased by 85,500 persons or 20%, totalling 512,100 persons (cf. www.dmr.am).

Occasionally and in dependence from the deterioration of the political situation in the region these flows intensify. This happened, for example in 2003 at the beginning of the USA-led war in Iraq. Several thousand refugees then left Iraq for Armenia and headed further to the West. The majority of these migrants came from those families who were troubled and frightened by the state of emergency in their country. Among the thousands of migrants from Iraq to Armenia, the majority were ethnic Armenians who have been resided in Iraq since long.

The Role of NGOs

In 1989, a *State Committee on Migrants and Refugees* was formed in order to provide help for and to work with the 360,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan. In the meantime the Committee has extended the field of its activities and has included different categories of migrants and asylum seekers into its spectrum of work. Several buildings have already been allocated as a temporary residence for migrants and refugees. A group of specialists has also been formed, composed of jurists, doctors, and interpreters. However, the contribution of social and international organizations in this work should

not be underestimated. Both the government of Armenia and accredited international organizations highly welcome the efforts and support of local non-governmental organizations. Today 10 to 15 NGOs are working in this field. Many of them are situated in Yerevan, but have their branches in distant and marginal regions of the Republic as well. By now, they have accumulated great experience by working with refugees, undocumented and transit migrants, victims of trafficking and migrants returning to Armenia.

3: Return Migration of RA Nationals and the Importance of Reintegration Assistance

Massive out-migration from Armenia started during the 1990s when, according to expert estimates, one million people emigrated from

Armenia, of which 65% departed to settle in Russia and 10 to 15% in various other European countries.

In recent years a different pattern can be observed. If before the year 2002 the negative migration balance was 50,000 to 60,000, in 2002 that number decreased to 3,000, and in 2003 increased again to 10,000. Moreover, from 2004 on the negative balance of migration turned into a positive one: in 2004, the net migration was 2,000; in 2005, it was 12,500; and in 2006, it was 21,800. These statistics allow us to observe a slow, but stable return flow of RA nationals from foreign countries.

The majority of migrants from Armenia hold an undocumented status in countries of destination. In order to attain a legal status they attempt to apply for asylum, but as a rule their applications are rejected and they face a demand to return. Readmission agreements have been concluded by Armenia with five European countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Lithuania and Bulgaria), allowing the foreign signatories to deport undocumented migrants and obliging Armenia to receive the deportees. Negotiations continue for additional readmission agreements with nine other countries.

However, after returning to Armenia, the vast majority of RA nationals depart again. After having spent in the average five to six years abroad, they find the legal environment in Armenia totally changed and unfamiliar; new institutions have meanwhile emerged. Returnees find that they have lost social connections (relatives; kin; friends); that they would prefer to escape the stressful experience of leaving and returning. In other words, the returnee finds her or himself in an absolutely different environment and is therefore looking for ways to leave again. For example, in 1996, the German authorities deported approximately 1,500 persons to Armenia. One year later the *Faculty of Sociology of the State Yerevan University* conducted an investigation into the destiny of those people. The survey revealed that 92% of them re-migrated from Armenia and a vast majority of them returned back to Germany. A study conducted by the *IOM* among returnees to South Caucasian countries confirmed these findings. To avoid re-migration, the provision of reintegration assistance for nationals seems highly important. Existing programs prove that re-migrating effects can be avoided or at least limited¹³¹.

Recently, the *Migration Agency of the Ministry of Territorial Administration of the RA* has elaborated a concept paper on the return and reintegration of Armenian migrants. The concept paper includes an “Implementation of Return and Reintegration Assistance Package”. It includes the obtaining, changing and registering of documents; job placement; social assistance issues; health protection issues; education issues; issues connected with the military service. Within the frameworks of return and reintegration assistance programs, returned nationals would have the possibilities to:

- be informed about policy and programs carried out in the RA in the field of social support, education, health protection, etc;
- receive advisory and, if available, practical assistance on the issues of obtaining, changing and registering of documents;
- receive information about job opportunities, professional skill trainings, organizations providing loans for organizing a small business, etc;
- receive information regarding state benefit programs on health protection as well as psychological assistance (free of charge);
- receive information regarding measures taken with the purpose of overcoming the language barrier occurring in children's education, trainings organized within the frameworks of state order, as well as acknowledgement of diplomas and other issues connected with education;
- receive information about amnesty applicable to persons who have not completed their obligatory military service (many of RA citizens have fear that after their return to Armenia they may be prosecuted because of draft or service escape).

Today, the following programs on return and reintegration are in action in Armenia:

- ‘Return Assistance Program for RA Nationals from Switzerland’, which is run by the Migration Agency at the Ministry of Territorial Administration for the Republic of Armenia, the Swiss Federal Office for Migration (FOM),

and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

- The program 'Return to Origins', which is run by the French-Armenian Development Foundation in Armenia and the National Agency for the Reception of Foreigners and Migration under the Government of France and the Armenian Association of Social Aid in France.
- The program 'Stable Reintegration after Voluntary Return', which is run by the Armenian Caritas, the Government of Belgium and the International Caritas of Belgium.
- The program 'Support for Migration Policy Development and the Forming of

Correspondent Potentials in Armenia', which is run by the British Council of Armenia, the Migration Agency at the Ministry of Territorial Administration for the Republic of Armenia and the International Centre of Human Development with the support of the European Union.

Within the framework of these programs, the webpage www.backtoarmennia.com was created, which provides potential returnees from foreign countries with valuable information on issues of return and reintegration in their homeland. Potential returnees and others also receive irrefragable answers to their questions through a hotline on this site.

The Swiss Model

The aim of the 'Return Assistance Program for RA Nationals from Switzerland' was to organize return and further reintegration of those RA nationals residing in Switzerland and whose applications for asylum had been rejected. The program started on April 19, 2004, on the basis of the memorandum 'On Assistance Programs for RA Nationals in Switzerland' signed between the *Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation* and the *Migration Agency of the Ministry of Territorial Administration for the Republic of Armenia*. The program terminated on December 31, 2008.

The assistance program for returnees had been implemented in the following five areas: (1) Catch-up courses for minors; (2) Training courses for adults; (3) Support in setting up a business company; (4) Job placement support; (5) Psychological counselling, social and medical assistance.

Within the framework of this program, 22 families (in all, 52 persons) have returned from Switzerland. Six families of beneficiaries received loans for setting up a business company. These loans have been spent on mushroom cultivation, cattle-breeding, soft furniture production, fruit preservation and the sale of fresh fruit. One returnee received a job placement, three returnees have completed computer courses, further ten

returnees have passed medical examination and six minors have attended accelerated learning courses. All beneficiaries have received psychological counselling. Program staff also helped them on the issues of obtaining documents, accessing a disability group, and in pension related matters.

Since April 1, 2006, a new component had been introduced into the program: an advisory assistance sub-program for returnees from European and CIS countries. This program included hot-line expert consultancy on migration issues. An information booklet had been developed for RA nationals residing in Switzerland who intend to return. According to the Program, the number of RA nationals seeking asylum in Switzerland has significantly decreased.

In 2008, it was decided to implement the following measures:

- To research, through the Foreign Office and the *Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency*, which European authorities are responsible for returnees to their countries of origin. The objective is to keep the program, which is implemented in cooperation with Switzerland, operational;
- To present a program proposal to partner European authorities for the implementation of the Swiss program model, taking into account peculiarities of the given countries;

- To hold a joint conference in Yerevan with the *Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation* and the *Federal Office for Migration (FOM)* of Switzerland, inviting staff members of foreign representations in Armenia and interested international organizations (*IOM, OSCE, ILO*, etc.);
- To inform Swiss state authorities about the importance and results of the program;
- To produce a film translated into English about the program's successful results and present it to partner European authorities;
- To organize meetings with high officials of embassies of European countries in the Republic of Armenia and to keep them aware of the importance and procedures of the reintegration program;
- To highlight the importance of the program at various international conferences;
- To prepare a website titled *Return and Reintegration*;
- To provide RA nationals returned from Switzerland with reintegration assistance in the prescribed procedures.

4: Conditions for the Legislative Basis

It must be mentioned that the migration related legislation in Armenia needs improvement. The existing rules, as accepted by the *National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia*, cover migration issues in an incomplete way and different aspects are regulated by separate rules and government decrees. For instance, until 2007, the normative field that regulated the migration of foreigners, was not completed and in several aspects did not correspond with internationally accepted and effectively used standards. Sometimes regulations did not even correlate with the current Constitution of the RA (1995), but left substantial regulations to the decision of executive authorities and, in doing so, called into question the democratic nature of the principles of law enforcement practices on migration issues (cf. Kabeleova et al. 2007). The key problem for the Armenian legislation on migration is that many procedures are not defined clearly enough in the laws and sub-legislative acts, including governmental resolutions and decrees, presidential decrees and also many rules and orders, established by different state committees and commissions (ibid.). Another problem concerns the democratic content of the legislation. At present law projects, government resolutions and decrees are discussed several times and are reviewed in different committees of the Parliament, while sub-legislative acts (for example, the rules established by the state ministries and agencies) are not thoroughly reviewed. The working order and the distribution of responsibilities among different state organs are not defined in precise and transparent ways,

and sometimes functions overlap. The practice and rule of secondary legislation, i.e. sub-legislative acts deriving from basic law, hamper the formation of a stable, effective legal field and limits to administrative power. While an implementation of sub-legislative acts may be effective for a short period of time, a clear and distinct legislation must be worked out, a proper democratic supervision must be established and as a consequence the administrative dispositions must be fully excluded (ibid.).

In June 2004, the government of Armenia adopted and approved the draft on the state regulation of migration. Afterwards a number of important drafts were adopted, in particular the draft of the government decision on border control implantation by the two-way inspection system and also the regard of the entry and departure of the RA nationals. In the near future the Armenian legislation on migration will be developed and improved by the adoption of several new statutes. Legislative projects which have already been submitted for discussion to the corresponding committees of the Parliament include 'The Law of immigration', 'The Law of the Regulation of the Labour Employment Regulation Abroad', and 'The Law of Entry and Departure of the Citizens of the RA'. These and a number of other actions allow improvements of the legislation that regulates migratory processes. However, the control over the law enforcement practices must also be reinforced and the administrative structures which are engaged with migration, both in the country and outside, must be strengthened.

5: National RA legislation on migration

The Republic of Armenia, after proclaiming its independence in 1990, adopted a number of laws, which, together with other issues, were intended to regulate issues of migration. Among the major laws adopted were the 'Law on Language' (1993), the 'Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Republic of Armenia' (1994), the 'Law on State Borders' (1994), the 'Law on Foreign

Investments' (1994), the 'Law on Citizenship' (1995)¹³², and the 'Law on Consular Services' (1996).

In 1999 the *State Department for Migration and Refugees* was founded as a special state body dealing with migration issues. Since then legislative actions on migration have gained momentum:

The RA Law on Refugees (March 3, 1999):

As early as 1993 Armenia acceded to the Geneva Convention of 1951 and its 'Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees' of 1967. The 1999 law defines grounds, order and conditions for the temporary accommodation of asylum seekers on the territory of the RA, for the granting, rejecting or terminating of the refugee status, the responsibilities of the authorized state bodies engaged in refugee issues, the rights and duties of the asylum seekers, guarantees for their legal and social protection.

The Law Concept on the State Regulation of Population Migration in the Republic of Armenia (November 29, 2000):

The law contains the principles of state migration policy, priorities and possible mechanisms and directions for their solution. It also outlines the changes required for the harmonization of the legislative field with the priorities of state migration policy. The law lists the state bodies engaged in migration issues and their functions, the proposals concerning the separate functions, and the mechanisms securing active collaboration between migration related bodies.

Subsequent to this law, the Government of the RA adopted six decrees:

- The *Decree on the Procedure for Issuing Refugee IDs and Travel Documents in the RA and on Approving Their Samples* (Decree No. 695; 20.11.1999)

This decree stipulates that persons who were granted refugee status in the RA are provided with a refugee certificate and travel documents. The first serves as an identification document inside

the territory of the RA, the second one for foreign countries.

- The *Decree on the Movement and Choice of Residency of Applicants for Refugee Status in the Territory of the RA* (Decree No. 52; 04.02.2000)

It stipulates that after being accommodated in a temporary residency, an asylum seeker is granted the right of free movement within the administrative territorial unit being under service of that division of the RA *Home Office* where the temporary residency is located (in Yerevan over the whole territory of the city). If there is a necessity to move all over the territory of the Republic, the asylum seeker must notify in a written form the division of the *Home Office* that is in charge for him.

- The *Decree on Placing Applicants for Refugee Status in the Territory of the RA in Special and Temporary Dwellings, Subjecting them to Medical Examination, Providing them with Free Legal Consultations and Translation Services, with Medical Assistance and Service* (Decree No. 86; 23.02.2000)

This decree stipulates that after entering the territory of the RA, an asylum seeker is accommodated in a special reception centre by the *State Department for Migration and Refugees* for undergoing medical checks and the examination of documents within a month. Then the person is accommodated in temporary dwellings provided by the Department. While the asylum application is processed, the asylum seeker is provided with free legal and interpreter services as well as medical assistance and service.

- The *Decree on Allocation of a Lump-Sum Allowance to Applicants for Refugee Status in the Territory of the Republic of Armenia* (Decree No. 82; 23.02.2000)

It stipulates that the asylum seeker, before an official decision on her or his application is made, will be provided with a monetary allowance to cover living and subsistence expenses.

- The *Decree on the Procedure for Issuing IDs to Applicants for Refugee Status in the RA* (Decree No. 594; 04.07.2001)

It stipulates that a persons who applied for refugee status in the RA, is provided with an asylum seeker certificate, which certifies that this person applied for refugee status to the *State Department for Migration and Refugees*.

- The *Decree on Refugee Status Determination Procedure* (19.07.2001)

It safeguards the implementation of the *RA Law on Refugees* and regulates the issues concerning the decision on the refugee status.

- The *Law on Legal, Socio-Economic Guarantees to the Persons Forcibly Deported from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and Acquired Citizenship of the RA* (December 6, 2000)

The law stipulates safeguards to persons forcibly deported from Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992, and who meanwhile acquired the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia for exercising their rights as well as social and legal guarantees for the protection of their interests. The law is aimed to encourage refugees to naturalize.

Subsequent to this law, the Government of the RA adopted three sub-legislative decrees:

- The *Decree on the Procedure of Providing Housing for Persons Forcibly Deported from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and who Acquired the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia* (May 14, 2001)

It stipulates that deportees from the Republic of Azerbaijan, who acquired the RA citizenship, must be provided with housing in the same way as refugees.

- The *Decree on Privatization of Housing Areas of Communal Centres Being at the Disposal*

of State Budgetary Institutions in favour of Persons Forcibly Deported from the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and who Acquired Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia (May 14, 2001)

It stipulates that deportees from Azerbaijan who adopted the RA citizenship and who occupied for more than three years rooms in communal centres belonging to the state budgetary institutions have the right to privatize the aforementioned accommodation.

- The *Decree on the Procedure of Compensating for Damages Done to Temporary Housing due to their Occupation by People Forcibly Deported from Azerbaijan in 1988-1992 and who Acquired the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia* (May 14, 2001)

It stipulates that compensation for damages done to temporary dwellings due to their occupation by deportees from Azerbaijan, who adopted the RA citizenship, will be made in the same manner as for refugees until a new respective governmental decree is adopted.

The *Ministry of Justice of the RA* released the following departmental normative acts:

On August 30, 2001:

- The *Decree of the Head of the State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA on Approving the Order of Registering of Refugee IDs, Issued to Persons Applied for Refugee Status*, as well as an *Order of Keeping the Register on Issued, Exchanged, Lost and Returned IDs* (Decree No. 36; 09.08.2001).
- The *Decree of the Head of the State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA on Approving the Application Form for Refugee Status*, *Order of Registering* as well as *Form of Questionnaire to be Completed by Asylum Seekers* (Decree No. 37; 09.08.2001)

On July 30, 2002:

- The *Decree of the Head of the State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA on Approving the Application Form for Compensating for Damages Done to Temporary Dwellings due to their Occupancy by Refugees as well as Persons Forcibly Deported from*

Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992, and Who Adopted the Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia (Decree No. 22; 15.07.2002).

The *RA Law on Amendments in the RA Law on State Duty* (December 13, 2000):

The law stipulates exemption from state duty in courts

- For refugees who seek to redress for his/her violated housing rights;
- For persons who applied for refugee status and appeal after the rejection of his/her refugee status.

At the session of the RA Government, held on December 14, 2000, the following projects were approved:

- The *Project on Providing Housing for Persons Forcibly Deported from Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992*:

The project envisages actions to be taken to provide about 13 thousand refugee families with housing.

- The *Project on Post-Conflict Rehabilitation of Bordering Territories of the RA*:

The project envisages actions to be taken to return 39 thousand displaced persons to the places of their permanent residence as well as to settle firmly 28 thousand people who have already returned to the places of their residence, as well as those who have not moved from their permanent residencies.

The *RA Law on Amendments in the Refugee Law of the RA* (March 5, 2001):

The adoption of the amendments was caused by the necessity of improvements to be made in the existing *Refugee Law of the RA*.

The *RA Law on Political Asylum* (September 26, 2001):

The law regulates the grounds and the procedure for acquiring political asylum, the conditions of rejecting the application and the termination of an already acquired right, as well as other related issues.

The *RA Law on Amendments in the RA Law on State Duty* (October 5, 2001):

The law stipulates the following privileges for deportees from Azerbaijan, who adopted the RA citizenship:

- Those persons, who are recognized as tenants of occupied living spaces owned by the community housing funds are exempted from the state duty to be paid for registration of tenancy agreements of these living spaces by notary.
- Those persons, who privatized occupied living spaces of communal centres, being at the disposal of state budgetary institutions, as well as those persons who are recognized as tenants of occupied living spaces of the community housing funds are exempted from state duty to be paid for registration of their rights to the mentioned property.

The *RA Law on the State Border* (November 20, 2001):

The law defines the rules of crossing the state border, the procedure of conducting boundary control and the passage of persons through the state border.

The *RA Law on Frontier Troops* (November 20, 2001):

It stipulates the concept of RA border troops, legal grounds, principles, rights and duties of their activity, legal and social protection of the frontier troop staff, citizens participating in maintenance of the state border and the members of their families, financial and logistical support of frontier troops.

The *RA Law on Amendments in the Refugee Law of the RA* (March 19, 2002):

The law stipulates the basis for granting temporary asylum (temporary residence permit) to foreign nationals and stateless persons in the RA as well as defining their rights and obligations.

The *RA Law on Amendments in the RA Law on Citizenship* (March 20, 2002):

The law stipulates the prolongation for being recognized as a citizen of the RA until December 31, 2003.

The *RA Law on Allocating the Apartments Built for the Refugees Deported from the Republic of Azerbaijan between 1988 and 1992 to Refugees with Ownership Right* (November 20, 2002):

The law regulates the relations connected with the allocation of apartments in residential buildings and cottage-shaped houses constructed on the territory of the RA by the resources of the state budget, foreign countries and international organizations for deportees from the Republic of Azerbaijan to refugees with ownership rights.

The RA Law on Citizens that Have not Served the Mandatory National Service in Violation of the Defined Procedure (March 17, 2003):

The law covers the period from the first fall draft of 1992 until October 31, 2005, and is applied to the RA citizens, who escaped the draft in violation of the *RA Law on Military Draft*, and reached the age of 27 (officers in reserve the age of 35), or being under the age of 27 (35), and have acquired reasons for exemption from the national service or have been granted draft deferment from the mandatory national service as defined under the *RA Law on Military Draft*. The document defines the sums to be charged for each of the conscriptions avoided.

The RA Law on Foreigners (December 25, 2007):

It regulates the entry of foreigners into the RA, their sojourn and habitation on the territory of the RA, their employment, transit movement, exit from the RA, as well as other issues in connection with foreigners.

In the same period a number of resolutions and decrees regulating migration issues were adopted:

- *The Government Decree on State Institutions on Refugees* (1999);
- *The Government Decree on the Transformation and Choice of Residency for Applicants of Refugee Status* (2000);
- *The Government Decree on Refugee Status Designation* (2001);
- *The Government Decree on the Procedure of Granting Provisional Asylum to Foreigners and Denationalized Persons* (2003);
- *The Government Decree on the Procedure of Issuing Identity Cards for the Status of Provisional Asylum Seekers and the Definition of Status* (2003).

Legislative Acts Presented for Consideration:

Within the date specified in the Concept on the State Regulation of Population Migration in the RA, the following draft laws have been developed and put into circulation by the ministries in charge during the last years:

The RA Draft Law on Exit from and Entry into the RA by Citizens of the RA - responsible implementers are the *RA Home Office* and the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*:

The draft law stipulates a detailed regulation to exercise the constitutional right of exit from and entry to the RA by citizens of the RA. It defines the exceptional cases when the exit of a citizen may be temporarily prohibited.

The RA Draft Law on Overseas Employment:

Responsible implementer is the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*. The draft law stipulates issues of overseas employment. It defines principles for organizing overseas employment, order and conditions of leaving for overseas employment, responsibilities of the governmental bodies and licensed organizations in the field of overseas employment. The draft law is presented to the Government of the RA.

The RA Draft Law on Making Amendments in the Law on Licensing:

Responsible implementer is the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*. The draft law stipulates that organizations dealing with organizing overseas employment are added to a number of establishments to be licensed. The draft law is presented to the Government of the RA.

The RA Draft Law on Ethnic Minorities:

Responsible implementer is the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*. The draft law legislatively confirms the preservation of historical, cultural, language and scientific values of the nationals of the RA belonging to ethnic minorities, and the specific state attitude towards the full exercise of their political and legal rights and guaranties for participation in the public and social life of the country. The draft law is presented to the Government of the RA.

The *RA Draft Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the RA*:

Responsible implementers are the *RA Foreign Office* and the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*. The acting *RA Law on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the RA* was adopted before the adoption of the Constitution and hence contains some contradiction to constitutional norms. The new draft law ensures great flexibility and provides the government with an opportunity to regulate immigration policy and to respond adequately to international developments.

The *RA Draft Law on Tourism*:

Responsible implementer is the *Ministry of Trade and Industry*. The draft law defines legal, managerial, socio-economic grounds for state policy implementation in the field of tourism as well as those state policy principles that are directed towards establishing legal grounds for the tourism market.

The *RA Draft Law on Making Amendments in the RA Law on Citizenship*:

Responsible implementer is the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*. The acting *RA Law on Citizenship* contains some contradictions to constitutional norms. The Constitution of the RA prohibits dual citizenship; however, the law in force does not completely exclude dual citizenship. As a result many citizens of the RA practically are found to be in a dual citizenship situation. For purpose of filling the existing gap, the draft law stipulates provisions for making amendments in the relevant articles of the law in force. The draft law is presented to the Government of the RA.

The *RA Draft Law on Immigration*:

Responsible implementer is the *State Department for Migration and Refugees of the RA*. The draft law regulates the entry, residence and exit of foreign nationals entering the territory of the RA for permanent residence, including foreigners of Armenian origin.

Subsequent to the *Concept on the State Regulation of Population Migration*, as approved by the Government of the RA, the following concepts and draft decrees were presented to the Government of the RA:

- The Concept on Resettlement in the RA;
- The Concept on Creating an Information System on Population Movement;
- The Draft Decree of the RA Government on the Implementation of Entry to the RA and Exit from the RA Registration at the State Border Points of the RA;
- The Draft Decree of the RA Government on the Project of Resettlement and Consolidation of the Population in the Territory of Meghri;
- The Draft Decree of the RA Government on Approving the Procedure for Granting Temporary Asylum in the Territory of the RA to Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons;
- The Draft Decree of the RA Government on Recognition of the State Body Authorized in Granting Temporary Asylum in the Territory of the RA;
- The Draft Decree of the RA Government on Procedure for Issuing Temporary Asylum ID and Approving its Sample;
- The Draft Decree of the RA Government on Procedure of Inspection at the State Border Points of the RA through a System of Primary and Secondary Inspection.

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NOTES

¹¹⁵ Editorial note: Overall figures of the deportees differ from 200,000 to 500,000. About a tenth of those 100,000 deported during the winter 1603-04 perished from exhaustion and when crossing the border river Arax. Cf. Koutcharian 1989, 239 et seq.

¹¹⁶ For details, cf. also: Lepsius (1897); Dadrian (2002)

¹¹⁷ Editorial note: The estimate of victim tolls, based on polls of the deportees' conveyed by the Swiss nurse Beatrice Rohner from Aleppo, derives from the German Embassy at Constantinople in its letter to German Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg of October 4, 1916. Cf. Gust: 2005, 519 et seqq.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Hofmann 2002, 15

¹¹⁹ Editorial note: Euphemistically labelled as 'repatriation' by Armenian organizations and Soviet Armenian institutions, the idea of settling Near East survivors of the Armenian genocide in Soviet Armenia dates back to a scheme that was put forward by the *Armenian National Delegation* at Paris in August 1923. "The idea was to irrigate the Sardarabad desert [in the Ararat Plain; Ed.], and populate it with 50,000 Armenians; it was taken up by the council of the *League of Nations*, which requested the great Norwegian explorer and philanthropist, Dr Fridtjof Nansen, to investigate the possibilities of the scheme" (cf. Walker 1980, 350). Since the project remained under-financed (with Germany, Greece, Norway, Romania and Switzerland as main donors, while Great Britain refused any contribution for fear that Soviet

Russia could gain control over it) the total number of those 'repatriates' who immigrated until 1937, remained relatively small, with 44,000 immigrants, predominantly from Greece (which was desperately burdened with integrating its own ethnic compatriots from Asia Minor), Iraq (1921-22) and Istanbul. In addition, since 1936 the number of immigrants to Soviet Armenia drastically declined due to the deterioration of international relations and the Stalinist Purges (1936-39). A slightly smaller figure of immigrants, 42,300, is to be found in the work of Avagyan, Grigor Yeremi: Haykakan SSH bnakhchutjune [The population of the Armenian SSR; in Armenian]. The Soviet Armenian Encyclopaedia, Vol. 6, gives the total number of 42,286 (p. 207).

¹²⁰ Editorial note: Out of the 450,000 ethnic Armenians in the Soviet forces who participated in battles, 300,000 had been killed in action during WWII.

¹²¹ Editorial note: As the cases of French and Near East immigrants to Soviet Armenia reveal, the integration of immigrants was very uneven. In contrary to the immigrants from the Middle Eastern states – in particular those from neighbouring Iran – the integration of the immigrants from France into a completely Soviet Armenian society largely failed. Nearly all of the overall 10,000 ethnic Armenians from France therefore returned to their country of origin, when given the opportunity of emigration after direct French-Soviet negotiations. Cf. Richardot 1982, 126

¹²² Suny 1993, 225

¹²³ Koutcharian 1989, 196

¹²⁴ Editorial Note: The situation slightly improved after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act of Agreement on the Security and Cooperation in Europe (1975): The unification of families, as safeguarded by this agreement, allowed a limited emigration of Jews, Germans and Armenians from the USSR.

¹²⁵ Editorial note: The reduction of figures relating to minorities may be indicative for repressions against this group. Under such circumstances, even in official polls, minority members would not reveal their ethnicity. On the other hand, the increase of figures may be caused by the attempt to give an ethnic group more statistical weight as a base for demanded influence and participation.

¹²⁶ Cited in: Hofmann 2006, 193

¹²⁷ Editorial note: The decennial US census is based on the highly disputable category of 'races' (i.e. 'Black - Black or African American', 'AIAN - American Indian and Alaska Native', 'NHPI - Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander', 'SOR - Some Other Race').

¹²⁸ Cf. web site: http://ukrcensus.gov.ua/rus/results/nationality_population/nationality_popul1/select_51/?bottom=cens_db&box=5.1W&k_t=00&p=25&rz=1_1&rz_b=2_1%20&n_page=2

¹²⁹ According to the Muslim interpretation in Iran, a book of revelation is possessed by Zoroastrians, Jews and Armenians (*Armenian-Apostolic Church*).

¹³⁰ Editorial note: This migration pattern of the early 1990s somehow contradicted the usual practice of immigrating to countries, where large communities and networks already exist. This may have been caused by the fact, that prior to 1990 nowhere beyond the Soviet borders a community of emigrants from Soviet Armenia existed. In Central Europe, post-Soviet Armenian migrants first came to countries with only new (post WWII) and small Armenian communities, such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Failing to stay in Germany due to strict asylum regulations and the lack of other ways to legally obtain residency, the focus of immigration shifted to Austria and Southern Europe, where traditional Armenian diaspora(s) are small. In Poland, the traditional Armenian community is extinct due to religious and cultural assimilation, but a new community of post-Soviet immigrants from Armenia emerged very soon.

¹³¹ According to the *Return Assistance Program for RA Nationals from Switzerland* conducted since 2004 by efforts of the *Federal Office for Migration (FOM)* of Switzerland, the *Swiss Development and Cooperation Agency* as well as the *Migration Agency* at the *Ministry of Territorial Administration of the Republic of Armenia* no returnee from Switzerland has left Armenia within the following four years.

¹³² The law was introduced on November 6, 1995. It defines the procedure of the acquisition and termination of RA citizenship. The procedure of acquiring RA citizenship for foreign nationals of Armenian ethnicity has meanwhile been simplified, as well as documents confirming RA citizenship.

OUT-MIGRATION FROM GEORGIA AFTER 1990

Irina Badurashvili

1: Official (state) statistics

Emigration or out-migration is a new phenomenon for Georgia that only appeared since the 1990s. Modern Georgia is quite a typical post-Soviet country that after its independence has been seriously affected by external migration. During the Soviet period ethnic Georgians tended to remain in Georgia; more than 95% of them stayed there. Migration was then primarily limited to internal migration, predominantly directed towards the capital Tbilisi, and mainly related to economic development and private purposes, but also strongly regulated by Soviet rules. There was some immigration of Russians to Georgia during Soviet times; by 1989 they made up some six percent of the Republic's overall population of 5.4 million.

When the union split, the new emerging international borders radically changed the situation and many members of minorities or persons suffering from economic and social hardships felt locked in the new independent countries and were subsequently interested to emigrate. The collapse of the USSR caused two main changes: 1) internal Soviet migration suddenly became international migration, and 2) relative peace among ethnic

groups, safeguarded by the Soviet power turned into major local conflicts, including wars.

In Georgia a large decrease in population figures between 1989 and 2002 could be observed. The 2002 population level shows a decline of some 20% from the 1989 census, while Georgia was still a republic of the Soviet Union. It seems, however, likely that this was a once-off event linked to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the ensuing political disruption. Part of this decrease is due to a declining birth rate; but the main reason is emigration. Russian soldiers returned home and some other ethnic groups also left in large numbers – again with the possible intent of returning to their countries of origin and/or historic homelands. Analysts suggest that at least half of the people who left Georgia during the 1990s went to the Russian Federation, and that many of them may well have been ethnic Russians. But Georgians did not leave in large numbers, except from Abkhazia where anecdotal evidence suggests that a large proportion of the ethnic Georgian population left for Russia following the break-away of the region and were now applying for Russian citizenship.

1.1 Statistical problems and methodological flaws

1.1.1 State estimates on migration

In the traditional Soviet system, strictly controlled in- and out-migrations through the registration of a citizen's permanent address was implemented by the local agencies of internal affairs. The USSR's Goskomstat centralized information from local authorities and established a complete matrix of inter-republic migration flows based on entries. In the final years of this system, registration got worse and the national registration systems failed to capture the scale of migration flows. With

the collapse of the USSR, migration statistics deteriorated for three main reasons: 1) Out-migration from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) became possible, 2) inter-republic collaboration to produce a general matrix ceased and, 3) the quality of in- and out-registration declined.

As has been mentioned before, comparing census data of 1989 to 2002, Georgia lost one million of its citizens through emigration (i.e. a

fifth of the population). At the same time the official statistical data on migration (cf. State Department for Statistics of Georgia 2002) presented below

did not represent the real scope of these migration movements:

Table 1:

International migration of population (in thousands)

	1990 ¹³³	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Arrivals	20,0	16,6	8,6	12,6	12,7	5,7	1,2	0,4	0,4	0,4	0,2	0,1
Departures	59,0	60,6	49,6	38,9	44,2	25,9	12,9	0,9	0,6	1,3	1,5	1,5
Net migration	-39,0	-44,0	-41,6	-26,3	-31,5	-20,2	-11,7	-0,5	-0,2	-0,9	-1,3	-1,4

For this reason and starting from 2003, the *Georgian Statistical Office* finally decided not to use for its estimation of external migration flows from Georgia the data received from local registers on the registration of Georgian citizens by place of permanent residence on which the Georgian migration statistics had been based for the second half of the 1990s; also, the office did not publish these data anymore.

On the basis of the 2002 census the *Georgian Statistical Office* re-calculated migration figures for the period between 1989 and 2002, with the main result that the negative net-migration of 998,500 persons for the whole period was determined as the negative balance between the

total population figures of the 1989 and the 2002 census, including the natural increase. The result was then interpolated on an annual basis. The methodology of this interpolation by annual time-periods is not yet published anywhere and is based on so called 'expert estimations' of the Georgian research team that conducted these estimates. From this time on, the *Georgian Statistical Office* does not produce any data on emigration and immigration and publishes only data on net-migration in Georgia. All previously circulated and published Georgian official migration statistics on the 1990s were qualified as unreliable and hence are no longer in use. Table 2 presents the results of this work (*State Department for Statistics of Georgia, 2003, p. 67*):

Table 2:

Net-migration (in thousands)

1989	-17,9	1996	-123,1
1990	-13,2	1997	-59,9
1991	-22,6	1998	-39,2
1992	-139,3	1999	-36,3
1993	-140,9	2000	-35,2
1994	-142,6	2001	-31,2
1995	-127,2		

Table 3 presents the latest published Georgian official migration statistics for the most recent

period (*Department of Statistics under the Ministry of Economic Development of Georgia 2008, 35*)

Table 3:

Balance of international migration of population (in thousands)					
2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
-32.6	-27.8	-27.5	5.5	76.3	-12.1

Unfortunately, again, there is no methodology of estimations of net-migration of Georgia's population for the years 2002 and 2003, as officially published by the *Georgian Statistical Office*, and again statisticians refer to expert's estimations.

From the year 2004 onwards, official statistics on migration in Georgia is based on the data on passenger-flows provided by the *Georgian Border Department* on the basis of the registration of Georgian citizens crossing the borders. This method has been suggested to the *Georgian Statistical Office* by foreign experts. However, it is doubtful that recent estimates of migration in Georgia are correct due to the artificial peak of in-migration in the years 2004 and 2005 that is followed by another round of out-migration for obvious reasons. This methodology resulted in criticism of local experts. Nevertheless, it is currently still in use due to the lack of any other data sources for migration statistics in Georgia.

During the 2002 Georgian census attempts have been made to obtain also some statistical information about migrants. For this purpose a special questionnaire on emigration ('Form EM') has been designed in order to register any family member residing abroad. The category 'emigrant' has been defined in the census as a person who left Georgia for abroad forever or temporarily and who at the time of the census is absent from the household for at least one year. The information received about emigrants during the 2002 census does not, of course, comprise emigration flows from Georgia in the period since its independence. One reason for this is that entire families have left Georgia, so that there were no household members left to name these emigrants. Another reason is that Georgians tend to hide information about absent family members working abroad. Due to the close relationships within families in Georgia they are regarded to be family members even if they

stay away for a long period of time. Hence, the number of emigrants from Georgia identified by the 2002 census is as low as 113,726 persons. This figure has provoked a lot of criticism in Georgia and led to the conclusion that the questionnaire on emigration actually did not work. At the same time it should be mentioned that the census data about migrants corresponds with data about absent family members as revealed by the Integrated Household Survey of the *Georgian Statistical Office*.

Nevertheless, the Georgian population census of 2002 provides us with some interesting information on the profile of Georgia's migrants: their age and gender ratio, reasons for migration, socio-demographic characteristics etc. Some findings of the census data on migration is briefly presented below:

- 78% of emigrants are abroad for improving the economic position of their family.
- Only 10% of them were employed before leaving.
- Less than 7% of them left for study and only 1% applied for political asylum.
- Around 40% of emigrants send remittances to Georgia and 7% of them receive support from families in Georgia.
- Emigrants are presented by both sexes (58.7% are males) and by a fairly young population (over 80% are people of working age).
- One fourth of migrants have completed higher education and 17% more secondary professional education.
- More than half of the emigrants (57%) are married.
- The majority of migrants left for Russia (64%); Greece (16%); Germany and the USA (4%), and for the Ukraine and Israel (2%).

1.1.2 Other National and International Estimates on Migration - Estimates in Georgia

Some experts in Georgia give, differing from the official statistics, estimations of migration processes in Georgia as presented in Table 4 (cf. Tsuladze et al. 2004, 205).

Table 4:

External migration of Georgian population (in thousands)

1990	-15,8	1999	-39,5
1991	-27,5	2000	-38,6
1992	-156,3	2001	-35,2
1993	-157,2	2002	-35,9
1994	-156,9	2003	-35,5
1995	-139,4	2004	-31,5
1996	-135,0	2005	-30,4
1997	-65,2	2006	-28,7
1998	-42,3		

Estimates on migration to Russia

The statistical data of the Russian Federation related to emigration from Georgia to Russia, despite that it is by opinion of Russian experts far from completeness, presents the following data¹³⁴:

Table 5:

External migration between the Russian Federation and Georgia (by Federal Service for State Statistics of Russia)

	Arrivals	Departure	Net-migration
1997	24,517	3,286	21,231
1998	21,059	2,933	18,126
1999	19,626	2,574	17,052
2000	20,213	1,802	18,411
2001	9,674	1,339	8,235
2002	7,128	964	6,164
2003	5,540	939	4,601
2004	4,886	740	4,146
2005	5,497	691	4,806
2006	6,806	593	6,213
2007	10,595	603	9,992

These data on the flows of people migrating to Russia for permanent (or long-time) residence reveal: 1) a decrease of emigration from Georgia until 2005, and 2) the reverse trend during 2006 and 2007. Nevertheless, it seems that persons who

have intended to emigrate from Georgia to Russia have settled there already; while current migration flows to Russia are mainly related to temporary labour migration. This assumption is confirmed by official Russian sources on the registration

of foreign employers (that are very far from real figures). According to the *Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation* in 2003, 3,200 citizens from Georgia and in 2004, 3,800 were working in Russia. At the same time the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Russia

has diminished for the same period from 2,537 to 1,889. According to the 2002 Russian census the number of ethnic Georgians has increased by 50% due to the massive emigration to Russia during the 1990s, compared to the year 1989 (198,000 in 2002, against 131,000 in 1989).

Estimates by international organisations

Some existing international data-sources on migration provide us with estimated numbers of international migration in Georgia. In the table below the data of the *United Nations Population*

Division are presented as used for the medium variant of World Population Prospects of 2006 Revision (<http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>).

Table 6:

Net-migration in Georgia

Period	Net migration (per year) both sexes combined
1950-1955	26
1955-1960	17
1960-1965	-8
1965-1970	0
1970-1975	-13
1975-1980	-16
1980-1985	-4
1985-1990	-13
1990-1995	-112
1995-2000	-70
2000-2005	-50
2005-2010	-30
2010-2015	-15
2015-2020	-15
2020-2025	-10
2025-2030	-10
2030-2035	-10
2035-2040	-10
2040-2045	-10
2045-2050	-10

From the table above we can see that the *United Nation Population Division* has different estimates on the external migration in Georgia. It continues to predict a negative net-migration

in the frame of 30,000 persons per year for the period between 2005 and 2010.

Analyzing the emigration trends from Georgia the data on asylum applications of Georgian

citizens provided by the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)* (2007) and presented in Table 7 below, represents the country

preferences of migrants and shows the increasing intention of residents in Georgia to migrate to particular countries.

Table 7:

Asylum applicants from Georgia during the year 2005 (main destinations)										
Asylum country	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Greece	...	1	1	...	8	48	323	1897
Austria	25	33	34	597	1921	1,525	1,731	954
Cyprus	1	24	19	178	759	886
France	74	110	127	184	373	1,067	1,554	1,726	1,563	788
Germany	2,441	3,328	1,979	1,096	801	1,220	1,531	1,139	802	493
Other	642	1,372	2,423	2,515	2,939	3,529	3,409	4,013	3,895	2,281
Total	3,157	4,811	4,555	3,828	4,148	6,437	8,442	8,629	9,073	7,299

1.2 Preliminary Conclusion on Estimates on Migration in Georgia

Analysing different sources of information on migration from Georgia it becomes obvious that Georgia has a large external migrant population and it is believed that the lack of work opportunities continues to spur massive emigration. The previously established method for estimating migration flows from Georgia was based on the system of the population registration set up when Georgia was still a member of the Soviet Union. This system no longer functions and factual evidence has been more difficult to obtain recently. Various estimates of emigration

have been made by experts over the past few years. These estimates vary considerably but all are high in per capita terms. What is known is that between the 1989 and the 2002 census the population count for Georgia fell by over one million people, amounting to a loss of almost one fifth of the population. The *UN* forecasts that Georgia's population will continue to decline at substantial rates for the foreseeable future. The recent emigration flows from Georgia are related to temporary labour migration.

2: Specialized Surveys Conducted by Governmental or Independent Organisations and Institutions

2.1 Four Surveys on the Causes of Emigration

The first survey has been carried out in 1994, with the assistance of the *Caucasus Institute for Peace, Development and Democracy*; the second in 1996 with the support of the *Open Society-Institute – Georgia*; the third in 1998 with the assistance of the Regional Office for the Caucasus of *IOM* and the last one in 2001 with the support of the *Department of International Development* of the UK (DFID). All surveys have been conducted by

Guram Svanidze or under his supervision.

The questionnaire of all four surveys was similar with the exception of the last study conducted in 2001. The sample size of the surveys varied from 500 respondents in 1994 to 1,000 interviewed in 2001. Also the coverage of the surveys varied from the capital city, Tbilisi, to several Georgian regions.

The survey questionnaire included 13 questions concerning the migration background of the respondents and their families and the respondents' intention to emigrate in the future. Respondents were also asked to express their opinion about the reasons of emigration from Georgia and about reasons of abstaining from leaving Georgia.

According to the author, a sensitive feature of emigration from Georgia in the 1990ies was the emigration of a significant number of representatives of ethnic minorities. Therefore it was one of the main goals in all four studies by Svanidze to determine the significance of discriminatory factors for emigration desires among the interviewed representatives of ethnic minorities in Georgia. A guiding hypothesis of his last survey was that there is an increase of intentions to migrate in the population of Georgia as compared with the 1998 survey. Labour migration has become more typical and is now one

of the main coping strategies for the population.

Despite some changes in the programme, the last survey, conducted in 2001, gave the authors a possibility to determine the dynamics of the background and intentions of migration of Georgian citizens in regions with ethnically homogenous and mixed populations. According to this last study the intention to migrate is increasing in Georgia and the main reasons of external migration may be explained by unemployment and decreasing living standards in Georgia. His study on migration of the ethnic minorities in Georgia revealed that the emigration desire is strongest among Armenians, who, at the same time, are less inclined to immigrate to Armenia, compared with the higher ratio of ethnic Azeris, who emigrated to Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation remains the main destination for migrants of all ethnic groups, including ethnic Georgians.

2.2 Migration Surveys by the State Department for Statistics of Georgia

2.2.1 The World Bank Supported „Consumer Barometer“

In the years 1999 and 2000, the *Georgian Statistical Office* included questions relating to migration issues into its survey on consumption behaviour. The sampling survey was based on the initial data-base of the Integrated Household Survey conducted by the statistical office and hence insured the representativeness results on the national level. In total, 1,500 respondents in Georgia have been interviewed four times, starting from December 1998 until April 2000.

According to the above mentioned surveys there were 6.4% of households in Georgia having at least one member abroad at the time when the interviews were conducted. The share of women among the migrants counted one forth in 1999, and one third in 2000, which indicated the increasing feminization of migration from Georgia. The majority (85%) of migrants are persons below 50 years of age. 40% of the migrants are higher educated persons.

The majority (66%) of the migrants left for Russia. Other destinations such as Greece,

Germany and the USA were also on the list of main recipient countries for Georgians at that time. Slightly more than half of the migrants are abroad for more than one year; 80% of the migrants left Georgia for labour abroad and 70% of them are sending remittances to their families in Georgia.

The employment of emigrants from Georgia abroad differs considerably and depends on whether these emigrants work in Russia or elsewhere. While one third of the migrants from Georgia in Russia run their own business and another 25% are engaged in qualified jobs, 45% of those in other countries have no regular work and further 30% are engaged in unskilled work.

The conducted surveys revealed that a significant part of residents in Georgia intended to leave the country in the following six months for migration, and these flows increased from 43.3% in 1999 to 49.3% in 2000. The dynamics or obtained results in the period under scrutiny also revealed that the proportion of higher educated persons in the potential emigration flows have increased

(from 37.6% in 1999, to 50% in 2000). There was also an increase of persons leaving for a period of more than one year (from 29.1% to 41.4%).

The ratio of ethnic Georgians against emigrants of other ethnicities increased from 73.6% in 1999, to 80.2% in 2000.

2.2.2 Migration Survey 2006

According to this unpublished migration survey that has been conducted in 2006 (in the framework of the project component GEc1502 – Reform of Official Statistics – Statistics 8 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – EuropeAid/120571/C/SV/Multi) the sampling procedure was based on a combination of methods: random selection and snow-ball sampling. The random selection was of two stage designs, the first phase based on the systematic selection of approximately 33,000 households from 425 census units, and the second on the findings of potential respondents during the household visits. During the final stage the snow-ball method has been used for finding returnees in the close surrounding of randomly selected potential respondents. The proportion of respondents found by this method fluctuated from 10 to 30% depending on the sampling unit. In total 1,006 respondents in all regions of Georgia have been interviewed, among them 329 returnees and 677 families with at least one household member abroad.

The analysis of survey data has shown that over 60% of the respondents are married people with children. Female migrants are more numerous among returnees than among those migrants currently abroad: 38% against 31%. This might be explained by the fact that women are more likely to return to their families. It may also indicate that the recent out-migration flows from Georgia are more male-specific. At the same time women prevail among migrants to the far abroad (European countries, USA etc.), while men prevail among migrants to the New Independent States (NIS). For example, in our sample of returnees from Russia females comprise only 18%, while they are 75% among previous migrants to Greece, 68% to the USA and 48% to Germany.

As a matter of fact young, well educated women from Georgia are highly prone to migrate to Western European countries and the USA, while the typical migrant to the NIS-territory is a married and less educated man in the age group of 40 years.

Hardly without exception migrants from Georgia go abroad to find a job and earn an additional income. Labour migrants from Georgia usually do not rely on employment mediation, but instead rely on their own informal contacts and networks abroad such as friends, relatives and family members. Two-thirds of our respondents found a job abroad with the help of relatives and acquaintances who settled there earlier, 12% found it by themselves and only 4% of the migrants found a job through an agency in Georgia or abroad. Due to the lack of official mechanisms for a legal organization of labour out-migration these are replaced by informal networks.

According to our survey, most migrants from Georgia (72%) did not hold an official contract with their employer. In very few cases (2%) the contract was drawn up, but formally with another person. So, three of four migrants from Georgia have worked abroad undocumented. In general, North America (USA and Canada) is the most attractive destination for migrants from Georgia due to the highest level of earnings there. According to our survey migrants in the USA earned in average 2,966 GEL per month. Even compared with Germany (1,257 GEL) this is more than twice higher and exceeds a lot the earnings in Greece (1,000 GEL), France (872 GEL) and Turkey (919 GEL). The monthly earnings in Russia and other countries of the NIS-territory are around 750 GEL per month. Of course, the living expenses also differ considerably by countries, but the material advantages of some destinations for labour migrants from Georgia are obvious.

The majority (65%) of the out-migrants from Georgia had a permanent occupation, additional 30% managed to find a temporary work (for more than one month). Despite the fact that migrants are mainly involved in non-prestigious and low skilled areas of the labour market, it is not always easy for them to find a job at all; 30% of the respondents experienced refusal when applying for a job. Employment abroad requires a certain command of foreign languages; one forth of the

refused respondents were refused by employers due to their insufficient command of language; further 45% because they were not local citizens, while 31% did not know the reason for the refusal.

Our survey revealed that more than half of the migrants who had been professionals in Georgia worked as service workers or shop and market sales assistants abroad and an additional 11% as unskilled workers; one third of the technicians and associate professionals were hired abroad as unskilled workers. According to our survey, the majority of migrants from Georgia (more than 70%) supported their families in Georgia, when being abroad. The average amount of remittances varies according to the different countries. The highest remittances are sent from the USA (in average 480.3 GEL per month), followed by Greece (323 GEL) and Turkey (269.7 GEL). The average scopes of remittances from migrants from Georgia who work in Russia are 250.5 GEL per month.

In addition to the systematic support of their families in Georgia, labour migrants try to save some money during their stay abroad. Our study revealed many cases of migrants who did not send money to their families, but instead preferred to save and bring the money along when returning to Georgia. According to our survey, 85% of the interviewees managed to make savings while working abroad. The average amount of savings was approximately 20,000 GEL for the total sample of returnees, which is a huge amount of money for residents of Georgia.

There are indications that in many actual cases migration becomes the main activity and the main source of income for a significant portion of Georgia's population. Taking into consideration that up to 7 to 8% of all households in Georgia currently have at least one member residing abroad for work, it is obvious that the economic consequences of labour migration are extremely significant and they cannot be ignored or neglected in any analysis of the social and economic situation of Georgia.

During the interviews we posed the question about positive and negative impacts of migration on the lives of the respondents. It should be emphasised that only 8% of the respondents noted

that migration had no positive impact at all; over 40% of the respondents pointed out to the positive financial inputs of their labour activity abroad, such as earning more money, and finding a better-paid job; 5.2% bought a house after their return to Georgia. Around 60% of all migrants declared that migration had no negative impact on them. 14% of the respondents complained that they felt unable to find an employment in their country of origin that is financially satisfactory, while 7% mentioned during the interview that they felt isolated from the life of their family when they lived abroad. 9% of the respondents mentioned among the negative impacts that they were unable to take part in the upbringing of their children. But looking at the data received from the sample of families with migrants currently abroad, we notice that the families at home evaluate the negative impacts of the absence of their family members twice more often than the migrants themselves. Almost half of the returnees mentioned that it was their family, who insisted on their return while they were abroad.

Comparing the employment status of migrants prior and after migration it becomes evident that in general migration somehow improves it. According to our survey 71% of those who worked as unskilled workers before their emigration became self-employed after their return, which means that they were able to invest the money brought from abroad. Although 62.5% of the respondents declared that not much changed in their lives after their return, around 36% of the returnees mentioned that their family lives are much more comfortable. But it seems that often returnees to Georgia felt difficulties in finding a job: Around 30% of those who had worked as professionals before their departure - including 18% as technicians and 7% as managers - were still unemployed at the time of the interview.

All respondents were asked to provide some information about the family members that are intending to leave Georgia in the near future (including themselves). Our survey showed that 30% of the previous migrants plan to go abroad again in the nearest future; 4% more mentioned during the interview that other family members plan to go abroad and one percent of the interviewees mentioned that their entire family will leave Georgia in the following six months.

Again, the most favoured destination is Russia (41% of all respondents), while 14% named Greece. Thus, in total, more than a third of the interviewed mentioned that in the next six months

at least one member of their family is leaving Georgia; over 90% of the potential migrants go temporarily abroad for work.

2.3 Study by the Georgian Mission of the IOM

The study titled 'Labour migration from Georgia' is based on a special migration survey of 600 households having at least one member abroad. Its main findings are based on the secondary source or information received not from the migrants themselves (being abroad for the time of the interview), but from their family members. Unfortunately, the available publication does not provide readers with the methodology of sampling of the respondents. It only mentions that 300 respondents have been interviewed in Tbilisi, and further 100 respondents each in the cities of Rustavi¹³⁵, Tkibuli¹³⁶ and Akhalkalaki¹³⁷, representing different Georgian regions.

The survey revealed four main countries of destination for migrants from Georgia: Russia, Greece, the USA and Germany, with migration to Russia being three times higher than that to any other country. According to this survey, almost all social-demographic groups participate in labour

migration. The survey confirmed the higher level of education of migrants: On the average they studied 13.8 years. At the same time, their employment abroad does not correspond to their education and professional qualification obtained in Georgia, partly due to the lacking command of foreign languages.

According to the information obtained from respondents the average earning of labour migrants abroad is \$755 of which one-fifth (\$162.40) is monthly sent to their families. Georgians who have migrated to Russia maintain the most regular contacts with their families in Georgia. Almost half of them have visited Georgia during their stay abroad (against only 20 to 25% of those in other countries). The survey also revealed that, given the opportunity, family members of the respondents would join them: Only 48% of the interviewees mentioned that they do not intend to go abroad for work.

2.4 Migration Studies by the Tbilisi State University

The first survey by Natia Chelidze has been conducted in 2000, in the capital Tbilisi and in the Ambrolauri district (Racha-Lechkhumi region) of Georgia. The questionnaire consisted of 26 questions related to socio-demographic characteristics of persons currently abroad; the reason of migration; the destination country; issues of labour; social and climate adaptation abroad; living conditions abroad; character of labour activity; contacts with family members; and future plans and conditions concerning the return to Georgia. Information was obtained from the family members of the migrants.

In total, 300 families were interviewed, among them 100 in the Ambrolauri district from July to August of 1999, and 200 in Tbilisi from September to October 1999. The author mentions that this survey can not be considered as representative, but

in the absence of any comprehensive information on labour migration in Georgia it sheds some light on the studied processes.

The main results of the survey are:

- In Tbilisi the gender composition of migrants is almost equal for men and women (53.5%: 46.5%). At 87% men prevail within the migration flows from Ambrolauri by far.
- If at the beginning of the 1990s migrants from Georgia mainly went to Russia and Turkey, an increase in the migration to the USA and Western Europe could be observed during the time of the survey.
- More than half of the migrants (56.6%) are married, and the rate of highly educated persons is 46.3% in total.

- The main motivation to migrate is related to economic reasons, such as no job in Georgia, and the wish to improve the economic situation of one's family.
- Through the information obtained from the family members almost 40% of those who left for migration very well adapted abroad. The remainder expressed certain problems with adaptation, missing their family very much and disliking the style of living abroad.
- According to this survey, the average earning abroad was 847.2 USD and the average amount of remittances sent to the family in Georgia was 199.2 USD.

The second migration survey has been conducted between 2000 and 2004. In total, Chelidze interviewed 1,132 households in seven settlements, including the cities of Tbilisi and Rustavi and one district in five selected provinces of Georgia. Furthermore, between 2002 and 2004, the researcher interviewed 150 returnees to Tbilisi, and in 2005, Chelidze conducted interviews with

125 migrants in the receiving countries, namely Germany (63), Russia (32), Greece (10), and in the USA (20). For finding respondents of the last category of migrants she applied first to the *Department for International Affairs of the Ministry of Education* and obtained a list of email addresses of 96 students who were abroad at that time. A successful contact and the receipt of filled in questionnaires by email have been established with up to 30 respondents. Respondents who agreed to cooperate have also been asked to mention several other migrants from Georgia whom they personally knew and who would agree to be interviewed by email. At this last stage the snow-ball method had been applied for finding potential respondents. Chelidze compares the information related to migration of Georgian citizens obtained from the family members with information received during the interviews with returnees. She concludes by observing that the results are nearly identical. Therefore the author believes that the method of interviewing family members of migrants delivers reliable data in Georgia.

2.5 Surveys on Returnees by the Georgian Centre of Population Research

I have conducted two special migration surveys in Georgia, the first in 2000 and the second in 2003. In both surveys Georgian citizens were interviewed, who had left for abroad during the 1990s with the intention to work there and have returned to Georgia by the time of interview. In face-to-face interviews they were asked about issues of their living and labour activities abroad (departure process, problems of legalization of stays and working activities), remittances to families and personal plans for future migration. The sample size in the first migration survey was 400 respondents and in the second 1,000.

The main results of the first study are:

- Since the majority of migrants are between 16 and 50 years, they are at the best working age. Only 10% of the respondents were older than 50 years.
- The vast majority of the interviewees (95%) described the financial position of their family

as dissatisfactory or bad. According to other known observations such estimations generally do not exceed 50 to 60%. Therefore we should assume that migrants from Georgia come from comparatively poor families. At the time of the interview 40% of migrants returned from CIS countries. 35% of the returnees from far abroad did not find a job in Georgia.

- The types of employment available to migrants differ considerably between Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) countries and other countries. Almost 60% of the returnees from the CIS say that they have been running their own business or have been hired as qualified employees. But only 15% of the returnees from countries abroad had comparable jobs. Forty percent of the migrants from abroad have been working as baby sitters or housekeepers. One out of five has been working as an assistant in the service sector, while the percentage of such migrants in the CIS is only 15%.

- The main reason of migrants was to improve their economic situation. They tried to support their families in Georgia financially.
- The monthly average remittances sent to the family in Georgia was \$127 for CIS-returnees, and \$121 for those working far abroad. The majority of the interviewed returnees (78% in CIS and 70% from abroad) were able to save some money during their stay.
- During their stay abroad Georgian citizens experienced certain problems with police and migration offices. According to the respondents' explanations (in addition to the questionnaire) in Russia these difficulties were caused by the obligation of official registration. Usually this problem was solved by bribing the local police. 18% of the respondents had problems with the migration office in countries abroad that are not part of the CIS.

The findings of the second survey have been presented at the *Population Association of America* (PAA) Annual meeting of 2004 in Boston and the *International Union for the Scientific Study of Population* (IUSSP) conference in Tours in July 2005 (both papers are available online).

Key findings from the survey are as follows:

Nearly without any exception Georgian citizens go abroad to find a job. This was a main motivation of migration for well over the total sample of the interviewees.

Labour out-migrants from Georgia usually do not rely on employment mediation, but rely instead on their own non-formal contacts and networks abroad such as friends, relatives and family members. Two-thirds of our respondents found a job abroad with the help of acquaintances who settled there earlier, 21% found it by themselves and only less than 10% of the migrants found a job through an intermediate firm in Georgia or abroad.

In lack of any bilateral agreements between Georgia and the receiving countries the possibilities for organized, legal labour migration are rather poor and may remain like this for a long time. Flows of irregular labour migrants from Georgia increase annually. This is a process that does not only concern Georgia, but involves also the labour markets of the recipient countries. It

seems that employers are much more interested in cheap, undocumented labour force, in order to avoid both taxes and responsibilities in case of any work accident. Migrants from Georgia reach the foreign country by short-time tourist visas and than overstay visas (on average, our respondents stayed abroad around two years), thus neglecting the regulations envisaged by the legislation of the host country. According to our survey, most of the out-migrants from Georgia (73%) did not hold an official contract with their employer. In rare exceptions (2%) the contract was drawn up, but formally on another person. So, two thirds of the migrants from Georgia worked abroad irregularly.

The status of Georgian migrants abroad causes many reasons for pressure from various administrative bodies. According to our survey 14% of the returnees were paying some money (except taxes) to representatives of the local administrations or police on a more or less regular base. Such experiences were mainly reported by the returnees from Russia and other NIS-countries, who mentioned during interviews that law enforcing bodies and criminals, oppressed many of the irregular migrants in these countries.

The majority of former migrants declared that they were also discriminated by employers in issues of work compensation. Every tenth respondent mentioned during the interview that when he or she has been working abroad there were at least one or two cases, when he or she did not receive the compensation for his or her work or received a lower amount of money than has been agreed on beforehand.

Evidently there is a clear distinction between two groups of labour migrants: Those who have been in Western European countries and the USA and those, who have returned from Russia and other NIS-countries. Respondents of the first group were much more frequently discriminated by employers in issues of work compensation. It is worth noting that women are almost twice as probable to be discriminated in that respect. These results confirmed our theoretical expectations arising from the general literature on international migration: That female immigrants are economically more disadvantaged than male immigrants. The gap in the earnings of immigrants from Georgia and local citizens appeared to be

the highest in the USA: Every fifth of the female respondents received a salary four times lower, while 35% of the male migrants earned three times less than the local citizens for the same kind of work.

The questionnaire also addressed the size of the average monthly income abroad as it is believed that a high salary abroad is a major push factor for migration. It seems that North America is the most attractive country for Georgian migrants due to the highest level of earnings there. According to our survey Georgian migrants in the USA earned on average 1,410.4 USD per month. Even in comparison with Germany (736 USD) this is almost twice more and significantly higher than in Greece (582.1 USD) and Turkey (457.6 USD). The monthly earnings in Russia and other countries of the NIS-territory are around 607 USD per month. Admittedly the living expenses also differ by countries, but the advantages of some destinations for labour migrants from Georgia are obvious.

Considering the gender discrepancies in the earnings we received results different from those in the general literature on international labour migration that confirm higher incomes for immigrant men than for women. Our survey found more or less significant gender disparities in the average incomes only for labour migrants in the NIS-territory: 662 USD for men and 471 USD for women. A number of reasons could explain this fact, for instance a gender-distinctive employment structure that causes disparities in the salaries of men and women: Male migrants from Georgia in Russia are mainly engaged in own business activities or perform construction works that are usually better paid than service occupations. Another possible explanation is the fact that a main motivation for many women to move to Russia or other NIS-territory is to accompany their husbands (which is much more difficult to realize in the case of other countries). In such cases women do not act as an independent social

actor and consequently have fewer possibilities to work.

The majority (65%) of the migrants from Georgia had a safe job. Additional 31% managed to find jobs for the duration of more than one month. Despite the fact that migrants are mainly involved in less-qualified work, the employment abroad requires a certain command of foreign languages. A fifth of the migrants declared during the interview that they were rejected by employers due to their insufficient knowledge of the language of the country.

As mentioned above, one of the most striking features of labour out-migration from Georgia is the usually high level of education and professional qualification of irregular migrants. The work that labour migrants usually perform abroad actually does not demand such skills. During our survey only a quarter of the respondents mentioned that their labour activity abroad corresponded to their professional qualification.

It should be noted that working abroad requires of a migrant to be well informed about the foreign labour market situation, to possess a command of foreign languages and to be flexible in terms of territorial mobility. The highly educated stratum of the Georgian society meets all these requirements. These people have a high ability to establish contacts in foreign countries and to adapt to new environments. However, despite their high level of education, migrants from Georgia are often not adequately qualified to work abroad in particular sectors. Furthermore, the irregular status of labour migrants abroad as well as the restricted range of available workplaces cause particular requirements of employees in the non-prestige and low paid professions. Therefore the irregular labour migration of Georgian citizens must be characterized as a certain kind of 'temporary brain waste' and as a behaviour typical for a population in a crisis situation.

2.6 "Enhancing Gains from International Migration in Europe and Central Asia"¹³⁸

This special migration survey among 1,200 returnees in various regions of Georgia, conducted in 2005 in the framework of the international project "Enhancing Gains from International Migration

in Europe and Central Asia" and commissioned by the *World Bank* (Washington office) revealed that men (60% of our sample) prevailed among Georgian nationals that worked temporarily

abroad. The mean age of migrants in our survey was 40.5 years. Most of the interviewed labour migrants were married (63.1%) with children. The average size of households consisted of four persons with one to two dependants in the family.

According to our findings only 26% of the former migrants have less than a secondary level of education. Over 43% of the labour migrants hold a university degree and almost 30% a college degree. The women are likely to be even higher educated than the interviewed men. In their lives prior to first migration, more than half of the respondents were employed in some way. This includes self-employment and a large number employed in the agricultural sector.

The main countries of destination for labour migrants from Georgia are Russia, Greece, Germany, Turkey and the USA. While being abroad they were not visiting families in Georgia, to which they returned more than two years later in the average. Migrants from Georgia going abroad usually do not rely on employment mediation, but instead make use of their own informal contacts and networks such as friends, relatives and family members abroad. Three-fourths of our respondents found a job abroad with the help of acquaintances, relatives and friends, less than 5% found it by themselves and less than 2% of the male migrants from Georgia and around 7% of the females found a job through an intermediate firm (e.g. dealing with 'au pair') in Georgia or abroad.

Nearly without exception migrants from Georgia leave their country of origin for economical reasons (to find a better paid job, to earn money). Abroad they were working mainly in private households, as service workers, as craft or related trade workers, and contract work as unskilled workers. The average income of Georgian labour migrants abroad exceeds 600 USD. Labour

migrants send to their families in Georgia slightly more than 40% of their earnings. The majority of migrants (54%) send remittances on a monthly base and 35% more send money home every two months. Most migrants from Georgia send money through friends and acquaintances travelling back to Georgia and considered this as the most convenient way of transfer. But more than 20% of the interviewed for the same reason and with the argument of highest reliability have used rapid bank transfers. The average size of remittances by migrants from Georgia is around 270 USD. That money is used by family members in Georgia mainly on food, closing and household appliance. More than the half of those migrants that did not send money brought upon their return goods and household appliances.

It seems that labour abroad improves the financial position of migrants. Comparing the employment of migrants before and after their return, we found that many returnees managed to start an own business. However the evaluation made by the respondents of their life at the time of the interview is rather pessimistic: Only 40% of the interviewed mentioned that their family life is now much more comfortable than before the migration. Among those who are not interested in starting any business activity, 42% mentioned as a reason that they did not save money for this purpose.

In general, returnees to Georgia positively evaluate their labour activity abroad. More than half of the interviewed mentioned as a positive result of migration the financial gains of labour activity abroad, 11% more are satisfied with learning a new language and 5% with the experienced adventure. At the same time, some 16% of the migrants felt stressed due to their separation from family and from their irregular status abroad.

3: Analysis of Socio-Economic Trends in Georgia

Georgia, once reputed to be the wealthiest republic in the USSR due to its tourism industry and bountiful agriculture, experienced a precipitous decline in the early years of its independence. The per capita GDP decreased from 4.646 USD in 1990 to 507 USD in 2000. As a newly independent, multi-ethnic state it was almost

immediately gripped by two civil wars with South Ossetia (1988 to 1992) and Abkhazia (1992 to 1993).¹³⁹ At the same time Georgia was plagued by a general social and economic collapse. A period of lawlessness and hyperinflation followed the cessation of the multilateral civil wars.

Since the 1990s, an increasing number of Georgian citizens have adopted economic (or labour) migration as a household survival strategy. The most reliable available data estimates that 6 to 10% of all households in Georgia have at least one member working abroad, with some regional fluctuation.

In 1995, the emergence of a constitutional government under Eduard Shevardnadze provided for some stability. The economy's rapid growth (11.4% GDP growth in 1996, 10.6% in 1997), however, soon slowed down, while unemployment continued to climb, as Georgia was jolted by the 1998 Russian rouble crisis, then plagued by drought and pervasive corruption. The *World Bank* noted that poverty in Georgia deepened in the last years of the Shevardnadze administration, estimating that extreme poverty rose from 14% in 1998, to 17% in 2003. Causes include rising inequality (with a Gini coefficient of 0.35 per capita and 0.48 totals for 2003) and expanding rural poverty, particularly as subsistence farming became less viable. Despite Georgia's lasting problems with corruption and unemployment, the GDP grew at an average annual rate of 6.8% between 2001 and 2004. It is unsettled which impact the current growth had on the depth of poverty.

The 2003 Rose Revolution marked a turning point in Georgia's economic and political development. When the Western-oriented

government of Mikheil Saakashvili came to power at the beginning of 2004, it aggressively pursued expansive market oriented reforms and an anti-corruption campaign which have improved both macroeconomic stability and the perception of an improved business environment. One of the notable successes of the Georgian economy has been the strong growth of GDP per capita, from 5.9% in 2004, to around ten percent in 2005 and 2006, and even 12% for 2007. In 2006, Georgia was listed as the world's most reformed economy by the *World Bank*'s 'Doing Business' survey (cf. web site: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/>).

At the same time poverty, along with unemployment, was acknowledged to be among the most urgent problems. At that time 52% of Georgia's population lived below the poverty line, according to the UNDP. According to the government, this number dropped to 39.4% in 2005, while the GDP grew from 5.9% in 2004, to 9.3% in 2005, and 9.4% in 2006. However, though there may be disagreements over the precise level of poverty in Georgia, there is general consensus that neither poverty nor extreme poverty has been significantly reduced. The discrepancy between a strong GDP growth and persisting poverty indicates that economic reforms have not efficiently impacted on the lives of Georgia's society.

3.1 Persistent Poverty in Georgia

Going beyond the strong GDP figures and transforming them into an increased prosperity is, as the government recognizes, a key priority for the next phase of the reforms. The government's main policy for poverty alleviation has been its attempts to stimulate growth, but increasing social payments has also been a priority and a central plank of the 2008 budget. Social assistance payments have increased from GEL 100 million (USD 47 million) in 2003, to GEL 778 million (USD 465 million) in 2007, with a projected budget of GEL 1.1 billion (USD 723 million) for 2008.

Still the question remains, how could poverty remain persistent in the face of such GDP increases? The government believes that both

tendencies are so incompatible that it has called into doubt the Integrated Household Survey that serves as the base of poverty calculations and is produced by the *Department of Statistics*. This in itself highlights the need for developing an improved collection of information and analytical capacity inside the Government if evidence driven social policy is to move forward.

There are four possible explanations why poverty may have remained high despite the government's efforts to alleviate it. Firstly, socially vulnerable groups may be disproportionately affected by external effects. In this way, events such as the closure of the Russian market to selected Georgian export products and the flood disaster in rural areas in April 2005, may have hit hardest

those groups with the least capacity to recover. Secondly, the macroeconomic improvements had little impact on the agricultural industry, which employs over half of the population. Agriculture's share in the GDP has fallen from 19.3% to 9.7% between 2003 and 2007, while the agricultural production declined by approximately five percent in real terms over the same period. Thirdly, the vast majority of social payments are not well-targeted at those who need it most. While social assistance that targets low-income families (as opposed to pensions that targets the elderly) was introduced in 2006, the value of the payments has not been increased to compensate inflation. In addition, total income-targeted payments remain relatively low compared to total pension payments. In 2008, the total cash payments made to the extremely poor - about GEL 80 million (USD 52.6 million) - was only about one eighth of the amount distributed as pensions. This is not a very effective way of providing social assistance, if the objective is poverty reduction, since pensioners are fairly evenly distributed among both rich and poor households. Fourthly, a combination of inflation and taxes could have reduced the consumer possibilities of the poor even if they were receiving assistance. Though officially, inflation has just passed ten percent in 2008, there are indications that food prices may have risen far faster than prices for other goods, and food is the main expenditure of the poor. The effect may be further exacerbated by the fact that VAT collection rates have grown significantly. These new taxes would present themselves to the consumer as an increase of prices. Overall the government has put in place the necessary structures for alleviating extreme poverty but more research needs to be done to understand why poverty has persisted in spite of the reforms.

The increase in average nominal wages has been impressive, with eight percent real growth for 2003, 22% for 2005, 18% for 2006 and 10% for 2007. However, these income figures relate to those with a full-time employment and are probably not representative for the entire population. The income distribution is difficult to ascertain. Official figures show a slight drop in the Gini coefficient, suggesting a slight reduction in the level of inequality, but this does not seem to be consistent with most people's day-to-day experience: A relatively small segment of

Georgia's society seems to have dramatically prospered during the last few years, while the majority has not seen any significant income improvements.

Understanding and estimating poverty is one of the biggest challenges for any human development assessment. In 2003, government figures show that 54% of all families were living in poverty. This figure slightly declined to 52% in 2004. There are good reasons to believe that this estimation of poverty in Georgia may be too high. The poverty figures are calculated using the *State Department of Statistics* (SDS) Integrated Household Survey and this is considered by many to be an unreliable source. In addition, the basket of goods the SDS historically used for calculating poverty contained more high-value food items (like meat) than poor families typically consume. It also counted poverty in terms of the percentage of households, not in terms of people. This leads to an overestimation of poverty, since small households are generally poorer.

As an alternative indicator, the estimates published by the *International Monetary Fund* (IMF), using *World Bank's* figures, suggests that absolute poverty has increased marginally, from 27% in 2004, to 31% in 2007. Slightly more than this, about 1.5 million people, or slightly over one third of the population classify themselves as poor by registering in the database of socially vulnerable families. Finally, by the *UNDP's* two-dollars-a-day-definition of poverty, 25% of the population in Georgia lives in poverty. This crude figure allows comparisons with other countries in the region. While there is no expert consensus about the absolute level of poverty in Georgia, there seems to be a general understanding that there has been little change in either poverty or extreme poverty cohorts over the last four years. In addition to the *IMF* assessment, the *European Commission's* assessment for 2007 reports that no progress can be reported as regards to poverty reduction and social welfare.

This is further supported by the household expenditure patterns. Expenditure on food as a proportion of income is a classic indicator of poverty, because as the income goes up, the percentage of income spent on food goes down. In Georgia, since 2003 household expenditure on food has remained fairly constant, at 50% of the income.¹⁴⁰

Polling also suggests that people do not feel that their lives have economically improved. The *International Republican Institute* conducted six polls since 2004, and only once during that time did more people state that their financial situation had rather improved than worsened over the preceding three months. In September 2007, eight percent said their situation had improved while 46% said that it had worsened. Similarly, the *Caucasus Research Resource Centers Data*

Initiative, which polls a representative sample of 3,300 people nationwide, said only 18% reported their financial position to have improved between 2005 and 2006.

Indicators characterizing the scale of poverty in Georgia presented in the table below also do not reveal any significant improvement in the living standard of Georgia's population in recent years.

Table 8:

Main Poverty Indicators* (%)

	1996	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Poverty level	52.2	51.8	51.1	52.4	54.5	35.7	39.4	38.5
Poverty depth	20.9	20.2	19.3	19.8	21.1	12.2	13.5	13.4
Poverty severity	11.3	10.7	9.9	10.3	11.2	6.1	6.6	6.7

Poverty indicators differ between urban and rural areas of Georgia. Extremely poor households are more numerous in rural areas, although the share of households below the poverty line is higher in cities. Additionally, the share of poor households in Tbilisi is lower than their share in the total population nationwide. The poverty in cities is mainly associated with insufficient food, while the rural population basically relies upon its own produce. The main problem there is the lack of monetary incomes and, consequently, the low affordability of services and household goods.

In the years 2000 to 2007, the monetary and non-monetary per capita income increased by 2.4 times, but the indicator is still below the minimum subsistence level that represents the absolute poverty line. In 2004, the minimum subsistence level of a working age male was GEL 84.3 in average, in 2005 it was GEL 95.7, in 2006 it was GEL 106.5, and in 2007 it totalled GEL 118.6. The monetary income of the majority of the population is still low and amounts to half of

the subsistence minimum of an average consumer. Most of the population is self-employed. At the same time, the share of employment in private enterprises and agriculture has somehow increased whereas the employment in the public sector and self-employment in non-agricultural areas has decreased.

More than half of the income of poor people is represented by various types of transfers including remittances from abroad, the sale of property, money borrowing and the use of savings or state allowances. The majority of extremely poor households are led by single women. A third of the households have no breadwinner whilst a fourth of the households comprise pensioners.

The table below shows the upward trend of the average monthly per capita income between the years 2000 and 2007. In the same period the monetary income and transfers almost trebled, and incomes from employment and self-employment also grew at relatively high rates.

Table 9:**Average Monthly Income per Capita (GEL)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total income	39.4	45.3	60.8	64.6	73.4	80.8	90.2	101.4
Total monetary income and transfers	28.8	34.0	41.0	45.8	50.3	59.8	68.5	81.2
Wages and salaries	11.7	13.7	16.1	16.1	17.8	23.3	28.6	36.2
Self-employment	5.8	6.3	8.2	8.6	9.7	10.5	10.8	11.6
Sale of agricultural produce	5.6	5.6	7.7	8.2	9.1	8.5	8.6	7.4
Asset holdings (rent, interest on bank deposit, etc.)	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.4	1.1
Pensions, stipends, allowances	2.3	3.2	2.2	2.2	4.1	6.8	8.7	11.3
Remittances	1.0	2.2	2.9	4.9	3.3	3.7	3.9	4.7
Money received from relatives, close friends	2.2	2.5	3.2	5.4	5.7	6.0	7.5	8.9
Non-monetary income	10.6	11.3	19.8	18.8	23.1	21.1	21.8	20.2
Total other monetary means	7.2	4.8	12.4	11.1	11.3	11.5	12.4	13.8
Sale of property	1.9	1.8	2.9	2.2	2.5	1.4	1.8	1.6
Debt or use of savings	5.3	3.0	9.5	8.9	8.8	10.1	10.6	12.2
Debt or use of savings	36.0	38.8	53.5	57.0	61.6	71.2	80.9	94.9
Total monetary and non-monetary means	46.6	50.1	73.3	75.7	84.7	92.3	102.7	115.2

3.2 Evaluation of the Amount of Remittances to Georgia

Remittances from abroad increased by almost four times. The largest remittance flows from labour migrants from Georgia were sent from Russia (63.1%), followed by the USA (13.6%), Greece (3.3%), Spain (3%), the Ukraine (2.1%), Turkey (2.1%) and Austria (1.7%).

The *National Bank of Georgia* (NBG) regularly publishes information on the volume of electronic remittances and their origin by countries, which is based upon the data of swift transfer systems, operating in Georgia's banking sector (Western Union, MoneyGram, Anelik, Caucasus Express, etc). These data reflect the money transferred to Georgian citizens or other physical persons in Georgia by physical persons from foreign countries. The amounts include transfers made by foreign citizens, including Georgian nationals who permanently reside outside Georgia and are

not necessarily labour migrants. The same is true for amounts transferred by citizens of foreign countries to their compatriots in Georgia.

The electronic remittances therefore do not always reflect the phenomena that we are interested in, especially if considering the fact that labour migrants' remittances can also be transferred through other channels such as bank accounts or non-bank means, in the form of cash. Nevertheless, the data of swift transfer electronic systems give a rather clear idea about the key countries where these remittances originate from.

Table 10 reflects the electronic remittance flows to Georgia from several countries with Russia well in the lead position. Over the past three years (2004 to 2006) Russia accounted for 60% of all remittances in the average, although its average

share in earlier years (2001 to 2003) did not exceed 27% and was well below the corresponding US indicator. At that time, the swift wire transfer was a comparatively new service both in Georgia and in Russia and was used by a very limited group of migrants, especially if considering that an intensive transport communication existed between the countries which facilitated the transfer of cash. The above mentioned type of service was

used more extensively by labour migrants from Georgia in countries with strict migration regimes which, along with high travel costs, made frequent trips to Georgia difficult. This may explain the rather low indicators of electronic remittances at the beginning of the 21st century, which do not depict the real frequency of migrant workers' remittances.

Table 10:

Electronic Remittances to Georgia (thousand USD)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007*
Total	63,269	69,559	72,122	96,085	259,122	403,133	546,340	352,801
USA	28,196	24,292	20,297	23,641	30,612	42,631	59,497	48,269
Russia	14,841	18,776	21,597	26,382	132,129	253,523	364,642	222,141
Germany	2,408	3,057	3,380	5,439	5,370	6,025	4,968	2,814
Israel	1,903	2,575	2,632	2,922	2,492	3,936	4,189	3,137
Spain	1,504	1,775	1,716	2,063	4,170	6,300	11,348	10,470
Greece	1,860	2,762	3,729	5,895	7,971	15,671	16,401	8,860
Belgium	1,200	1,559	1,313	1,472	1,796	1,368	1,901	1,637
Ukraine	1,206	1,458	1,706	1,755	7,361	15,252	11,146	8,589
United Kingdom	1,170	1,531	1,677	2,341	5,902	4,904	5,923	3,851
Poland	291	215	179	321	282	285	339	222
The Netherlands	532	481	371	732	829	887	1,022	477
Kazakhstan	883	1,002	838	863	2,663	1,638	3,652	3,845
Canada	591	710	618	1,266	1,093	1,604	2,049	1,055
Turkey	834	1,221	1,598	2,819	5,721	10,215	13,929	7,299
France	424	946	1,627	3,167	3,148	3,651	3,545	1,580
United Arab Emirates	510	499	609	670	899	1,200	1,302	457
Azerbaijan	46	52	49	100	160	2,256	567	386
Turkmenistan	140	91	83	115	519	120	231	30
Other countries	4,630	6,558	8,104	14,123	46,002	31,667	39,690	27,703

Source: NBG

*Note: Data covering a period of six months

The *National Bank of Georgia*, since 2007 in charge of the compilation of the balance of payment¹⁴¹, collates the results of the periodic household surveys with the data of the banking sector, primarily of swift transfer electronic systems. Based upon this data, there are three remittances related statistical categories which can be distinguished as follows: 1) workers' remittances (money sent by those Georgian citizens who

have been working in foreign countries for more than a year), 2) the compensation of employees (remittances of citizens employed for seasonal, temporary or seasonal jobs in foreign countries for less than one year) and 3) migration-related transfers (a monetary equivalent to assets brought by a labour migrant from a foreign country to the country of origin at the time of his final return). The sum of the indicators recorded under the

abovementioned categories represents the official total volume of labour migrants' remittances.

The total labour migrant's remittances to Georgia (see Table 11) substantially differ from the data of electronic remittances. This is especially true for the period from 2000 to 2003 when migrants used swift transfer electronic systems much less frequently. In order to perform its task, the *State Department for Statistics* had to fill the informational gap with regards to the transfer of remittances by collating the data from

various sources including the results of household surveys and special statistical studies together with the scarce data from the banking system. This, naturally, did not provide the desired result.

Afterwards, as the size of electronic remittances sharply increased and their record-keeping improved, it became possible to obtain more accurate data. The lack of special statistical studies, however, which is caused by the lack of financing such studies, does not allow a more objective quantitative evaluation of remittances.

Table 11:
Structure of the Total Labour Migrants' Remittances to Georgia (in million USD)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007*
Total	274	181	231	235	303	346	485	305
Labour compensation of workers	179	94	152	168	236	247	315	182
Workers' remittances	95	87	75	64	64	94	153	101
Migrants' transfers	4	3	3	5	17	22

Source: NBG, *World Bank*, Migration and Remittances Fact Book

*Note: Data covering a period of six months

The table clearly reveals that the labour compensation – the remittances of those citizens who stay abroad for less than a year – prevails in the official remittance flows of migrant workers. The balance of payment statistics, however, does not even regard such citizens as migrants when applying the term in its strict definition. Taking into account the increase of emigration and visa regimes applied to citizens of Georgia, especially in recent times, as well as the high costs of and the difficulty to travel, it can hardly be assumed that short-term migrants send twice as much money to their country of origin as those migrants who stay abroad for extended periods of time. It is, however, this very category of migrants that is the most numerous. Moreover, the share of migrant transfers in the overall remittance flow is extremely small. This can be explained by the difficulty of their recording, which is a typical problem for all countries concerned, not only for Georgia. In conclusion, there is a need for introducing a more elaborated practice of recording and classifying migrants' remittances especially since the significant part of the financial resources from Georgian migrants arrive to their family members by other means than the official

money transfers.

The results of a survey conducted in 2003 under the aegis of the *International Organisation for Migration* (IOM) and the *Association for Economic Education* offer a certain indicator that only fifty percent of the migrants sent money via banking institutions, whereas 17% made the dispatch via post. Subsequently, the remaining 33% send cash by physical persons.

It should be noted that the share of non-bank remittances was much higher in Georgia at the end of the 1990s. According to expert estimates of that time, the overall volume of the flow of remittances ranged between 600 and 720 million USD. The comparison of the given data with the official remittance indicator of 2000 suggests that the share of unofficial remittances varied from between 54 and 62% at that time. Considering that Russia did not yet impose a visa regime and travel procedures with other countries were not as strict as they are now, thereby favouring non-bank remittances, it can be assumed that the unofficial remittance share reached and even exceeded 60%. In the following period, however, it showed a downward trend which was somewhat

strengthened over the past few years (2004 to 2006) and led to a notable decrease in the share of unofficial remittances in total flows by the year 2006.

This observation of a decline of unofficial remittances is also supported by empirical data showing that remittances to Georgia came mainly from the main destinations of Georgian citizens, namely from Russia and Greece. According to an *IOM* survey, more than half of the remittances from these countries were transferred through acquaintances; friends and long distance bus drivers, whereas 84% of migrants' remittances from the US came in the form of bank or other types of electronic transfers.

An extreme aggravation of Russian-Georgian relations, which resulted in the imposition of a transport, visa and mail blockade by Russia and the deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia, increased the official remittance flows significantly. The communications blockade made it very difficult for Georgian migrants to transfer money through informal channels, thus forcing them to use the service of banking institutions and

their swift transfer systems more extensively. In the second quarter of 2007, the amount of money transferred to Georgia from Russia through the above mentioned systems grew by 50% compared to the same period of the previous year. Moreover, another observation suggests that irregular migrants tend to accumulate money in larger amounts in order to send it to Georgia at the first possible opportunity.

According to the *National Bank of Georgia*, remittances from abroad constituted an increasing share of the GDP – from 4.8% in 2003, to 6.3% in 2006. This data, based on money transfer operators is believed to capture approximately one-third or less of the actual flows, given the high utilization of informal channels. Remittances actually may constitute as much as 20% of the GDP. Officially, Russia was the largest source of remittances, accounting for 63% (253 million USD) of all official flows in 2005.

A 2006 estimate by the *UN Global Commission on International Migration* (GCIM) shows a much higher figure of remittances to Georgia – USD 1 billion annually.

Table 12:

Aggregate Labour Migrants' Remittances to Georgia and their Scale

	2000	2006
Aggregate volume of remittances* (USD mln)	720.0	800.0
Ratio between aggregate volume of remittances and GDP, %	23.5	10.2
Ratio between aggregate volume of remittances and export volume, %	223.1	80.6
Ratio between aggregate volume of remittances and the volume of foreign direct investments, %	548.8	67.2

Source: *Department for Statistics of the Ministry of Economic Development*, NBG, *World Bank*

It is also interesting that the aggregate volume of remittances against the GDP substantially decreased between 2000 and 2006, which can be explained by a sharp increase in the GDP, on the one hand, and less impressive dynamics in total remittance flows, on the other. The strengthening of the national currency also contributed to this process. The ratio of migrant remittances to the GDP is still quite high, although it remains modest in international comparison.

Although the volume of remittances of labour migrants has sharply decreased against the GDP as well as against the total export volume and the size of direct foreign investments since 2000, such remittances still remain one of the most relevant sources of foreign currency flows. Therefore the maintenance of their intensity represents an important factor for macroeconomic stability.

Remittances to Georgia, as compared to Eastern European and some other post-Soviet

countries are more oriented on consumption than on savings and investment. The impact of remittances upon the national economy, therefore, is limited to the multiplier effect which, in its turn, is quite restricted due to a clear-cut orientation of consumption of imports. The remittances of labour migrants signify a vital source for a large part of

Georgian households; although the distribution of the remittance flows reveal a certain inequality. The majority of recipients are inhabitants of the capital city and larger urban centres for whom remittances often represent an additional source of income and serve as a means of improving their social standing.

3.3 Georgia's Labour Market

Hence, as our analysis has shown there are no remarkable changes in the economic position of households in Georgia during the last period. Poverty and unemployment remain to be the major problems for a significant part of the population despite of economic reforms, humanitarian aid and extensive social policy measures. The official unemployment rate of those registered as unemployed has continued to rise, reaching a decade's peak from 11.5% in 2003, to 13.8% in 2005, and was on pace to become stable in 2006. The details paint an even starker picture: about 75% of the unemployed have not had a job for at least one year, and the 20 to 30 years age group has the highest overall unemployment rate of 28.8% (rates are lowest for those aged between 46 and 65). In addition, annual inflation had crept up to 8.8% by December 2006, and the creation of new jobs remained slow. Another reason for persistent poverty, and a problem in itself, is the continuing high level of unemployment. Official statistics give the increase of unemployment as 11.5% in 2004, to 13.3% in 2007. However, the number of people who classify themselves as 'unemployed' is usually closer to 30%. The reason for this discrepancy is that official statistics (and international standards) define subsistence agriculture as 'employment', while many of the people who work in such positions do not.

Unemployment varies throughout the country. As the above discrepancy suggests, it may not be a good idea to use official unemployment figures as the basis for targeting assistance to the unemployed, since official figures routinely show unemployment as higher in the cities. Clearly the

most widespread unproductive 'employment' remains in the countryside.

Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Georgian economy, even as its contribution to the GDP has fallen from 30% in 1990, to 14.8% in 2005. Trade and industry continue to be important, but financial intermediation, the booming construction and transportation industries and communications have been driving much of the growth; jobs in these sectors tend to be in urban areas.

The labour market in Georgia is also gender segmented. Women are mainly employed in the public sector with the proportion of 117 women per 100 men, whereas the proportion in the non-public sector is 57 women with hired employment per 100 men. Moreover, there are 161 highly qualified women professionals per 100 men out of the total number of employees of the same lot, 150 medium qualified women specialists per 100 men and only 5 women per 100 men in the unqualified labour force.

It is obvious that the qualification of women in the labour market does not fall short of that of men. Nevertheless, if in the early 1990s an average monthly salary of a woman employed in the economy comprised 75% of a man's average salary, during the late 1990s it dropped to 52% and currently does not exceed 48.6%. All of these facts, along with an increase of unpaid female labour in the household economy, indicate widespread gender discrimination in Georgia's labour market.

Table 13:

Gender Structure of Employment (Women per 100 Men) in Georgia, 2006

Total population	107
Total employees	91
of which:	
Entrepreneur / businessman employer	23
Hired employee	91
Public sector hired employee	117
Non-public sector hired employee	57
Out of total employees:	
Heads of management bodies	36
High level qualified professionals	161
Medium level qualified professionals	159
Employees engaged in preparing information, registering documents, record-keeping and rendering service	254
Employees engaged in trade, service or related activity	107
Qualified workers of agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishery sectors	103
Qualified workers of production, construction, transport, communications sectors	16
Operators, mechanics, assemblers and drivers	2
Unqualified employees	5

Source: Department for Statistics, Ministry of Economic Development

4: Current Return and Reintegration Programmes

Current return and reintegration programmes are relatively new, few and operate on a limited scale. Unfortunately, this means that relatively few returnees have been through the full programmes. By contrast, *IOM* Georgia reports having helped 4,100 Georgians to return through its Assisted Voluntary Return Programme up through mid-2005.

The *IOM* has the longest history of implementing return and reintegration programmes in Georgia. However, for the most part, current efforts are targeted towards rejected asylum seekers, who represent only a small proportion of all returnees. Limited awareness and a small number of

countries with programmes also limit the scale of the initiative.

Most programmes follow a similar model. They are centred on assisting returnees to find some means of income, be it through job placement and training or support in opening one's own business. The programmes provide funding and access to resources such as training on how to write a business plan. Additional services include housing assistance, counselling, adaptation training, and health care.

Table 14 briefly presents the programmes on returnees that exist in Georgia so far:

Table 14:**Existing Return Programme Partners**

Country	Georgia Partner(s)	Managing Agency	Years of operation	Number of returnees served
Belgium	Caritas	FEDASIL	April 26, 2006 to April 2008	One case (plus one exception – person from Austria)
Czech Republic	<i>People in need (PIN)</i>	Czech and German Government	2005 to 2008	44 families (total)
Czech Republic	IOM	NA	NA	Case-by-case
Great Britain	IOM	<i>The Home Office of the UK and the European Refugee Fund.</i>	2003 to present	88 individuals
Ireland	IOM	NA	NA	Case-by-case
Netherlands	Caritas	<i>CORDAID</i>	2006 to 2007	Two cases
Poland	IOM	NA	NA	Case-by-case
Switzerland	<i>World Vision/IOM</i>	<i>Federal Office for Migration (FOM)/Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)</i>	February 2006 to March 2008	51 individuals
Switzerland	IOM	Swiss Government	Since January 15, 2006	48 individuals

5: The International Framework of Out-Migration and Legal Frameworks of Migration in Georgia

At the request of the Government of Georgia and with support of the Czech and German governments IOM carried out an assessment of the country's migration management system from October 1-5, 2007 and within the scope of the *European Commission* (EC) funded programme 'Informed Migration – An Integrated Approach to Promoting Legal Migration through National Capacity Building and Inter-regional Dialogue between the South Caucasus and the EU'. The information presented below is based on the results of this assessment report and mentioned in the list of references.

The assessment team noted that the Government of Georgia faces several challenges in the management of the flows of foreigners across its international borders and their ensuing stay in the country, be it temporary or for longer periods. It is also important to consider Georgia's geopolitical situation with lasting instability in the region as well as Georgia's proximity to the new EU borders of Romania and Bulgaria,

which might produce an increase in the arrival of migrants aiming to enter the EU, particularly following these countries' up-coming entry into the Schengen zone. The overriding factor is that legal migration into Georgia is accessible to such an extent that undocumented migration becomes almost a 'non-issue'. Some of the more important contributing factors are:

- Georgia's extremely liberal and open policy on migration following its free market policies;
- A very liberal visa regime both in terms of visa categories as well as in relation to visa issuance at the borders – available for practically every citizenship;
- Neither proper inter-agency administrative structure nor a clear-cut inter-agency cooperation between the various ministries and agencies, allocated with competences in different areas of migration management. Ultimately this undermines the objective of dealing with the different immigration issues in a coherent manner;

- The lack of systematic requirements for issuing residence permits and their categories as well as the length of validity – particularly crucial for the residence permits issued on the basis of employment, with regards also to Georgia's own unemployed population;
- There is no specific work permit regime for foreigners in place, meaning that there are no limits to the employment of foreigners who obtain their residence permits simply on presentation of employment contracts. There are no partic management administration, as well as efficient practices. The experts' assessment of Georgia's migration management capacity identified weaknesses which, unless quickly addressed, are expected to fuel the flow of undocumented migrants, transnational crime and other abuses directly and indirectly linked to migration - potentially jeopardising the country's security and interests. These weaknesses in the field of migration include:
 - A lack of overall direction and limited policy development and implementation capability;
 - An insufficient legal framework and a lack of clear criteria for entry and residence;
 - The fact that there is neither a government agency coordinating migration management nor, alternatively, clear terms of reference for the division of tasks between the existing agencies dealing with the migration process;
 - A lack of a coherent system for migration data collection and analysis and an insufficiently elaborated data exchange mechanism between migration related institutions.

Relations to the European Union

The *European Union–Georgia European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan* (ENP AP) was endorsed by the *EU-Georgia Cooperation Council* on 14 November 2006. The main priorities for the EU's support in the *Action Plan's* implementation in the period between 2007 and 2013 are given as democratic development, the rule of law and good governance; economic development and the ENP AP implementation; poverty reduction, social reforms and the peaceful settlement of Georgia's internal conflicts.

Priority area number 4 of the ENP AP calls for enhanced cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security, including the field of border management. In the area of migration issues, the AP foresees, among others, the elaboration of a coherent, comprehensive and balanced 'National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum Issues'. Furthermore it calls for the establishment of an electronic database for the monitoring of migration flows, improved coordination between relevant national agencies dealing with migration, cooperation on the reintegration of returned asylum applicants and irregular migrants, and the strengthening of the dialogue and cooperation in preventing and fighting against irregular migration. The latter could, according to the document, possibly lead to a future EC-Georgia agreement on readmissions.

The European Council is currently holding discussions with the *Committee of Permanent Representatives* (COREPER) on the issue of visa facilitation for Georgia. At the same time the *EC Sub-Committee on Justice, Liberty and Security* is discussing a 'mobility partnership' and met in January 2008, to discuss the progress. It is clear to the Georgian government (State Minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular) that readmission is linked to visa facilitation. Furthermore the *European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security*, Franco Frattini called in his letter on the issue of visa facilitation on Georgia to introduce biometric passports by 2009. The issue of the *EU Migration Acquis* alignment for the Caucasus Countries remains a high priority for the European Commission (Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security), which now considers the Acquis not necessarily as a prerequisite for accession, but rather a vehicle for closer cooperation on migration matters.

The Georgian government very positively accepted the idea of mobility partnerships between EU Members and ENP countries, put forward by the European Council Conclusions of June 18, 2007 'On Extending and Enhancing the Global Approach to Migration'. In fact, Georgia was hoping to become one of the pilot countries for

the implementation of this new concept. However, following a decision of the European Council of December 2007, Georgia has not been included as a pilot country for the implementation of mobility partnerships. But it can be expected that the Georgian government will pursue the inclusion in the second round of pilot partnerships.

Apart from the recently initiated negotiations between the *European Commission* and Georgia on a readmission agreement with the EC representing all EU member states, Georgia has also been conducting readmission agreement negotiations

with individual EU member states. In some cases (Bulgaria, Italy, Germany) readmission agreements have been concluded and either ratified or awaiting ratification, whereas negotiations are ongoing with Austria, the Benelux countries, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Sweden. Georgia has also entered into readmission agreements with the non-EU member states Switzerland and the Ukraine, whereas negotiations are ongoing with Norway, Russia and Turkey.

Current Migration Policy of Georgia

Currently there is no explicit emigration policy in Georgia, even though policy-makers are well aware of the economic and demographic effects of the large-scale out-migration of nationals of productive working age, as well as the possibly positive effects of remittances and diaspora involvement.

The existing legislation of Georgia governing migration issues consists of a number of laws, regulations and instructions stipulating the rights of nationals, foreign nationals and stateless persons and regulating the issues of entry, sojourn (residence), return, and irregular migration. The national migration law also relies on the norms of legal acts of other branches of law, for instance administrative or penal law, to ensure the prevention and prosecution of offences and crimes in the area of migration.

Although the general legal provisions that regulate the entry into Georgia do comply with European standards, there remain a number of significant gaps in the Georgian legislation that are related to the non-detailed list of categories of entry visas. While reviewing the entry regulations, it was already mentioned that the 'ordinary' Georgian visa has a universal character and covers almost all legal purposes, except study. The same happens with the residence permit, though study purposes are included in the list of other criteria determining the residence permit eligibility.

Georgian immigration legislation does not fully cover the issue of foreigners being employed or doing business in Georgia. There is no limitation to employment or economic activities, once a person

enters Georgia with an ordinary visa. A specific labour migration legislation does not exist either. The law also fails to limit business activities of foreigners in Georgia. In contradiction to this absence of regulations, several sub-regulations refer to and sometimes are even based on such limitations, which could not be found in the law.

The norms that grant residence permits based on labour contracts also need critical reviewing. As already mentioned the *Law on Foreigners* stipulates that a temporary residence permit may be granted to a foreigner, who has been engaged in labour activities in Georgia, including freelancers. This implies that no work permit is necessary to obtain a residence permit based on employment grounds.

For employed persons there are no legal provisions or institutions in charge of the *EU Acquis* required 'labour market test' to verify whether the employment of a foreigner is justifiable vis-à-vis the availability of the local work-force. Similarly, for self-employed persons there is no institution and no legal provisions in place to carry out the *Acquis* required 'economic benefits test' to verify the economic viability and interest of Georgia in any particular small or medium enterprise venture. Basically even the preliminary differentiation between these two categories (employed and self-employed) which is a cornerstone of the *EU Acquis* on the employment of foreigners is not made by Georgian legislation.

Just as the current system for entry into Georgia is characterized by a very limited categorization and by its overly universal

character, the criteria determining eligibility for obtaining residence permits are equally general. Therefore, the establishment of a clear and diversified categorization of residence permits issued to foreigners is of vital importance for the improvement of Georgia's immigration policy and practice.

In the current migration law, all foreigners who do not require a visa to enter Georgia have the right to stay in the country for three months without visas, at which time they are obliged to apply for a temporary residence permit. In a similar fashion, foreigners who do need to have a visa for entering Georgia are obliged to apply for a residence permit before the validity of their visa expires. When receiving the permit the foreigners are automatically registered according to the place of residence that they have indicated in their

application. With the exception of humanitarian reasons, it should not be possible for persons under the visa free regime to obtain a residence permit (i.e. change of status) if the above suggested visa categories were applied and their original entry was in the above categories.

However, there is no control mechanism in place to monitor whether foreigners do indeed apply for a residence permit upon the expiration of their visa or their visa-free stay, and whether they apply for a renewal of their residence permit once the current permit expires. As a result, no information is available on the number of foreigners, who exceed their right to stay and hence no action is taken by the government to promote either regularization of foreigners staying in Georgia on an irregular basis or to facilitate their departure from the country.

Emigration Policy and Protection of Labour Migrants Abroad

According to current regulations, nationals from Georgia who decide to leave the country on a permanent basis need to register this at the Ministry of Justice. However, for various reasons this does not happen to a large extent, which means that the numbers of emigrants registered by the Ministry of Justice by no means reflect the real outward out-migration movements.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends Georgian nationals, who live abroad to register with the Georgian embassies in the countries of their destination. According to information presented to the assessment team, the consular sections of Georgian embassies register both Georgian nationals residing abroad on a permanent and temporary basis. However until more precise benefits for registration (e.g. vote abroad or fiscal facilitation at home as a foreign resident) are legally put in place it will be difficult to convince Georgian nationals abroad of the uses

of registration. As labour migration is still one of the important aspects of out-migration from Georgia, it would be recommended to establish a legal framework for managing the aspects of employment of Georgian nationals abroad, i.e. possible bilateral agreements.

Regulation of the activities of recruitment agencies sending Georgian nationals for employment abroad should be one priority in this regard, for example through a system of licensing or any other system that is in compliance with best international practices. Equally important is the support and protection of nationals from Georgia during their employment abroad, e.g. through the conclusion of bilateral labour migration agreements with countries of destination that contain specific agreements on the protection of migrant workers, the deployment of labour attachés at embassies of Georgia abroad, engaging in mobility partnerships with EU Member States, etc.

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NOTES

¹³³ The official statistics on migration for 1990-1991 is not published in statistical books, but was obtained from the *Georgian Statistical Office* and is cited in Tsuladze et al. 1999.

¹³⁴ Cf. web site: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/05-09.htm

¹³⁵ Editorial note: Situated 25 km southeast of the capital Tbilisi, Rustavi used to be a major centre of heavy (steal) industries, but suffered dramatically from the dissolution of the USSR. Most of its industrial plants were shut down, while 65% of the city's population became unemployed, with the attendant social problems of high crime and acute poverty. The population shrank from 160,000 in the mid-1990s to 116,000 (census of 2002) as residents moved elsewhere in search of work.

¹³⁶ Editorial note: Situated in Western Central Georgia (Imereti), Tkibuli was a centre of coal mining during Soviet times. Now only one of previously nine mines is in operation. The tea production that was the second major industry in that area also collapsed after 1991, for lack of quality.

¹³⁷ Editorial note: Akhalkalaki (population 60,975) is the main administrative centre of the Samtskhe-Javakheti province with a predominantly non-Georgian population (ca. 90% ethnic Armenians). While the area was relatively well off during Soviet times, it became one of the poorest areas in post-Soviet Georgia. According to official data, the poverty rate in 2008 was as high as 66% (of which 51.1% are living below the official subsistence level). The modest industry of Soviet times collapsed after 1991, and with the withdrawal of the Russian military base – so far unreplaced by the Georgian army – the last major employer in the area left (1,000 working places for the local population). The average monthly income in the province is as low as 83.4 GEL (45.40 EUR) and would be even lower without seasonal labour migration to Russia.

¹³⁸ The aggregated results of this survey are published by Mansoor & Quillin (Eds.) 2007.

¹³⁹ Editorial note: The Georgian Civil War consisted of interethnic strife as well as of intra-national conflict. The latter emerged after a military coup d'état (December 21, 1991 - January 6, 1992) against the first democratically elected President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and continued with Gamsakhurdia's rebellion in a vain attempt to regain power. Clashes between 'Zviadist' armed militia and pro-

governmental forces continued throughout 1992 and 1993, leading, among others, to the decision by Aslan Abashidze, head of the Autonomous Republic of Adzharia, to close the administrative border against the entries of militiamen from the two conflicting parties, thus establishing an authoritarian semi-separatist regime in Adzharia and causing frictions in the relations between the regional government and the central government of Georgia.

¹⁴⁰ Editorial note: The reasons for low or high expenditure on foods are manifold and not easy to explain. For comparison, the average per capita expenditure on food in Germany was 12.9% of all consumer expenses in 2005 (2007: 9.7% of the consumer expenditure per private household; 2008: 14% of the monthly average per capita income), which is among the lowest of all EU countries (Luxemburg: 11%; Great Britain: 12.3%; Sweden: 12.4%). Nearly 40 years ago, the share was 25% in Germany. Among the higher spending EU countries are currently France (2005: 15.7%), Spain and Italy (20%), Lithuania (37%) and Rumania (50%). However, experts do not see the low amount as indicative for the wealth of the German or other low spending populations, but explain it either as an indicator for increasing poverty, when people start to save on their food expenditure instead of other consumer goods, or as a lack of eating culture in comparison with other European countries (priority choice). A third explanation relates to the relative stability of food prizes in Germany (the price of bread has increased by nine times since 1950) as compared to the higher increase of other consumer goods (since 1995: 22.5%) and of wages (since 1950: more than 20 times). In Russia, only 6% of the respondents of polls by the private Russian polling institution *VЦИОМ* (web site: <http://wciom.ru/>) spend less than a quarter of their household budget on food (May 2008); 30% of the respondents spend 25-49% and the relative majority (41%) even 50-74%; 16% of the population spend more than 75% of their household budget on food. Over a period of the last three years (2005-08) the polling results remained nearly unchanged in Russia. Residents of the megacities of Moscow and St. Petersburg spend relatively less on food than the rest of the Russian Federation. Compare for Germany,

web site: <http://www.raiffeisen.com/news/artikel/30210128>; and for Russia, web site: <http://www.gusnews.net/2008/06/25/russland-ausgaben-fur-lebensmittel/>.

¹⁴¹ Before 2007, this function was performed by the *Department for Statistics*.

MIGRATION FROM ARMENIA AND GEORGIA TO MOSCOW

Galina I. Osadchaya and Tatiana N. Yudina

1: Statistics

1.1 Migration-Generated Population Growth of Moscow's Population

The analysis of statistical data demonstrates that the growth of population in Moscow after 1990 remained positive (except during the years 1992 and 1993) and only fluctuated in its scale. The negative population growth observed during the years 1992 and 1993 is explained mainly by the fact that during these years the government of the capital city adopted harsh measures aimed at preventing influx of migrants to Moscow. At

present the index of migration-generated growth in Moscow is one of the highest among all Russian regions. Since 2005, however, a slight decrease of migration turnover can be observed (see Table 1). It should be noted that the figures in Table 1 reflect only permanent migration and do not take into account temporary migrations that, as demographers argue, exceed the scale of permanent migration by a factor of 3 to 6.¹⁴²

Table 1:

**Migration-generated population growth of Moscow's population 1992 to 2006,
in thousands¹⁴³**

Year	Migration-generated growth or decrease
1992	-17,1
1993	-16,5
1994	10,8
1995	24,5
1996	35,6
1997	47,8
1998	59,5
1999	61,1
2000	65,5
2001	52,0
2002	48,2
2003	54,1
2004	54,5
2005	52,3
2006	50,6

Despite a decrease of migration-generated growth the efficiency of migration in absolute terms remains to be high: the migration-generated

growth coefficient in Moscow is four times as high as the same coefficient in Russia as a whole (see Table 2).

Table 2:

**Migration-generated population growth coefficients
(Migration-generated population growth per 10,000 persons per year)¹⁴⁴**

Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Entire Russian Federation	9	18	35	66	44	35	35	29	18	25	19	16	6	7	9	11
Central Federal circuit	30	53	75	1006	111	95	96	88	74	82	68	64	36	34	35	39
Moscow City	93	57	92	117	260	242	263	245	214	239	211	166	52	52	53	48

1.2 Migration-Generated Population Growth of Moscow's Population due to Migrants from Armenia and Georgia Arriving in Moscow for Permanent Residence

Moscow remains to be attractive for migrants from Armenia and Georgia arriving for permanent residence in the city. However the migration-generated growth index with regards to Georgia and Armenia is gradually decreasing: from 2,200 persons in 2000, to 900 persons in 2006 from Armenia; and from 2,600 persons in 2000, to 500 persons in 2006 from Georgia. Until 2005, Georgia provided a greater share of migration growth than

Armenia. In 2005, however, migration-generated growth due to Armenian migrants in Moscow started to comprise 9.9% of the total migration-generated growth rate from the New Independent States (NIS) of Moscow's population while the same index for migrants from Georgia comprised mere 6.8%. This trend prevailed in the subsequent year 2006 (see Table 3).

Table 3:

Migration-generated growth of Moscow's population due to migrants from Armenia and Georgia who arrived for permanent residence¹⁴⁵

	2000		2001		2002		2003		2005		2006	
	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%
Migration-generated growth (from NIS), including:	16.6	100	6.8	100	6.1	100	3.3	100	7.6	100	9/1	100
Armenia	2.2	13.1	0.7	9.7	0.5	8.5	0.1	4.1	0.8	9.9	0.9	8.0
Georgia	2.6	15.8	0.8	12.2	0.7	11.6	0.5	15.4	0.5	6.8	0.5	5.9

Until 2003, the flow of migrants from Georgia arriving for permanent residence exceeded the flow from Armenia in the total volume of all immigrants to Moscow: every tenth of all immigrants were

Georgian while Armenians resulted in 8% of all immigrants. From 2005, the ratio changed and more Armenians arrived in Moscow (see Table 4).

Table 4:

Structure of migrant flow, number of persons arrived in Moscow from Armenia and Georgia for permanent residence between 2000 and 2006¹⁴⁶

	2000		2001		2002		2003		2005		2006	
	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. persons	%	Thou. Persons	%	Thou. Persons	%
Total # of migrants	20.7	100	11.1	100	9.6	100	6.4	100	10.7	100	11.9	100
From Armenia	2.6	12.4	1.2	10.8	0.9	0.5	8.2	8.2	0.86	8.1	1.02	8.6
From Georgia	3.0	14.6	1.3	11.8	1.0	10.2	0.7	10.9	0.67	6.2	0.71	5.9

The absolute scale of reverse migration flows to Georgia and Armenia from Moscow is inconsiderable. During the recent five years the average number of those who left Moscow for Armenia comprises 100 to 105 persons, the

average number of people who left Moscow for Georgia comprises 150 to 160 persons. These figures reflect the general trend of return migration from Moscow.

1.3 Gender, Matrimonial and Educational Structure of Migration Flows from Armenia and Georgia to Moscow

Gender

Males fit to work represent the absolute majority (70 to 85%) of migrants from Armenia and Georgia. When in 1989, of every 100 Moscow residents of Armenian origin 58 were male and 42 were female (for Moscow residents of Georgian

origin this proportion was 60 to 40) then in 2002, this gender disparity increased: The proportion of sexes among Armenians comprised 62 to 38, and among Georgians it comprised 65 to 35.

Matrimonial structure

Statistical data on the matrimonial and educational structure of migration flows from Armenia and Georgia are currently unavailable. Therefore the description of these structures in the following subsection will be based on results of earlier studies.¹⁴⁷ According to these studies, 32% of the immigrants from Armenia and 23% of those from Georgia arrive with no family members.

Among Georgians arriving unaccompanied the percentage of unmarried men is higher than among single Armenians. Resettlements of families are more characteristic to Georgian migrants. Three quarters (75%) of Georgian migrants polled came to Moscow together with their families; of those, 36% with their parents, 8.0% with a spouse, 28% with a spouse and children, 3% with children and

parents. 64% of Armenians followed this pattern. Studies of migrants from Armenia demonstrate

also that the family status of Georgians and Armenians is different.

Educational structure

In general, Armenians are one of the best educated ethnic groups among the ethnic minorities of Moscow (Galkina 2006, 188). Nevertheless there are relevant differences in the educational level and cultural education of new-coming and ‘old’ Armenian residents. According to Arutyunian’s studies (2001) and further elaborated by Galkina (2006, 188), predominantly Armenophone Armenians coming to Moscow have a lower level of education, if compared to Russophone Armenians, who reside in Moscow at least for 20 years, or are born in Moscow. Among the second group, about 75% have completed a higher

education level, while among Russian Muscovites about 30 to 60% have completed higher education, depending on their age groups (Vendina 2005).

As Table 5 illustrates, 39% of the ‘new’ immigrants from Armenia since 1989 until 2002 and 37.3% of those from Georgia have higher education certificates. Similar data were obtained by Lebedev (2006). According to his survey 36% of Armenian immigrants and 32% of Georgian immigrants hold higher education degrees. These data confirm calculations brought by Drobiževa et al. (2007).

Table 5:

Number of persons of Armenian and Georgian origin with higher education, incomplete higher education, and specialized secondary education (per 1,000 persons of 15 years old and above)

Country of origin	Education					
	Higher education			Secondary education		
	1989	1994	2002	1989	1994	2002
Armenia	551	567	399	144	166	208
Georgia	No data	514	373	No data	173	227

Source: Arutyunian 2001; Drobiževa et al. 2007

1.4 Armenian and Georgian Communities in Moscow

Migration flows contribute increasingly to the ethnic re-composition of Moscow’s population (see Table 6).

Table 6:

The percentage of ethnic Armenians and Georgians among the population of Moscow

Ethnic origin	Percentage of the total population				Increases between 1989 and 2002, in percentage
	1970	1979	1989	2002	
Armenians	0.4	0.4	0.5	1.2	0.7
Georgians	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.3

According to the 2002 census, the Armenian community in Moscow numbers 124,000 people. The number of Armenians residing in Moscow increased threefold between the censuses of 1989 and 2002. The share of Moscow born ethnic Armenians is 24% while 76% of the Armenian residents have moved in at one time or another; of these, 26% arrived after 1990. According to Arutyunian's study (2001), the new generation of the Armenian population of Moscow is fundamentally distinct from the Armenians who settled in the city earlier. Peculiarities of the new generation emerge in social orientations and in cultural attitudes. Newcomers are oriented toward the Armenian culture. All Armenians interviewed are migrants of the 1990s who regard the Armenian language as their mother tongue and speak it fluently. Only one third of them speak Russian. All in all, according to the census 2002, 36.1% of Armenians residing in Moscow speak Russian fluently and regard Russian as their second language.

As several researchers (cf. Vendina 2005; Rybakovski 2006; Drobiževa et al. 2007) note, Armenians tend to agglomerate in certain areas of Moscow. The largest concentration of Armenian newcomers can be found in the suburban Vostryakovo district, in the far south of Central Moscow.

The Georgian community of Moscow is smaller than the Armenian one, comprising about 54,000 to 55,000 people (cf. Rybakovski 2006; Drobiževa et al. 2007; Osadchaya 2008).

The greatest rates of the Georgian community growth occurred between 1992 and 1995. More Georgians came to Moscow during these four years than in the precedent 36 years (Kutelia et al. 2006). Currently Georgians comprise 22% of the metropolis' population. According to Drobiževa et al. (2007), the majority of Moscow's Georgians are speaking Russian fluently, while two thirds retain a good command of the Georgian language. These findings correlate with data of the 2002 census: the share of Georgians who have a complete command of the Russian language comprised 44.2% (according to the census of 1989, 58% of Georgians regarded Russian as their mother tongue, while 95.0% of Georgians had complete command of Russian as their second language).

The Georgian settlement in Moscow is more disperse than the settlement of Armenians and it is not distinguishable for any increased concentrations. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the north-west and south west sectors of the city as sectors that are inhabited by Georgians more often.

The census of 2002 reflected for the first time citizenship among other social characteristics. Besides residents with Russian citizenship those with Armenian and Georgian citizenships are relatively visible (see Table 7). Due to the introduction of dual citizenship in Armenia in spring 2007, it is possible to assume that the number of Armenians with dual citizenship will rise.

Table 7:

Moscow's population by citizenship (Data of 2002 All-Russian census)

Foreign citizens	Thousand people	Percentage
Total #	338	100
Citizens of Armenia	29	0.3
Citizens of Georgia	20	0.2

1.5 Employment of Armenians and Georgians and Their Work in Moscow

On Moscow's labour market there is a huge demand for cheap labour force. Nowadays legal mechanisms for the attraction of temporary migrant labour are rather well adjusted. According

to *Federal Migration Service* (FMS) data between 1995 and 2004 a permanent and stable increase in the number of people attracted to work from FSU countries can be observed. For example, in 2003

work permits were issued to 106,000 persons. In 2004, about 220,000 persons from 111 countries received work permits in the metropolis. A trend to attracting workers from Armenia and a similar

trend for workers from Georgia is being recorded, while at the same time trends for fluctuations diminish (see Table 8).

Table 8:

**Number of foreign workers attracted to work in Moscow from Armenia and Georgia
(Data provided by the *Federal Migration Service of the RF Ministry of Interior*)**

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Total number	57.2	69.2	54.7	72.1	73.2	64.4	82.7	72.1	106.7	145.4
New foreign countries including nationals of	29.3	36.1	19.2	32.0	27.1	26.9	28.3	21.3	32.1	--
Armenia	1.6	1.8	1.4	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.3	2.3	--
Georgia	4.2	4.7	3.5	4.0	3.4	3.4	2.9	0.9	1.3	--

According to data of the labour resources balance in the average, for instance in 2003, 457,200 foreign migrants worked in Moscow. Of these, 2,300 persons were from Armenia and 1,300 persons were from Georgia. This comprises 2.1% and 1.2% of the total number of foreign citizens attracted to Moscow; respectively 7.2% and 4.0% of the total number of newcomers from new foreign countries. By mid-2008, 65,591 migrants were employed in Moscow. Of these, 2,014 persons are citizens of Armenia.

In July 2008, an understanding on organized recruitment of workers from Armenia for Moscow has been achieved on the basis of negotiations between the Government of Moscow and the *Employment Service of the Republic of Armenia*. Respective agencies of Moscow's government request lists of vacancies from enterprises, these lists are then presented to employment services in Armenia. Mandatory requirement for enterprises are that in their requests they have to guarantee that would-be workers will be provided with housing, health service and that standards of labour laws will be abided.

The *Federal Migration Service* (FMS) alleges that the majority of Georgian labour migrants are staying in Moscow undocumented, and that only 1% of all incoming Georgian migrants work with permission.¹⁴⁸

According to the information provided by the *Moscow Employment Service Agency*, Armenian

citizens work, first of all, in construction, commerce, public catering, industry, communal utilities and transportation. Arutyunian (2001) corroborates this information of the employment service, even though priorities of the spheres are somewhat different. According to the author, Armenian migrants are employed first of all in trade and the service sector, then in industry, construction, transportation, and, to a lesser extent, in education, science, health and culture. A relatively large percentage of Armenian newcomers is represented by employees of private companies or are engaged in individual labour activities.

Drobiževa et al. (2007) argue that Armenians, when compared to Georgians, get employment in Moscow more easily. This is connected to the social and occupational composition of people who arrive from Armenia and Georgia, and to their social ambitions and possibilities provided by the respective ethnic communities in Moscow. Armenians arriving in Moscow have a higher educational level and higher vocational claims, and fellow nationals, who have already achieved certain positions in Moscow, help them to find better jobs. Georgians are more represented by intelligentsia. Within the Georgian community there is a higher percentage of unemployed persons.

According to expert estimates made by Tyuryukanova (2003), a citizen of Armenia

who works undocumented in Moscow transfers 64 USD/month to his home country; a citizen of Georgia transfers 61 USD/month. But there

are higher estimates alleging that an Armenian migrant may transfer up to 126 USD/month.

1.6 Violations of Passport Regulations

According to the *Moscow City Main Directorate for Internal Affairs*, the numbers of migrants detained for violation of passport regulations and

registration regulations tend to decrease from 2,000 persons in 2000, to 998 persons in 2004.

2: International Structure of Migration from Georgia and Armenia to Moscow

The international structure of migration from Georgia and Armenia to Moscow is determined by bilateral treaties, agreements between receiving

and sending parties as well as by multipartite agreements and treaties concluded within the CIS framework.

2.1 The Relationship between the Russian Federation and Georgia in Terms of Migration

Three documents adopted prior to 1995, legislate the relationship between the RF and Georgia in terms of migration:

- The Treaty between the Russian Federation Government and the Government of the Republic of Georgia on the Cooperation in the Sphere of Culture, Science and Education (Tbilisi, February 3, 1994);
- The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia on Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation (Tbilisi, February 3, 1994);
- Declaration on the Development and Deepening of the Comprehensive Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia (Signed by Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Head of Republic of the Georgia state, September 15, 1995).

In accordance with the understanding of the presidents of the two countries Vladimir Putin and Eduard Shevardnadze the work on a new framework treaty on friendship and cooperation between the RF and Georgia has been developed. According to the foreign ministries of the two countries this work was virtually completed by 2006. However in 2007 the work on this document was put on hold.¹⁴⁹ Events of August 2008 brought about

the break of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia. This development complicated the movement of Georgians to Russia (Moscow) and their return to Georgia.¹⁵⁰ According to specialists tracing migration flows, Georgians have to leave their country via third countries. Official data characterizing the mobility of Georgians in 2008 does not yet exist. According to data provided by the *Russian Federal Migration Service* (FMS) one more problem emerged. As of September 2008, about 500 natives of Georgia arrived in Moscow and applied for refugee status.¹⁵¹ Back in 2006, a week-long confrontation between Russia and Georgia had ended with the deportation of undocumented Georgian migrants.

According to data gathered by the *All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion* (VCIOM) as a result of the conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008, the attitude of Russians towards Georgians has changed. Half of the polled Russian population (51% of people) changed their attitude to Georgians for worse. But 41% of respondents retain their usual attitude to the Georgian people; while 2% of respondents even improved their attitude to Georgians. It should be noted that if there are 54% young people, aged between 18 and 24, whose attitudes to Georgians deteriorated then there are 48% of those who share these ill

feelings in the age cohort of 25 to 43 years old. Approximately 52% of people belonging to the age cohort of 35 to 44 years and the same percentage of older respondents (60 years and more) changed their attitude towards Georgians for worse.¹⁵²

Respondents with elementary education and incomplete secondary education (53%) noted that their attitude to the Georgian people changed for worse more frequently than, for example, interviewed people with higher and incomplete education (49%). People with higher education level are rather stable in their attitudes to Georgians (among people polled who have higher education 45% did not change their attitude; while among respondents with lower level of education this share comprises 38 to 42%).

Residents of Siberia and southern parts of Russia proved to be the most continual in their attitudes to Georgians (52% of residents of Siberia and 46% of southern residents did not change their attitudes to Georgians). However residents of the Urals (67%) and the North-West (56%) changed their perception of the Georgian people for worse.

Half of the polled Russians (50%) do believe that there are more things in Russian-Georgian relations that separate those nations. Yet 28% still think that there are more unifying elements than disuniting elements in these relations. The smallest group consists of those who think that there are more commonalities in Georgian-Russian relations: in the 18 to 24 year old cohort such people comprise 21%, and the greatest percentage of such people is in the 25 to 34 year old cohort (32%) and in the 45 to 59 year old cohort (31%).

As polls performed by the *Levada-Centre* demonstrate¹⁵³, Russian public opinion was

always very sensitive in its reactions to events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. When a situation around unrecognized republics escalated, and Russian TV channels began to cover it intensively, public opinion changed considerably. However, it should be noted that though Russian society was gravely concerned with 'the situation in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia' (73% of people polled in September 2007 expressed such concern) even then about a half of the people polled said that they had 'no sympathy for neither party of the conflict' (however numbers of people sympathizing with Ossetians tended to increase and comprised 36%, while the number of persons sympathizing with Georgians was 12 times less and comprised 3%). Over the whole period of polls greater parts of respondents could not define their attitude towards processes that took place in Georgia.

In June 2008, the *Levada-Centre* executed a poll of 2,000 Russians on 'Russian's Attitude toward Georgia, the US, the Ukraine and Citizens of these Countries'. The poll was representative for the adult population. According to the poll's results 57% of Russians think that Georgia poses a threat to Russia's interests (the figure is a sum of answers to 'certainly yes' plus 'more likely yes'). 50% of Russians think that Georgia interferes in domestic affairs of Russia while 37% hold to the opposite opinion. The attitude of the majority (53%) remains neutral, a quarter regards Georgia in 'rather' or 'absolutely negative terms'. One fifth of Russians polled regards Georgia 'rather' or 'absolutely positively'. The majority of people polled advocate a restriction or prohibition of Georgians' entry to the RF (35% favour restrictions and 20% favoured prohibition).

2.2 Migration Relation between the Russian Federation and Armenia

The structure of migration relations between the RF and the Republic of Armenia is governed by The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia (1997).

Official persons give a high appraisal of the development of relations between the RF and

Armenia, the cooperation of the two countries within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the *Collective Security Treaty Organization* (CSTO) frameworks and within international organizations.¹⁵⁴ No special study of the attitude within the Russian population towards Armenia is performed. However, results of a study named 'Natives of Trans-Caucasus in

Moscow' conducted by Drobiževa et al. (2006) give indirect evidence of the fact that Armenians "positively appraise a lack of inter-ethnic tension in Moscow".

The protection of Georgian and Armenian migrants' interests and needs issues are reflected in international treaties, special documents on migration issues signed by the RF and Armenia within the CIS framework.¹⁵⁵

List of Documents on Migration Issues (adopted within the CIS Framework)

Designation of document and date of its adoption	Signed or joined	Entry into effect
1. Treaty on the establishment of a Consultative Board on labour, migration and social protection of CIS members' population protection (Council of government heads, November 13, 1992, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature
2. Treaty on non-visa movement of CIS citizens (Council of government heads, October 9, 1992, Bishkek)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect upon signature
3. Agreement on aid for refugees and forced migrants (Council of government heads, September 24, 1993, Moscow).	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature
4. Agreement on the cooperation in the sphere of labour migration and migrant workers rights protection (Council of government heads, September 24, 1993, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on November 21, 1994; in the Republic of Armenia and on September 1, 1995, in the RF
5. Treaty on mutual recognition of rights to indemnification of harm caused to workers by injury, professional disease or any other damage to health connected with their performance of labour duties (Council of government heads, September 9, 1994, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on August 11, 1995
6. Agreement on cooperation in the sphere of labour protection (Council of government heads, December 9, 1994, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on October 6, 1995, in the RF; on October 27, 1995, in the Republic of Armenia, and on January 29, 2004, in Georgia
7. Agreement on the investigation procedure of employment injuries of workers staying abroad from their permanent residence states (Council of government heads, December 12, 1994, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on March 10, 1995, in the RF and the Republic of Armenia

8. Protocol attached to the Agreement on aid to refugees and forced migrants of September 24, 1993 (Council of government heads, February 10, 1995, Almaty city)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect on March 10, 1995, in the RF and the Republic of Armenia
9. Agreement on the procedure of development and compliance with agreed norms and requirements on labour protection and mutually delivered products (Council of government heads, March 12, 1996, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on January 17, 1997, in the Republic of Armenia from May 17, 1999
10. Agreement on procedure of CIS citizens' exit to non-CIS states and departure from these states (Council of government heads, January 17, 1997, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on August 3, 2004
11. Treaty on the regulation of social and labour relations in transnational corporations operating in the territory of CIS member-states (Council of government heads, October 9, 1997, Bishkek)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature in the RF on July 10, 2003, and in the Republic of Armenia on November 9, 2000
12. Agreement on CIS member-states' cooperation in struggle against illegal migration (Council of government heads, March 6, 1998, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature
13. Agreement on the cooperation on the application of single rate manuals for the occupation and trades of workers and qualification manuals of employee's jobs (Council of government heads, January 1, 1999, Saratov)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation Georgia	Took effect on June 16, 1999. Took effect in the RF on April 27, 2000. On July 10, 2003, the RF notified its intention not to join the treaty.
14. Resolution on the regulation of general data bases on illegal migrants and persons whose entry to CIS members is prohibited pursuant to effective national laws and due to the procedure of information exchange on illegal migration (Agreement on cooperation in the combat of illegal migration) (Council of government heads, January 25, 2000, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature
15. Concept of time-phased formation of a common labour market and labour force migration regulation in CIS member-states	Signed by the Presiding person	
16. Resolution on a joint commission of CIS member states for CIS countries' cooperation in the struggle against illegal migration of March 5, 1998 (Council of government heads, April 16, 2004, Cholpan-Ata city)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature

17. Resolution on the concept of CIS member states' cooperation on combating illegal migration (Council of government heads, September 10, 2004, Astana)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature
18. Resolution on a program of CIS member states' cooperation on combating illegal migration for the years 2006 to 2008 (Council of government heads, August 26, 2005, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature
19. Protocol on the introduction of modifications and addenda to the agreement on cooperation in the sphere of labour migration and migrant workers rights protection of April 15, 1994 (Council of government heads, November 25, 2005, Moscow)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect from December 15, 2006
20. Statement of CIS member states' heads on an intensification of cooperation in struggle against illegal migration (Council of heads of CIS member states, November 28, 2006, Minsk city)	Republic of Armenia The Russian Federation	Took effect upon signature

As we can see, from 2000 onwards, Georgia did not take part in negotiations on migration issues. Therefore the legal status of Georgian migrants in Russia is regulated by documents that Georgia has adopted and ratified during the 1990s as well as by general norms of the RF Federal laws # 115-Φ3 'On the legal status of foreign citizens' of July 25, 2002, and # 110-Φ3 'On migration registration of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation' and amendments to this law.

An analysis of the statutory base of the CIS in the sphere of migration also shows that at the present time co-operations (including interaction of the RF and the Republic of Armenia) are carried on primarily along two principal directions: in the sphere of labour migration and in the sphere of combating illegal migration. These directions do not sufficiently meet contemporary requirements. The need to broaden the range of cooperation along other aspects of migration is a long-felt one. On October 5, 2007, the Council of Heads of States adopted the decision on agreed Migration policy of CIS member-states.

Commitment to generally accepted principles and standards of international law and provisions of national laws of CIS member states, adherence

to principles stated in the *Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms* of May 26, 1995, as well as adherence to other interstate and intergovernmental agreements concluded in this sphere within the framework of the Commonwealth are expressed in the *Declaration of the Agreed Migration Policy of the Commonwealth of Independent States Members*. The heads of states proclaimed their willingness to:

- Pursue the agreed migration policy;
- Promote securing the CIS member states' citizens rights to freedom of movement, choice of place of residence, staying and labour activity performance;
- Debar any discrimination based on gender, race, language, religion and beliefs, political or other opinions, ethnic or social origin, property or family status;
- Provide support to ethnic, language, cultural and religious uniqueness of the CIS member states' citizens;
- Contribute to shaping respect for laws, language and culture of a country of stay among the CIS member states' citizens;

- Promote cooperation of state and non-state structures in the sphere of migration;
- Extend cooperation on issues of labour migration processes normalization and regulation;
- Develop informational interaction in the sphere of migration;
- Seek to provision beneficial conditions for mutual travels of the CIS member states' citizens;
- Carry on measures aimed at the prevention and suppression of illegal migration, provide mutual help in prevention, identification and suppression of illegal migration channels;
- Seek to co-operate on migration laws' harmonization issues, and in the development of migration programs and their implementation.

In the new version of the convention *On the legal status of labour migrant workers and members of their families*¹⁵⁶ of the CIS member states all rights that citizens of the receiving party enjoy pursuant to the national law are granted to migrants.¹⁵⁷ Migrant workers and members of their families enjoy fully guaranteed the following rights: right to life; right to freedom and security of person; right to marry; right to equality before law and justice; right to protection against illegal interference in private or family life; right to protection against illegal infringement in inviolability of dwelling; right to protection of personal correspondence and other types of communication secrecy; right to the protection of honour, dignity and business reputation; right to the protection of legally owned private property; right of access to cultural life and participation in it; right to social security (social insurance) in accordance with laws of receiving party (except retirement insurance); right to get emergency medical aid.

Also, freedoms of speech; worship; expression of opinion; establishment of associations; public voluntary organizations and joining trade unions in accordance with laws of the receiving party; reunification of migrant workers' families are guaranteed to migrant workers. In addition, migrant workers enjoy rights to school training, vocational training and re-training; to free

reception of information from competent bodies of all parties as well as the right to learn their mother tongues.

The convention emphasizes that migrant workers and members of their families cannot be expelled from the receiving party otherwise than on grounds stipulated in international treaties and laws of the particular receiving party.

At the same time a possibility of introducing restrictions for migrant workers in respect to: categories of jobs migrants may occupy; business occupations or activities in the receiving party's interests; access to paid labour activity for the purpose of national labour market protection and provision for priority right of the receiving party's own citizens to occupation of vacant jobs; vocational training on the same conditions as citizens of the receiving party enjoy.

It is emphasized that rights of migrant workers and members of their families may be subject to restrictions envisaged in laws of all parties, for the purpose of national security, public order, health and morals of population, or for the protection of other persons' rights and freedoms.

Additionally, for the purpose of migrants' interests and needs protection the *Moscow City Government* takes measures for migration flows regulation. The government has developed calculation rules of activities aimed at an organized recruitment of foreign labour force including:¹⁵⁸

- Submission of request on the need of workers of particular vocations to the *Moscow City Committee for Interregional Relations and National Policy*. Requests are to be submitted by employers who have to indicate in these requests wage, terms of work and warrant accommodation in dormitories and medical service provision.
- Concurrence of employers requests by the Committee with the *Moscow City Office for Population Employment* and requests send to agencies for labour and employment of respective republics where requested workers are selected for limited times specified with a particular employer.
- Mandatory health examination in republican medical institutions for migrant workers;
- Notification of employers on the availability

of workers in sending countries; employer's visit to the respective republic for a check of conformity of the selected workers with the requirements set forth in request to the employer's submission;

- Transfer of workers to Moscow to be accompanied by representatives of employer's

and republican agency for labour and employment; accommodation of newcomers in employer's dormitory or in administrative municipality of *The Moscow Single Migration Window* (MSMW). Officers of MSMW execute registration of migrants and then process work permits for them.¹⁵⁹

3: Legal Framework of Migration to Russia/Moscow: Laws and Resolutions on Migration

The structure of relations in terms of migration between the RF and Georgia, and the RF and the Republic of Armenia are governed by the RF Federal law # 115-FZ 'On the legal status of foreign citizens' of July 25, 2002. This law defines the legal status of foreign citizens in the RF and regulates relations between both, foreign citizens and bodies of state power, local authorities that arise due to the stay (residence) of foreign citizens in the RF and with the performance of labour, business or other activities by foreign citizens on the territory of the RF.

In January 2007, a new federal law # 110-ФЗ 'On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation' (issued on July 18, 2006) took effect. This law included all issues related to the registration of foreign citizens that previously had been governed by provisions of the 'Federal Law on the Legal Status'. In addition, from January 15, 2007, amendments to the law 'On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the RF' took effect. These amendments are aimed at the simplification of rules regulating foreigners' stay and work in Russia. Thus one may assert that from January 15, 2007, the new migration laws are effective in Russia. Modifications in the new migration laws lie in the fact that for all foreign citizens arriving to Russia registration only by place of stay – which may be accommodation or other premises, like institutions or organizations – has been introduced instead of a registration by place of stay only in accommodations. Besides that, registration which previously had been permitted only by authorities became possible through a notification procedure. For citizens who had arrived without visa, work permits were issued with no quota limitations under the previous laws. Pursuant to the new laws

any work permit is to be issued within the quota limit. Pursuant to the previous law work permits were executed by employers. Pursuant to the new law an employee applies for his or her work permit. Also, according to new laws employers must not obtain a permit to employ foreigners. Pursuant to the old law, persons who arrived for a temporary stay or temporary residence in the RF territory were allowed to work only in the respective part of the RF for which the work or residence permits were issued. The new law takes peculiarities of regional economic relations into account and provides for the possibility of these rules to be modified. If before persons temporarily residing in the RF were not required to have work permits then now this requirement is mandatory.

The procedure of foreign labour quota definition has also changed. If previously the need for migrant labour was determined and established for a year in advance, and changes in the quota in the course of the year were not envisaged, then the new laws allow a more flexible solution. If an employer feels the necessity to attract additional labour and beyond the quota previously declared, or new employers demand migrant labour the quotas might increase.

In 2007, measures taken against employers for violations of migration laws, i.e. for attracting undocumented migrants became more vigorous. If earlier employers were fined for the recruiting of migrant labour force and penalties comprised 2,000 to 3,000 RUB (ca. 43.74 to 65.58 EUR), irrespective of the number of migrant workers hired; then today responsibility is envisaged, firstly, not for recruiting, but for employing undocumented workers and, secondly, the maximum fine for hiring undocumented workers rose up to 800,000 RUB (ca. 17,495 EUR).

One more novelty introduced in 2007-2008 was the adoption of resolutions of the RF government # 683 'On defining the Allowable Percentage of Foreign Workers Employed by Economic Entities Performing Activity in the Retail Trade Sphere on the Territory of the Russian Federation' on November 15, 2006, and # 1003 'On Defining the Allowable Percentage of Foreign Workers Employed by Economic Entities Performing Activity in the Sphere of Retail Trade in the Field of Sports in the Russian Federation Territory' of December 29, 2007. These resolutions limited the possibility for trade activity only for those who have temporary or permanent residency. These resolutions do not cover persons who occupy senior management positions in economic entities.

On August 21, 2007, the *Moscow City Government* considered and adopted a new urban migration program for 2008-2010 (Moscow City Government Resolution # 711-III 'On Moscow City Migration Program for 2008-2010'). This program became an extension and correction of the migration policy previously regulated by the 'Moscow City Migration Policy for 2005-2007'. New provisions of the program were induced by the fact that the introduction of registrations by notification minimizes the rights of the RF constituent parts to regulate migration processes to Moscow and deprive them of the capability to control numbers of labour migrants, to obtain timely information on sectors of migrant employment, their accommodation conditions, and their health status. According to the conception of its developers the new program aims at the creation of a comprehensive system of providing the city with skilled labour resources, the maintenance of market balance, and the optimization of migration processes. The program contains some fundamentally new positions for the resolution of a number of migration problems. For instance, the metropolis proposes to create so-

called migration terminals, a Moscow exchange centre which will include representative offices of the Federal structures and will be *Moscow City Government's* authorized organization for foreign citizen employment in Moscow. For the issuance of documents foreign citizens need to get work permits. A foreign worker who needs to register as a migrant may apply for such registration in the migration terminal and, provided his or her application is duly accepted, use the terminal's address for registration. After that the migration terminal commences to bear responsibility for the invited foreign worker that it accepted.

The *Moscow City Department of Education* has approved and implements a program of foreign migrant children's integration into Moscow's educational environment and its cultural, linguistic, social and psychological conditions of the metropolis.¹⁶⁰ The framework entails a Russian language program for migrant children, who do not or poorly speak Russian in order to improve their level of socio-cultural adaptation to the Russian and the Moscow society.

At the same time the issue of social benefits for foreigners who work in Moscow is not resolved. Mechanisms of defining foreign labour force quota are not completely adjusted. So far it is being discussed how to trace migrants with serious diseases and what funds will provide their recovering and health. An analysis of the sanitary and epidemiological situation or health condition of the migrant labour force staying in Moscow indicates that up to 14% of these workers arrive in Moscow with virulent diseases: tuberculosis, syphilis, leprosy, hepatitis, HIV-AIDS. Pursuant the effective laws people infected with HIV-AIDS are subject to expulsion from Russia but no clear mechanisms for such a procedure are in place. The *Moscow City Government* prepared respective suggestions and submitted them for consideration.

4: Migration policies of Moscow City

As noted earlier in this paper, since 2005 migration policies for Moscow City were developed within the framework of the *Moscow City Migration*

Program for 2005-2007, approved by the 'Moscow City Government Resolution # 491-III' of June 2005.

As a result of the implementation of this program a system of interaction among Moscow City state power bodies is responsible for the regulation of foreign labour migration processes. This contributed to an increase of the percentage of legally recruited foreign workers employed in communal services in 2006 by 62%, in comparison to 2005.

However problems related to migration and migrants are far from being resolved and settled (cf. Yudina 2007). From January 15, 2007 the introduction of migrant's registration by notification procedures and more severe penalties for the violation of rules regulating the recruitment and employment of foreign labour force.¹⁶¹ In 2007, 578,390 persons from countries enjoying the right of entry without visa received work permits in Moscow. However, according to data provided by the *Federal Migration Service Directorate for Moscow City*, employers sent only 207,108 notifications on employment of foreign workers. Data on the employment of 371,282 foreign workers from countries enjoying the right of entry without visa are absent. This can be interpreted as the existence of a shadow labour market and the decrease of social protection.

The *Moscow City Migration Program for 2008-2010*, as approved on August 21, 2007 under # 711-III, has taken previous flaws and new conditions of migration processes into account. It is based on acts of laws and other statutory acts of the RF on migration issues. The program sets aims, tasks and principal directions of urban policy in the sphere of migrant labour, social protection and social insurance, education and their integration into the metropolis' social environment.

Thus, in order to promote employment of foreign citizens and the provision of civilized conditions for their stay in the capital, the creation of the *Moscow Single Migration Window* (MSMW) has been approved and a pilot MSMW project is tested in territories owned by 'Likhachev's automotive plant public joint-stock company'. Measures for the establishment of a 'Foreign guest's map automatic information system' (hereinafter referred to as FGM AIS) are being taken in order to supply information to the Moscow City executive power bodies' work.

Powers of the Moscow City *Moscow Centre of Labour Exchange* State Enterprise (hereinafter

referred to as MCLE SE) and the *Moscow City Office of Population Employment State Service* are being specified. MCLE SE is charged with the execution of accepting and distributing foreign citizens over MSMW offices, the issuance of documents for the registration by place of stay and the obtainment of work permits, organization of health examinations, and the dispatch of foreign citizens arrived within the framework of organized enrolment to jobs. The *Office of Population Employment Service* is charged with the assistance provided for foreign citizens arriving beyond organized recruitment confines and looking for employment. Measures aimed at organized recruitment of migrant workers are being taken. To achieve agreed efforts directed at the formation of organized recruitment systems and the dispatch of highly skilled foreign workers to jobs, a special inter-agency commission is being established, and interaction with sending countries is being performed.

An agreement with the *Russian Federal Migration Service Directorate for Moscow City* on the execution of inspecting documents issued by MCLE SE and required of foreign citizens to register the place of temporary stay and obtain work permits, including health examination, has been achieved.

The Moscow City Government policy in the sphere of labour may be characterized by its proposals on improving the RF migration laws. In the essence, the improvement consists of the fact that the determination of quota for foreign labour force has to be the matter of social partnership and be performed by regional trilateral commissions and on federal level by the Russian trilateral commission for social and labour relations regulation. According to the position of Moscow City this approach will enable to take into account interests of all participants of the market. Trade unions will control observance of the Russian workers' interests, while the *Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs* will control the interests of employers in migrant labour force, and executive authorities will control abidance by agreements and observance of the region's economic interests. Thus the RF government will approve annual quotas for the issuance of work permits to foreign citizens, including the distribution of quota by the RF regions in accordance with understandings included in

the general agreement with the *All-Russian Trade Union Associations* and the *All-Russian Associations of Employers*.

Yet it should be noted that experts in Russia are increasingly inclined to the abolition of quotas. Some have proposed to establish uniform procedures of recruitment and employment of foreign citizens who have arrived to the RF with or without visas from employers. These procedures require that employers attain permission to recruit and employ foreign workers. Further it has been proposed to issue documents that foreign workers need to get work permits. The *Moscow City Government* contemplates simultaneous submissions of medical certificates of the health status of foreign citizens with the applications for work permits; to introduce requirements of vocational training in order to control foreign worker's hiring private persons within limits of labour and civil agreements; to modify labour migrant registration procedures; to introduce effective law amendments that control the change of places of stay as a ground for the removal of registration.

Alongside with that it is proposed to:

- Make residential and non residential premises owners responsible for the improper use of these premises connected to foreign citizens' accommodation;
- Introduce administrative responsibility for:
- A violation of labour, labour protection and population employment laws in the process of worker recruitment and illegal employment;
- Illegal activity aimed at foreign worker employment in the RF territory;
- A violation of rules of maintenance and operation of residential premises not accepted for operation or recognized as unsuitable for residence as well as failure to make efforts aimed at an elimination of causes and conditions conducive to these premises' use for undocumented residence including foreign citizens' residence.

These measures counteract undocumented migration and resist undocumented employment of labour migrants.

The most important steps towards the enhancement of social protection are measures envisaged in the program for medical aid to arriving migrants (*Moscow City Department for Public Health Service*) and in the *Provisional administrative and residential town for repeated use Project*.¹⁶² These measures are aimed at the provision of fire and sanitary epidemiological safety and of conditions propitious for foreigners and migrants from other parts of Russia staying in Moscow.

One of the program's tasks is the discovery of efficient methods of migrant adaptation and integration into Moscow's socio-cultural environment. Already existent programs of migrant children's adaptation are being advanced.¹⁶³ That includes educational, social psychological and cultural-linguistic programs, the development of educational books for the instruction and socio-cultural adaptation of migrants who speak Russian poorly. Furthermore the inter-regional competition 'Dialogue as a path to understanding' and other projects will be continued. The quality of education in educational institutions with ethnic-cultural components implementing general educational programs and having a great share of migrant students will be monitored. Extension of programs developed by the 'Ethno-sphere for social and cultural adaptation' within the *Centre for Migrants Working in Moscow*, the developments of new concepts, methods, programs in the sphere of migrants' socio-cultural and language adaptation are scheduled. Within the program's framework social assistance targeted to distressed migrants and to members of their families is envisaged. Volunteers are involved in the work with migrant families.

Duties of the program's principal customer-coordinator are vested with the *Moscow City Committee for Inter-regional Relations and National Policy*. The *Moscow Centre of Labour Exchange* has appointed the organization authorized by the *Moscow City Government* which provides for migrants' employment in Moscow the issuance of documents that migrants need to get work permits, as well as for the organization and technical support of the implementation of the program's measures in respect of labour migrants.

Within the framework of the *Moscow City Government's* resolution all urban departments, committees, and directorates that take part in the implementation of the program have developed

plans of their own. Results of these plans' implementations have not been analyzed so far and will be summarized in 2009.

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¹⁵² Cf. web site: http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10604.html?no_cache=1&cHash=10738bbe57. Last accessed 8th February 2009.

¹⁵³ Cf. web site: <http://www.levada.ru/press/2008082701.html>. Last accessed 8th February 2009.

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¹⁵⁵ Решение Совета глав государств СНГ ‘О согласованности миграционной политики государств участников СНГ’. ”КонсультантПлюс” [CIS state heads’ Council resolution ‘On concurrence of migration policies of CIS member states’, “ConsultantPlus”]

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Решение Совета глав государств СНГ *Конвенция о правовом статусе трудящихся-мигрантов и членов их семей государств-участников СНГ*. “КонсультантПлюс” [Resolution of the Council of heads of state - CIS members *Convention on legal status of labour migrant workers and members of their families*. “ConsultantPlus”]

¹⁵⁷ These include: safe labour conditions; equal remuneration for equal work including additional pays and reimbursements

for persons entitled to such additional pays; use of housing for payment; obtainment of school education, vocational training and re-training and advanced training; social welfare (social insurance) except retirement insurance in pursuant laws of the receiving party; mandatory social insurance for accidents at enterprises or professional disease; reimbursement of harm inflicted to life and health in result of accident at enterprise or professional disease; access to other paid labour activities in case of employment loss due to circumstances beyond control of a migrant worker (with limitations stipulated in Article 4 of the Convention taken into consideration).

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Постановление Правительства Москвы от 22.07.2008 № 592-ПП “О мерах по оптимизации привлечения иностранных работников на предприятия города Москвы” [Moscow city Government resolution # 592-ПП *On measures aimed at optimization of foreign workers drawing to enterprises of Moscow city*]; web site: <http://www.cao.mos.ru/document/2008/08/20/d9949/> (Last accessed 8th February 2009)

¹⁵⁹ *MSMW* is a State Department. Its tasks include information

on vacancies to labour migrants, as well as explanation of their rights, and assignment to a residence in administrative cities, supplied with sanitary and technical conditions. Opening of these cities was scheduled for September and October 2008.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. web site: http://www.educom.ru/ru/departments/news/news_detail.php?ID=5144 (Last accessed 8th February 2009)

¹⁶¹ Compare Federal Laws # 109-ФЗ ‘On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Citizens in the Russian Federation’ of July 18, 2006, # 110-ФЗ ‘On the Introduction of Modifications in the Federal Law’, ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation’, and on the recognition of individual provisions of the Federal Law ‘On the Introduction of Modifications and Amendments into Some Acts of the Russian Federation Laws Invalidation’.

¹⁶² In Russian: Временный административно-бытовой городок повторного применения (ВАГ)

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Tessa Savvidis

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List of Abbreviations	
AMD	Armenian Dram (currency)
ASA	Armenian Sociological Association
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
DFID	Department of International Development of the UK
DMR	(State) Department for Migration and Refugees
EC	European Commission
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
FDP(s)	Forcibly Displaced Person(s)
EUROSTAT	Statistical Office of the European Union
FGM AIS	Foreign guest’s map automatic information system
FMS	Federal Migration Service (of the Russian Federation)
FSB	Federal Security Service (of the Russian Federation)
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GCIM	UN Global Commission on International Migration
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEL	Georgian Lari (currency)
Goskomstat	State Committee for Statistics (USSR)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MCLE SE	Moscow Centre of Labor Exchange State Enterprise
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Foreign Office)
MIA	Ministry of Internal Affairs (Home Office)
MNS	Ministry of National Security
MSMW	The Moscow Single Migration Window
NBG	National Bank of Georgia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIS	New Independent States
NSSRA	National Statistics Service of the Republic of Armenia
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RA	Republic of Armenia
RF	Russian Federation
RSFSR	Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic
RUB	Russian rouble (currency)
SDS	State Department of Statistics (Georgia)
SMP	State Migration Policy
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	United States Dollar

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